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1 Introduction 
With the rise of new technologies in informatics, biotechnology and 
telecommunications, a great number of new high-tech ventures has been founded 
in Germany since the mid 1990s. The absolute number of newly founded 
ventures has increased during that time and since then (e.g. Bundesministerium 
für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, 2003a).1 The internet revolution has led to the internet 
hype or bubble. Many new business models were created and numerous new 
ventures in that field emerged literally over night. This development was fostered 
by the formation of a venture capital industry in Germany and the creation of 
‘Neuer Markt’ in March 1997, the German stock market equivalent of the 
NASDAQ. Society even named these new ventures, their activities and their 
market the ‘New Economy’. This was nicely put by Hjorth who wrote “the 
western economies eagerly unite in a description of the millennium days as the 
dawn of ‘The New economy’” (Hjorth et al., 2003: 96). Altogether, the 
entrepreneurship wave was perfect. It was suddenly ‘cool’ to be an entrepreneur 
and the newly founded ventures attracted an immense publicity. Business plan 
competitions were institutionalised, TV series covered new ventures and their 
founders. And universities reacted by offering classes in entrepreneurship. 
Everyone was thrilled by the suddenly emerging entrepreneurial spirit.  
One striking aspect about the Internet hype and the entrepreneurship wave was 
the high percentage of new ventures which were founded by a team (cf. Bronner 
& Mellewigt, 2000; Kamm et al., 1990; Gartner et al., 1994). It was the time of 
the ‘new economy boy groups’, i.e. former management consultants who formed 
a team and started a B2C or B2B venture. They represented a new breed of 
entrepreneurs, i.e. highly educated and exposed to a dynamic professional 
environment (Hellmann & Fiedler, 2001). Some of the new entrepreneurs were 
elevated by television and press to a status of ‘pop icons’. One only needs to 
think of Loretta Würtemberger, Stefan Schambach or the three Samwer brothers.2  
 
Economically and politically, the entrepreneurship wave was most welcome and 
supported as far as possible. New ventures are valuable to society and aid 
                                              
1 For detailed analyses on the level of entrepreneurial activities for various countries, see the 
GEM (General Entrepreneurship Monitor) reports at www.gemconsortium.org. And for data 
on the German entrepreneurship development, see especially ZEW (Zentrum für europäische 
Wirtschaftsforschung) at www.zew.de. 
2 These three are co-founders of Webmiles AG, Intershop AG and alando.de AG 
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economic development as they create jobs and foster innovations and creativity 
(Audretsch, 2002; Haid & Weigand, 2001). An anonymous writer of the OECD 
wrote “Entrepreneurship is central to the functioning of market economies. 
Entrepreneurs are agents of change and growth in a market economy” (OECD, 
1998: 11). The former German Federal Minister of Economics, Werner Müller, 
stated that “an economic policy that aims at enhancing growth and employment 
has to maintain an European viewpoint. (...) We need a climate that triggers 
innovation in all of Europe and that encourages the development of an 
entrepreneurial spirit” (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, 2001: 
translated by author). Just lately, the European Union has passed a green paper 
on the state of the art of entrepreneurship in Europe in January 2003 
(Kommission der Eurpäischen Gemeinschaften, 2003). They attested that there 
has been a shift in the structure of businesses in the economy over the last 
decades. The 1960s and 1970s were dominated by large corporations. However, 
due to restructuring, outsourcing and consolidation efforts, these corporations 
became less and smaller. At the same time, the number of company owners has 
risen from 29 to 45 million in all OECD countries between 1972 and 1998 
(Kommission der Eurpäischen Gemeinschaften, 2003). Thus, from an economic 
standpoint, it is healthy to have many new ventures founded. Entrepreneurship 
fosters a positive economic development.  
Although many new ventures were founded, a high percentage of them failed 
(ZEW, 2002). Dandridge put it that “small firms and growing firms have less 
tolerance for inefficiency than do established large firms” (1979: 57). However, 
as expectations and publicity on these new ventures were high, the failures 
attracted a lot of attention, too. As quickly as the entrepreneurship wave has 
rolled over Germany, nearly as quickly has it died again. The best example is the 
closure of ‘Neuer Markt’ stock exchange on the 5th June 2003.  
 
If new ventures are of such economic importance, they cannot be neglected or 
even ignored by academia. In order to keep the entrepreneurship wave and foster 
entrepreneurial spirit, we need to research it. Entrepreneurship has been a 
research topic in the United States since the seventies. In Germany it did not 
really start until the mid eighties or even later. Thus entrepreneurship is a rather 
young discipline and quite fragmented as well. The main research fields cover 
finance & venture capital, the psychology of the individual, female 
entrepreneurship and opportunity recognition (e.g. Hjorth et al., 2003; Sexton & 
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Landström, 2000). But if we want to better understand entrepreneurship as a 
whole and if we want to be able to work against the relatively high failure rates 
of new ventures in their early years, we have to take organisational aspects into 
consideration and research them more.  
“Yet a new venture’s capacity to recruit the appropriate people and 
build an effective organization around them arguably has a much if 
not more to do with ultimate success.” (Burton, 2001: 13-14). 
 
New ventures have not until recently attracted any substantial interest from 
organisational theorists (Brytting, 1991; Bouwen & Steyaert, 1990b). The 
purpose of this study is therefore to shed light on organisational aspects in new 
ventures and to further develop our understanding and knowledge in organising 
processes in new ventures. It seems especially interesting to focus on ventures 
that have been founded by a team as they make up a large percentage of the new 
ventures.  
 
To gain such new knowledge, this study has been designed as follows:  
In chapter two, entrepreneurship as an emerging research field is being 
introduced. Although entrepreneurship has been mentioned and discussed in 
mainly economic literature already for the last 300 years, not until the last thirty 
years had it been a discipline within the management sciences. The research foci 
have shifted from the entrepreneur over opportunity recognition to finance issues. 
This development can also be traced in different entrepreneurship definitions. 
One prominent sub theme in entrepreneurship research are entrepreneurial teams. 
This will be especially looked at as it resembles one focus of the study. As new 
ventures face many problems which stem from organisational aspects, an 
overview of studies which exist in the intersection between entrepreneurship and 
organisation theory will be given. However, the lack of organising concepts leads 
to an overview of organisation theory in chapter three. That chapter explores to 
what extent organisation theory can be used to explain early developments in 
young organisations. The emphasis will be on developing a dynamic approach to 
organisations and to define aspects which need to be reflected upon before 
transferring them to entrepreneurship theory. Especially Weick’s theory of 
organising will be introduced. As entrepreneurship is legitimated through the 
emergence of new ventures, chapter four presents creation processes of and 
within organisations. This approach aims at filling the gap in organisation theory.  
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The gaps and inconsistencies that have been worked out in the theoretical fields 
are formulated in the research questions presented in chapter five. This will be 
followed by the methodology and the research design appropriate for the 
empirical study. The latter is then explored in chapter six. On the basis of four 
conducted case studies, the creation, evolution and development of these new 
ventures will be analysed over a period of their first three years. The attention 
within this section will be on their organising processes. Chapter seven discusses 
the case studies findings with the extant literature from entrepreneurship and 
organisation theory. Four organising principles are created in which the main 
findings are summarised and elaborated on. The last chapter will summarise the 
meta findings, draw conclusions and illustrate the implications for new venture 
founders and policy makers alike.  
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2 Entrepreneurship 
In this chapter entrepreneurship as an emerging research field is introduced. 
Although the entrepreneur and his tasks have been discussed in research for the 
last 300 years, the subject has recently attracted considerable attention. As 
organising in new ventures is the main focus of this study, emphasis on this 
chapter will be on organisational aspects within in entrepreneurship research.  
 
2.1 Developing the research field – what is entrepreneurship?  
Entrepreneurship is still a rather vague and imprecise term within the social 
sciences with no established definition (e.g. Gartner et al., 1994; Bruyat & Julien, 
2000). Hardly any definition manages to cover entrepreneurship and at the same 
time characterises the entrepreneur as well. This is due to the variety of 
entrepreneurial tasks and the scope of the subject of entrepreneurship (Jennings, 
1994: 10).3 This section briefly introduces historical studies of entrepreneurship. 
The entrepreneur’s roles as described in research as well as his tasks are used to 
derive at an entrepreneurship definition.   
 
As a matter of principle there is no entrepreneurship without an entrepreneur. 
From a mere linguistical point of view, the historic provenience of the subject 
stems from the French word ‘entreprendre’ (Bretz, 1988: 26), an entrepreneur 
being someone who organised and managed military and adventure expeditions 
(Jennings, 1994: 11).4  
 
2.1.1 Roles of entrepreneurs in the last 300 years 
Already at the beginning of the 18th century, economic studies and theories 
conceptualised the phenomenon of entrepreneurship, focusing especially on the 
entrepreneur’s roles. The different foci of those studies can be outlined in three 
categories (Bretz, 1988: 33-38):5 the entrepreneur as risk taker, the entrepreneur 
as combinator or coordinator and the entrepreneur as innovator.  
                                              
3 Closely related to that is the discussion whether entrepreneurship is a research subject of its 
own. Cf. the discussion in Academy of Management Review 25 (1) (Shane & Venkatarana, 
2000) as well as the comments in issue 26 (1) (Zahra & Dess, 2001; Singh, 2001; Erikson, 
2001; Shane & Venkataraman, 2001). 
4 On the origins and history of the word in the German language see (Fallgatter, 2001) 
5 For a comprehensive discussion of the historic development of the term entrepreneur, see Bretz 
(1988: Ch. 2.1.). 
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The notion of the entrepreneur as risk taker goes back to Richard Cantillon 
(1680-1734)6. The entrepreneur yields speculation profits. He buys for fixed 
prices, but does not know the sales prices he will achieve and thus cannot 
estimate his profits.7 Crucial is the notion of risk which the entrepreneur is 
constantly taking. This is also pointed out by Frederick Hawley (1843-1929)  in 
his book ‘Capital and Population’ (1882/1972). The entrepreneur constantly takes 
insecure decisions as to which product or service to manufacture and offer. The 
profit is the remuneration for the liability and risk he is taking.  
 
Jean-Babtiste Say (1767-1832) described the entrepreneur as coordinator or 
broker in his “Treatise on political economy’ (1869/2001).8 The entrepreneur is 
the link between the scientist who develops theories and the worker who does the 
work. The entrepreneur pools the different resources and production factors. He 
has to estimate the demand and tries to meet it. He serves the important function 
of linking different sectors (agriculture, production, trade) with various actors 
(land owner and capitalists, technicians and workers, producers and consumers) 
(Koolman, 1994). Adam Smith (1723-1790)9 also regards the entrepreneur as 
coordinator. He sees the ‘undertaker’ as capitalist and capital operator, where the 
invisible hand of the market plays the organising role.  
 
In his ‘History of Economic Analysis’ (1912), Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) 
introduces the entrepreneur as enforcer of new combinations. He argued that 
entrepreneurship originates from innovations. For him the economic system is in 
equilibrium and the entrepreneur tends to break that equilibrium by introducing 
innovations. His concept of economic development is based on five innovation 
possibilities: (1) creation of a new good or a good of new quality, (2) application 
of new production techniques, (3) detection of a new market, (4) exploitation of 
new resources as well as (5) implementation of a re-organisation of market 
                                              
6 In his ‚Essay on the Nature of Commerce’ published in 1730, Cantillon discerned financially 
independent land owners; entrepreneurs, conducting marketing transactions on their own risk 
in order to yield profits; and employees who avoid making decisions in order to secure their 
income stipulated in contracts. 
7 According to this definition, larcenists and mendicants also fall in the category of 
entrepreneurs. 
8 Already in 1766, Turgot distinguished between an entrepreneur and a capitalist. In literature, 
however, the work of J.-B. Say prevailed (cf. Bruyat et al., 2000: FN 1). 
9 Smith’s most renowned work ‘The Wealth of Nations’ was published 1937 in New York. 
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relations. These combinations should not be based on incremental improvements, 
but they should radically breach with the past. This is the first time when the 
entrepreneur is referred to as innovator. The entrepreneur starts and shifts 
business-cycles that characterise the economy on the macro-level. Schumpeter 
called the process ‘creative destruction’.  
 
Despite an entrepreneur being a risk taker, a coordinator, an enforcer of new 
combinations and an innovator, the entrepreneur is seen today to fulfil more roles 
and tasks. The modern view of an entrepreneur will be depicted in the next 
section. Nevertheless, these old definitions are important as they are still the base 
of today’s research. 
 
2.1.2 Who is an entrepreneur and what are his tasks? 
What does the newly opened bakery shop around the corner have in common with 
Stefan Schambach or Lothar Späth? Depending on the definition, all of them are 
entrepreneurs. But the tasks of an entrepreneur are manifold. However, to give an 
overview, several definitions of entrepreneurship will be presented and will shed 
light on the various functions, e.g. founding the company, owning the company, 
bringing innovations to market, recognising opportunities, combining resources 
and expanding the company. In the following, each of these tasks will be 
underlined by definitions that all together emphasise the variety of the subject.10 
Single aspects often refer to separate research fields within entrepreneurship.  
 
One of the first definition which comes to ones mind, is that an entrepreneur is 
somebody who has founded one or several companies. Dyer (1992) calls the 
founding of new companies the essence of entrepreneurial activity. The 
entrepreneur is the one who had the idea, realised it and organised and managed 
resources such as employees, investors, production lines and facilities. 
“Entrepreneurship is the creation of organizations. What differentiates 
entrepreneurs from non-entrepreneurs is that entrepreneurs create 
organizations, while non-entrepreneurs do not.“ (Gartner, 1988: 11) 
 
At first sight this seems plausible, however it disregards those entrepreneurs, who 
e.g. bought an existing company, re-designed it and managed it successfully 
                                              
10 For a detailed literature overview on the definitions of an entrepreneur see Gartner (1988). 
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(Stevenson, 1999). Many people in Germany would probably deem Lothar Späth 
an entrepreneur, although he was not the founder of Jenoptik AG. On the other 
hand, would we call a scientist an entrepreneur, who in fact founded a company, 
but never managed it and only holds a seat in the scientific board?  
 
Thus, one could make the attempt to define an entrepreneur as a person who is the 
proprietor/owner of a company.  
“... an entrepreneur is defined as a major owner […] of a business 
venture not employed elsewhere.” (Brockhaus, 1980: 510) 
This definition might be true for Stefan Schambach, Loretta Würtemberger and 
Peter Heinrich.11 But would we also refer to the little kiosk owner around the 
corner or the third bakery owner in our street as an entrepreneur only because 
they own their shops? If the argument of ownership is held consequently, risk 
capital investors are also entrepreneurs as they often hold between 20 and 70 
percent of the shares of new ventures. How many shares in a company do I need 
in order to be called an entrepreneur?  
 
Some classifications are easier, when the innovation aspect is added. According 
to such definitions, an entrepreneur is someone who realised one of Schumpeter’s 
five opportunities to enforce new combinations.  
“Creating and building something new and more effective rather than 
just the continuation of something which already exists.“ (Timmons et 
al., 1977: 4) 
Accordingly, the founder of a new company, whose business idea is based on new 
patents or other innovations, is an entrepreneur. This simplifies the differentiation 
between Stefan Schambach and the little bakery around the corner.12 But are 
entrepreneurs always innovative according to Schumpeter’s criteria? What about 
a successful imitation instead of innovation? Was the founder of MLP, Manfred 
Lautenschläger, not an entrepreneur? An innovation is defined as the destruction 
of competencies where available know-how is mainly useless. Imitation on the 
other hand means competency enlargement and is based on existing know-how 
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986). For both aspects it is important that they are 
                                              
11 These are co-founders of Intershop AG, Webmiles AG and MediGene GmbH.  
12 Unless the baker would produce red, green and yellow rolls which are not available on the 
market yet and which present a real innovation. 
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transferred and brought to market and used economically (Stevenson & Gumpert, 
1985: 88).  
 
This leads to opportunity recognition as an additional factor for identifying a 
‘real’ entrepreneur. In order to successfully found a company, the attention does 
not have to focus on innovation or imitation. In fact, it is a matter of successfully 
recognising and exploiting opportunities.  
“How opportunities, to bring into existence ‘future’ goods and 
services are discovered, created and exploited, by whom, and with 
what consequences.” (Venkataraman, 1997: 120)  
 
And a true opportunity should lead to positive turnover and profit. Thus an 
entrepreneur could be the third baker in the street if he is making a huge profit, 
opens up new stores and later becomes the biggest baker or bakery trade chain in 
the country, e.g. Kamps AG. Unlike others, Heiner Kamps recognised and 
realised opportunities in the market. Opportunities can be defined as “a perceived 
future situation with a positive outcome.“ (Karlson & Junehed, 2000: 13) or as 
Stevenson and Jarillo put it, “a future situation that is deemed desirable and 
feasible” (1991: 194). 
 
Several high-tech start-up companies embrace the perception of opportunities and 
the consequent or systematic screening of the market. In biotech industry, e.g. 
LION bioscience AG, systematically searches for the identification of new 
targets. Actually, they do not proceed to develop the active substances/drugs but 
rather sell the targets to pharmaceutical development companies. Thus their 
business is the recognition, identification and exploitation of opportunities. 
 
Recognition and exploitation of opportunities is often linked to the utilisation of 
resources. However, especially start-up companies frequently can be 
characterised by following opportunities without having resources at their 
disposal.  
“Entrepreneurship is the process by which individuals – either on their 
own or inside organizations – pursue opportunities without regards to 
the resources they currently control.“ (Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990: 23) 
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“Entrepreneurship is defined as taking advantage of opportunity by 
novel combination of resources, in ways that have impact on a 
market.” (Wiklund, 1998: 13) 
 
In the majority of cases, a start-up company owns an important resource like a 
patent or has market access. In a second step, it tries to secure lacking resources, 
often by exploiting resources of third parties (Stevenson et al., 1991). This 
definition of entrepreneurship combines recognition and exploitation 
independently from resource equipment. According to the study of Hart et al. 
(1995), the definition should be narrowed down to the pursuit of opportunities 
independent from alienable resources. Many high-tech companies founded during 
the so-called Internet hype in 1999/2000 can be subsumed under this definition.  
 
Every paragraph above added one more aspect to the definition of an 
entrepreneur. All the aspects are used in the Academy of Management’s 
definition of entrepreneurship. Since 1998, the Academy has its own 
Entrepreneurship Division which relates to entrepreneurship as: 
“The Entrepreneurship Division's domain is the creation and 
management of new businesses, small businesses and family firms, as 
well as the characteristics and special problems of entrepreneurs. The 
Division's major topic areas include:  
• New venture ideas and strategies,  
• Ecological influences on venture creation and demise,  
• The acquisition and management of venture capital and venture 
teams,  
• Self-employment,  
• The owner-manager,  
• Management succession,  
• Corporate venturing, and the  
• Relationship between entrepreneurship and economic 
development.” (Academy of Management, 2003) 
 
So far, the entrepreneur and entrepreneurship have been defined in many ways 
and opened up a large research field. This view is so broad that it is overlapping 
with a number of related research areas. The following chapter therefore tries to 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP   11 
 
 
depict overlaps with adjacent research fields and to demarcate and narrow down 
the field.  
 
2.1.3 Entrepreneurship in contrast to SME Management and Corporate 
Entrepreneurship 
There are two large adjacent research fields which have common boundaries and 
intersections with entrepreneurship. These are SME (small and medium sized 
enterprises) and corporate entrepreneurship, with intrapreneurship sometimes 
being used as a synonym (Hjorth, 2001).  
 
The differentiation between small business owners and entrepreneurs13 is similar 
to that between the small business venture and the entrepreneurial venture. The 
latter aims at growth (Fallgatter, 2001). It is characteristic for the small business 
that its shares are mostly held by the manager, who is heading and organising the 
company. He is the omnipresent founder of the company and the company’s 
identity is clearly linked to him. In addition, family members are often employed 
working at the company, too. And for the founder, the company’s profits are the 
main source of income. The business idea as such has already been realised in 
many varieties before (Miller, 1983). The company is in most cases a handicraft 
or retail business. There are no medium-termed product life cycles which limit the 
growth potential. The small business does not have special innovations or 
marketing campaigns. This all contrasts the entrepreneurial company, which was 
founded because of a new product or resource combination. The company is 
stamped by innovations and novelty. Growth and high profits are the most 
important objectives for the company. Examples are technology-driven product 
companies or innovative service providers that are characterised by fast product 
life cycles (Carland et al., 1984). 
 
Contrary to entrepreneurship, corporate entrepreneurship or intrapreneurship 
refers to activities within existing or established companies (Zahra et al., 1999b; 
1999a; 1999c). Corporate entrepreneurship studies processes which companies 
use for the modernisation, expansion or new definition of business units.14 
                                              
13 The distinction in German research (Unternehmensgründer vs. Existenzgründer) was 
introduced by Szyperski and Nathusius (1977: 27). 
14 See zu Knyphausen-Aufseß (2002) for examples of intrapreneurship in large corporations. 
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According to Stevenson and Jarillo (1990) corporate entrepreneurship can be seen 
as a special way of management in large corporations.15 The aim is to transfer and 
apply entrepreneurial behaviour at large corporations (e.g. Burgelman, 1983, 
1994; Covin & Slevin, 1991; Stopford & Baden-Fuller, 1994). 
To point out intrapreneurship, Stevenson and Jarillo’s entrepreneurship definition  
stating that “Entrepreneurship is the process by which individuals – either on 
their own or inside organizations – pursue opportunities without regards to the 
resources they currently control“ (1990: 23) could also start with 
intrapreneurship instead of entrepreneurship. This shows that an intrapreneur 
takes on similar roles and functions as an entrepreneur. Only he is not founder of 
a start-up company but employee of an existing, already established company. 
Often he is the promoter of an innovation within a company (Pinchot, 1985). 
 
Recapitulating, entrepreneurship as a research field was introduced with its 
notions covering the last 300 years followed by various definitions depicting the 
scope of the field. It becomes clear that there is no general definition of 
entrepreneur and entrepreneurship. To limit the study, SME as well as Corporate 
Entrepreneurship were defined but will not be dealt with in this study. Within 
these limits, entrepreneurship will be defined as the process where opportunities, 
independent of resource availabilities, are pursued and will result in a new 
company foundation with entrepreneurs as ‘organisation makers’. The latter 
expression can be interpreted almost literally. Entrepreneurs are constructing new 
organisational realities and are creating new communities of meaning in 
delineating and shaping the internal versus the external environment (Steyaert, 
1995).  
 
                                              
15 Brown et al. (2001) developed instruments to operationalise Stevenson’s entrepreneurial 
management style.  
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2.2 Entrepreneurship research in the last decades 
The entrepreneurship research field is a rather young discipline (Aldrich, 1999; 
Katz & Gartner, 1988). However, it has grown considerably over the last twenty 
years. Milestones in forming its boundaries and identity were:  
(1) the first MBA course on Management of New Enterprise which was taught 
at Harvard in 1947 (Hjorth et al., 2003),  
(2) the Journal of Small Business Management which started in 1963,  
(3) the first major academic conference on entrepreneurship at Purdue in fall 
1970 (Cooper et al., 1997b),  
(4) the Journal Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice which started in 1976, 
being called American Journal of Small Business in the beginning (Hjorth, 
2001), 
(5) the first Encyclopedia of Entrepreneurship edited by Kent, Sexton and 
Vesper in 1982 and  
(6) entrepreneurship becoming a full division of the Academy of Management 
in 1998.  
 
By now, entrepreneurship has become a respected discipline within the field of 
management. However, entrepreneurship research has developed differently at 
different countries. Entrepreneurship research in Germany is, compared to the 
United States, still in its infancy. It booms since the mid 1990s which is due to the 
internet hype and the emerging venture capital industry. But what are the main 
research streams within entrepreneurship regardless of countries’ specific 
developments? 
Several studies have discussed entrepreneurship research in terms of its 
development over the years (Busenitz et al., 2003), e.g. Low and McMillan 
(1994), Churchill (1992), Grégoire et al. (2001; 2002). They all come to the 
conclusion that a convergence of conversations can be seen in entrepreneurship 
research. The next paragraph depicts two studies in which Grégoire et al. (2001; 
2002) have come up with four major research fields.  
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2.2.1 Four major research fields within entrepreneurship  
Grégoire et al. (2001) analysed all 13,593 references cited in the 752 papers 
published in the Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research Proceedings between 
1981 and 1999. As a result, four converging axes were identified which attracted 
the attention of entrepreneurship researchers over time.  
 
These axes represent research on  
(1) Personal characteristics of the entrepreneur 
Psychology had a major influence on entrepreneurship becoming part of the 
social sciences (Hjorth et al., 2003). The main question attracting interest in this 
subfield is ‘Who is an entrepreneur’. The aim is to find out which characteristical 
traits and attributes discern an entrepreneur from other economic individuals and 
their behaviour (Gartner, 1985). This was probably started by McClelland (1961) 
referring to Weber in ‘The Achieving Society’ and Collins and Moore’s (1964) 
book ‘The Enterprising Man’ who put at the core of entrepreneurship the ‘desire 
for independence’ and identified certain Oedipal conflicts and neuroses of the 
entrepreneur as the causal variable. This was followed by Kets de Vries (1977) 
concentrating on the entrepreneurial personality and later Brockhaus (1980) who 
studied the locus of control of entrepreneurs. Cooper and Dunkelberg (1986) 
analysed how the entrepreneurs acquired their venture, e.g. by inheriting, 
purchasing or founding it and compared it with their background and personal 
characteristics. Many more psychological and sociological studies have been 
carried out (Stevenson et al., 1990), often in an experimental way tackling 
questions on success, the wish of responsibility, challenges, risk acceptance, 
autonomy, power awareness, innovation ability, training as well as work 
experience.16 However, either the results from these studies are not very 
significant or counter-studies show that entrepreneurs hardly differ from non-
entrepreneurs in the researched characteristics (Gartner, 1988). Studies searching 
for the typical entrepreneur by means of demographical data like age, gender or 
family status are not very informative either (Vaught & Hoy, 1981), because this 
would imply that only ‘natural born entrepreneurs’ exist. This however, 
consequently excludes the possibility to become an entrepreneur and 
entrepreneurship education could be questioned, too. In addition, understanding 
the personality of an entrepreneur would neither be valuable since individual 
                                              
16 A detailed literature overview is abandoned. Exemplary, see Gartner (1988). 
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behaviour is not consistent over time nor can personality traits predict behaviour 
(Hyrsky, 1999). At large, this trait approach did not contribute to a common 
characterisation of the entrepreneur (Gartner, 1985: 697).  
 
(2) Factors affecting new venture performance  
The main question is “How can we measure new venture performance?” and the 
factors affecting the performance. These factors range from the founder, the 
entrepreneur or entrepreneurial team (e.g. Birley & Stockley, 2000; Ensley, 1999; 
Hambrick et al., 1996; Roure & Maidique, 1986) to strategy aspects and 
environmental factors (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Roure & Keeley, 
1990). Sandberg and Hofer (1987; 1987) were the first to combine these different 
factors. They showed that industry structure and the venture’s strategy constitute 
more important influence on new venture performance than the entrepreneur’s 
behavioural characteristics. The problem with these studies is that market 
acceptance is easily treated as something that happens or not. Markets are treated 
as something which exists but which is not actively created. Industry conditions 
are often regarded as universally homogeneous and similar to all firms. Such 
assumptions oversimplify and do not reflect the reality of new firms very well 
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). 
Another research stream in this category deals with new ventures’ sets of 
resources and capabilities, being based on the resource-based perspective 
(Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). Often this view has been 
combined with different stages of growth models (e.g. Churchill & Lewis, 1983) 
or their transitions (e.g. Arbaugh & Camp, 2000).  
 
(3) Venture capitalist’s practices and their impact on entrepreneurship  
A large number of studies concerns venture capitalists’ roles and practices. The 
early seminal work by MacMillan et al. (1985) deals with the exploration of VC’s 
decision criteria. From there, three different directions can be noted. Tyebjee and 
Buno’s (1984) model of VCs’ investment process, Gorman and Sahlman’s (1989) 
description of VC’s activities and finally Gompers and Lerner’s (1999) 
examination of the form and function of venture capital funds. The last direction 
was pushed by Sapienza’s (1992) study of VCs’ involvement in funded venture. 
Manigart and Sapienza (2000) provide a useful overview of the field’s 
development, concluding that selection, monitoring, advising and value-adding 
notions have mainly be studied from a conventional agency perspective. They 
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suggest to merge these research lines with strategic management theory to gain 
better insights. A link to new venture performance studies can be seen in 
Sandberg and Hofer’s (1987) study in their use of VC’s decision criteria as 
predictors of new venture performance.  
 
(4) The influence of (social) networks  
The fourth research line within Grégoire’s study involves network aspects. This 
area is mostly based on Aldrich and Zimmer’s (1986) as well as on Birley’s 
(1985) articles. The networking approach does not so much focus on networks 
and coalitions as in a management perspective but on expanding the action frame 
of the venturing process (Johannisson, 2000). Because of the liability of size and 
newness (Stinchcombe, 1965), prospective entrepreneurs have to mobilize ‘social 
resources’ (Starr & MacMillan, 1990) to having additional resources controlled 
by ownership. They need active networking capabilities to reach maturity and 
opportunities to grow. The personal network of an entrepreneur provides him 
with a universal resource kit. Enforcing identity and building general support 
generates cultural and emotional capital. Apart from providing information about 
and access to supplementary physical and financial resources, the personal 
network contains human and social capital (Johannisson, 2000). Johannisson 
distinguishes between general personal networks as the origin of business 
ventures and entrepreneurial networking and venture performance in networking 
research concerning entrepreneurship, which reflect different subfields in this 
research area.  
 
Grégoire et al. (2001) analysed the described axes of convergence over time and 
how they had evolved. They identified four time periods.  
1981-1985: The characteristics of entrepreneurs as a defining theme 
1986-1990: Parallel conversations exhibiting little convergence 
1991-1995: Structuring the field around a strategic perspective 
1996-1999: Entering the resource-based perspective 
 
Having analysed entrepreneurship research developments and methods used in 
mainstream management journals, entrepreneurship can be said to be focused on 
performance as the main variable with studies conducted at the firm level. 
Archival data used for regression-based analysis are predominantly used 
(Grégoire et al., 2002). Especially the dearth of (qualitative) research methods is 
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critical as thus important aspects of entrepreneurship will not be analysed and 
researched. As an outlook, Churchill (1992) claimed future research should deal 
with research methodologies, corporate venturing, venture and risk capital, high 
tech entrepreneurship and the process of entrepreneurship. However, the strive to 
become a discipline has led to a number of theory-construction-articles in the 
journal of Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, especially during 1992 and 
1993.  
 
2.2.2 Entrepreneurial teams 
In the following, the subfield of entrepreneurial teams will be outlined in more 
detail as it directly refers to the title of this study. According to Kimberly (1979) 
and Sing et al. (1986), new venture managers are disproportionately more 
important to the success of their firms than are managers of existing firms 
because of the unique threats associated with trying to be simultaneously both 
new and different. Thus managerial choice in new ventures drives organisational 
performance most directly (Ensley et al., 2002; Eisenhardt et al., 1990). Since the 
mid 1980s, management and entrepreneurial teams have received increasing 
attraction (Keeley & Roure, 1993), especially, as many of the new ventures have 
been founded by a team instead of a single founder (Kamm et al., 1990). Bronner 
and Mellewigt (2000) came to the conclusion in their study that technology 
orientated new ventures in Germany are founded by a team in 50-60% of all 
cases. In the US, this percentage is slightly higher with 60-80%.  
The initial problem is that of its definition. As demonstrated in the figure below, 
Birley and Stockley (2000) have listed various definitions of the entrepreneurial 
team. The differences deal mostly with aspects of ownership, full and/or part-time 
managerial involvement or the position within the hierarchy. Figure 1 gives an 
idea about differences in components which make up the entrepreneurial team’s 
definition.  
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Figure 1: Components of various entrepreneurial team definitions 
the entrepreneurial team 
member... 
was involved 
in pre-start 
up activities
has co-
founded the 
business 
holds equity
works 
full/part time 
in the comp. 
has 
management 
involvement
Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven (1990) 
not 
necessarily 
not 
necessarily 
not 
necessarily 
yes yes 
Kamm et al. (1989, 
1993) 
yes yes yes 
not 
necessarily  
not 
necessarily 
Watson et al. (1995) 
not 
necessarily 
yes ? yes probably 
Source: by author, based on Birley and Stockley (2000: 289)   
 
The problem is not only that of the definition but that many studies speak of top 
management teams. Although the management team is not always congruent with 
the entrepreneurial team, these two concepts can be easily transferred. For this 
study, entrepreneurial teams will be defined as consisting of members involved in 
founding the business and having an equity stake in the new venture. 
  
The research on entrepreneurial and top management teams is mainly focused on 
the relation of various factors to the venture’s performance, growth or success in 
general. It is assumed that the team’s characteristics have an impact on the 
venture’s development (Gartner et al., 1992a). Its genuine importance is well 
demonstrated by the following quote: “The new firm depends upon the team to 
such an extent that investors often indicate that they emphasize the quality of the 
management team more than any other single factor as they make investment 
decisions” (Cooper & Daily, 1997a: 127). Thus the performance of the 
entrepreneurial team is seen as a key determinant of the venture’s success 
(Thakur, 1999; Cooper et al., 1994; Herron & Robinson, 1993). 
 
The behaviour of the entrepreneurial team is often explained by emphasising the 
importance of understanding demographic characteristics such as age, 
organisational tenure, functional background or education of the team members as 
well as the distributional properties of those variables. In most studies, 
demographic attributes are used as a surrogate for skills. This approach stems 
from the ‘upper-echelons’ paradigm by Hambrick and Mason (1984) which views 
organisational outcomes, e.g. strategies and performance, as a reflection of the 
values and cognitive bases of powerful actors in the organisation. The 
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characteristics and the functioning of the top management team have far greater 
potential for predicting organisational outcomes than do the characteristics of the 
CEO. The underlying premise is that personal experience, values and likely 
behaviours of entrepreneurs and managers can be inferred from observable 
individual characteristics.  
Team size is most often used as a control variable, however, the study by 
Hambirck and D’Aveni (1992) shows that firms nearing bankruptcy tended to 
have smaller teams than similar surviving firms. Conferring to high-technology 
firms, their team size was associated with growth as larger teams provide more 
capabilities (Cooper & Bruno, 1977; Eisenhardt et al., 1990). Roure and Maidique 
(1986) showed empirical support for links between the prior joint experience 
among top-management team members and venture success.  
The general hypothesis has been that heterogeneous (complementary) teams are 
more successful than homogeneous (additive) ones (e.g. Ensley & Amason, 1999; 
Bronner et al., 2000), especially when they are functionally complete (e.g. Roure 
et al., 1986; Gartner, 1985; Kamm et al., 1990). However, Ensley and Mason 
(1999) talk of a ‘double-edged sword’ regarding the heterogeneity discussion in 
entrepreneurial teams. Heterogeneous abilities, education and functional 
experience lead to more cognitive resources and more creative solutions 
compared to homogeneous teams. These differences in abilities and perspectives 
cause cognitive conflicts. If they are solved on a cognitive level, the quality of 
decisions will improve. On the other hand, heterogeneity causes frequent and 
difficult communication. This results in the inefficient use of information. And 
conflicts are dealt with on an affective rather than a cognitive level. Overall, 
heterogeneity can also have a negative impact on performance. Whether the 
heterogeneity will lead to positive or negative consequences is mainly due to 
contextual factors as the impact of the industry or environment. Especially in 
dynamic environments, heterogeneous teams are advantageous as they are more 
flexible and better adaptable (Eisenhardt, 1998; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; 
Bronner et al., 2000). The sort of integration that is necessary for this flexibility 
and efficiency is more likely to be a function of affective, interpersonal 
relationships than of formal, role-defined relationships (Katz & Kahn, 1966). 
 
According to Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990), team tenure is seen as an 
important factor of high performing new ventures. Cohesive teams tend to 
experience less turnover (O'Reilly et al., 1989). They seem to have certain 
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interactive advantages which allow them to perform better than less cohesive 
teams. Closely linked to the cohesiveness is the use of conflict. Teams that 
engage in functional, task-oriented conflict perform better than those in which 
conflict is dysfunctional and personally oriented (Schweiger et al., 1989; Amason, 
1996). These two types of conflict are also called cognitive and affective conflict. 
The first is defined as “task oriented and focused judgemental differences about 
how bets to achieve common objectives” (Amason, 1996: 127). The affective 
dimension is defined as “personally oriented disagreement focusing on 
interpersonal dislikes and disaffections” (Ensley et al., 2002: 369).  
Despite the question of cohesiveness, team dynamics as instability or turnover are 
common phenomena (Cooper et al., 1997a). Timmons (1994) reports that within 
the first five years, almost every new firm in the context of high-potential 
ventures had lost one founder.  
 
All together, research on entrepreneurial teams is very diversified and sometimes 
conflicting in its findings. For this study, only ventures which have been founded 
by a team will be looked at. The question will be to analyse the impact of the 
team on the organising processes and the role, single member played in it. To be 
able to analyse these organising process in more detail, the intersection of 
entrepreneurship and organisation studies will be looked at in more detail.  
 
2.3 Entrepreneurship and organisation studies  
The intersection of entrepreneurship and organisation studies seems to be a 
neglected one. Not only does any definition pay any attention to that topic nor do 
many studies exist. In consequence, our understanding of organising processes 
taking place in new ventures is still very scarce (Brytting, 1991; Bouwen & 
Steyaert, 1990a; Gartner et al., 1992a; Manstedten, 1997), even though the 
number and quality of publications in the entrepreneurship field has dramatically 
increased over the past years. In outlining future needs of the entrepreneurship 
field, Churchill (1992) highlighted research methodologies, corporate venturing, 
venture and risk capital, high tech entrepreneurship and the process of 
entrepreneurship. The organisational dimension was not considered to be a 
research theme. Respectively, organising is not a prominent topic in 
entrepreneurship research, still entrepreneurs struggle because of organisational 
problems. This is documented mainly in more practitioner-oriented publications 
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(e.g. Malmsten et al., 2001; Manstedten, 1997). Although the importance of 
organising processes for their performance is widely acknowledged, the topic is 
largely ignored in both entrepreneurship research and teaching. ‘The Portable 
MBA in Entrepreneurship’ (Bygrave, 1994) does not even devote one section to 
the organising of ventures, but the book claims to cover the complete range what 
leading business schools teach about entrepreneurship. Bouwen and Steyaert 
(1990b: 243) summarise similarly:  
“The organizational focus or logic principle is seen as one of the 
factors influencing entrepreneurship. In the present literature on 
entrepreneurship, the awareness of this organization perspective 
seems to be rather partial. Recent reviews of entrepreneurship do not 
mention the organizational dimension as a research topic or as an 
issue for future research.” 
Vice versa, small and young firms have not been studied in the field of 
organisational behaviour and organisational theory either. There is almost a 
black-out with regard to the creation of organisations. Most research in the 
organisational behaviour field has been oriented towards large firms. In 
consequence, Quinn and Cameron suggested that  
“it may be that organizations must go through the first three stages in 
the developmental model before many of our conventional theories are 
appropriate. This would seem to be a particularly reasonable 
observation when we recognize that most research has focused on 
mature organizations and most research has been cross-sectional in 
design” (1988: 37).  
A few, large organisations are still the source of our current knowledge in 
organisation theory, e.g. Roethlisberger’s (1937) study of the Hawthorne plant of 
Western Electric involved a company of 29,000 employees. Chester Barnard’s 
(1938) experience base was at New Jersey Bell. Alfred Sloan (1941) was at 
General Motors. Woodward dealt with companies employing a minimum of 100 
people and Frederick Taylor (1913) examined Bethlehem steel. 
More recently, Czarniawska-Joerges (1992: Ch. 1) argued that the need to study 
large organisations is still prominent as large organisations will be with us for a 
long time. When speaking of large, she treats ‘large’ and ‘complex’ 
synonymously, thus denying as such the complexity and variation of organising 
in smaller contexts and stating finally that we already know relatively much about 
small firms, thus allowing to concentrate more on large companies.  
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Often organisation theorists think of small firms as one homogeneous whole, 
while entrepreneurial scholars have stressed their heterogeneity. One illustration 
can be seen in the work of Mintzberg (1979b) who formulates five configurations 
for a theory of organisational structure. He distinguishes between the 
entrepreneurial (‘simple structure’) and the innovative configuration 
(‘adhocracy’) to describe the structural features of small, young and innovative 
firms. These two labels cannot be seen as being sufficient for describing the 
dynamics of the organising processes for such a heterogeneity of small firms and 
their structures. A second example can be found in the context of developmental 
models in which new ventures evolve into ‘grown-up’ firms. The underlying 
assumption seems often to be that new small firms are destined to grow into large 
organisations. Many of these models are characterised by a normative evolution 
towards a maturity phase (e.g. Greiner, 1972; Churchill et al., 1983) implying that 
those which do not reach the final stage remain premature. Dyer (1986) claims an 
evolution towards the stage of public ownership and professional management. 
However, this implies that others are deemed to be unprofessional.  
This shows how small firms are seen as one group in which becoming big and 
large is the measure of maturity and professionalism. It seems as if the 
understanding and theorising about entrepreneurial firms is sometimes more 
hindered when being approached from a large firm perspective.  
 
All this results in the need for more studies on the organisational dimension of 
entrepreneurship. From the viewpoint of entrepreneurship, this means that 
studying organising processes is a necessary theme for understanding 
entrepreneurship better. And the aim should not be to generate insights for 
organisation theory, i.e. large firms. Dandridge was one of the first to utter that 
claim when using the image that “children are not ‘little grown ups’” 
(Dandridge, 1979). d’Amboise and Muldowney (1988: 236) formulated a similar 
but more moderate argument:  
“It is clear that prescriptions for the management of small business 
are rooted in the corpus of general management theory; however, it is 
increasingly apparent that general management is not sufficiently 
specific when applied to small business. Small business management 
includes adequate number of distinguishing characteristics so that a 
subbody of constructs particular to it is necessary”.  
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From the point of organisation theory, this means that the study of entrepreneurial 
firms is important for understanding organising processes. This can be supported 
by Weick (1974a: 487) encouraging studies on “everyday events, places, and 
questions, micro-organizations, and absurd organizations” and not only large 
firms.  
 
New concepts for start-ups and small firms need to take into account their 
changing and highly dynamic reality and environment. A process view of reality 
and organising is proposed to suit better than static and equilibrium-focused 
models. Entrepreneurship applies particularly well to such a ‘flux’-context. A 
process view has lately been advocated in the entrepreneurship field (e.g. Bhave, 
1994; Gartner, 1985). One way to apply the process view is by using a process 
language. This aligns with Gartner’s idea that ‘words lead to deeds’ (1993). He 
argues that the words we use to talk about entrepreneurship influence our ability 
to think about the phenomenon and the subsequent research carried out. A second 
way to concretise a process view and to approach the idea of a dynamic process is 
by describing entrepreneurship in terms of dilemmas. The context of high tech 
companies which can be characterised by technological complexity, 
environmental dependency and economic uncertainty seems appropriate for a 
dilemmatic vocabulary and conceptualisation. Describing entrepreneurship in 
terms of dilemmas has been recently done by Jarillo (1989) concerning the use of 
external resources or by Dees and Starr (1992) regarding ethical issues faced by 
entrepreneurs. Although they stated important dilemmas entrepreneurs faced, 
little was said about the nature of dilemmas and their relationship to the 
entrepreneurial process. A third way to emphasise processes is by focusing on 
events in the stream of reality. Examples in entrepreneurship are studies by 
Bygrave (1989a; 1989b; 1993). Bygrave (1993) who considered the 
entrepreneurial event to be central in studying entrepreneurship. The 
entrepreneurial event involves the creation of a new organisation to pursue an 
opportunity. Entrepreneurial events occur within a larger context, a framework of 
events, circumstances, situations, settings and niches (Bird, 1989). Gersick (1994) 
found that a new venture was regulating its progress not only on the basis of 
temporal pacing by using milestones but through event-based triggers for action. 
Actions were initiated only when the right event had occurred.  
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In this study, entrepreneurship is seen as a consecution of events and interactions, 
short-lived appearances in Weikian terms, around which interpretations and 
actions are organised.  
 
One of the reasons for the lacking interest in organising studies in 
entrepreneurship might be that organising itself is not seen as a key to new 
economic activity, which is at the heart of entrepreneurship studies. Thus, our 
understanding of new venture organising is limited to few key topics, such as the 
emergence of the organisation (e.g. Aldrich, 1999; Carter et al., 1996; Katz et al., 
1988), and its reasons for growth and performance (cf. Wiklund, 1998). In the 
past decade, this situation has hardly changed (Hjorth et al., 2003). The few 
existing studies on young organisations can broadly be differentiated into those 
displaying static and those displaying dynamic views on the organisation, which 
is in parallel to organisation theory studies.  
 
2.3.1 Studies from a static, structural point of view 
New venture organising from a structural and static view tends to analyse the 
optimal fit between organisational structures and performance. In most studies the 
organisational structure is defined by dimensions such as specialisation, 
centralisation, formalisation and standardisation. These dimensions are mainly 
derived from the Aston Studies (Pugh et al., 1963; Pugh et al., 1968). In these 
studies, structures are regarded as the ‘visible skeletons’ around which 
coordination, decisions and responsibilities are organised (Meijaard et al., 2001: 
180).  
 
The study by Meijaard, Brand and Mosselman (2001) is one of the few analysing 
the relationship between organisational structure and performance in small and 
medium sized companies. The dimensions ‘work division’ and ‘coordination 
mechanisms’ are their starting point from which they run the analysis on data 
generated by a stratified sample of 1482 SMEs. A typology of nine organisational 
structures was derived through cluster analysis. They concluded that the 
relationship between structure and performance is complex. But this paper needs 
to be criticised in two aspects. First, the research design is based upon research on 
large firms. Rather than questioning SME’s which structure variables they regard 
as being relevant, traditional variables are taken for granted. Second, taking their 
results, small SMEs are depicted as structure-less. However, if one agrees that 
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task diversity and self coordination are structure variables, then the smallest firm 
cannot be considered as being unstructured. Dandridge supports this by asking 
whether “this means that 9 million firms are each uniquely indefinable, or simply 
that these firms do not fit the patterns we have learned from large complex 
systems?” (1979: 56). However, there is a wide-spread impression about small 
ventures being structure-less. Although Mintzberg calls it ‘Simple Structure’, he 
claims that “the Simple Structure is characterized, above all, by what it is not – 
elaborated. Typically, it has little or no technostructure, few support staffers, a 
loose division of labor, minimal differentiation among its units, and a small 
managerial hierarchy. Little of its behaviour is formalized, and makes minimal 
use of planning, training and the liaison devices. It is above all, organic. In a 
sense, Simple Structure is nonstructure” (1979b: 306). This is a good example 
how small firms and simple structures are typically perceived among organisation 
theorists (Brytting, 1991). 
 
Manstedten (1997) analysed the emergence and the further development of 
organisational structures as well as the organisational behaviour in a sample of 
young software companies. His starting point were traditional organisation 
theories about structure and processes and their development over time. The study 
resulted into a detailed stage model for new ventures. He argued that new 
ventures copy known structures and principles from traditional companies and 
that new organisational innovations can hardly be found. 
 
Ganz and Tombeil (2001) researched the growth of 18 German start-ups. They 
partly covered organisational aspects such as the development of structures. They 
stated that organisational structures need to be flexible and dynamic in order to 
allow for diversity and to leave space for identity and individuality. By using 
Eisenhardt’s and Browns’s patching concept (1999), Ganz and Tombeil applied 
traditional organisation concepts such as specialisation, coordination etc. (cf. 
Pugh et al., 1968) to describe the companies. Questions regarding the reason and 
the way certain patterns developed were not tackled. They concluded by stating 
that young and dynamic ventures have hybrid organisational models with a focus 
on a functional structure.  
 
Geeraerts (1984) examined the influence of the type of ownership on 
organisational structures in small firms. Grounding his study on the Aston’s 
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operationalisations (Pugh & Hickson, 1976), he found that no relation exists 
between size and structure in the group of business-owner managers . But a 
positive relation was found in the group of not-owner managers. And the larger 
the firms the more differentiated and formalised they were. However, he also 
pointed out that there status of the management influences other aspects of the 
structure as well. But he failed to name these influences. An explorative and 
qualitative study might be able to identify some of those influences.  
 
Van de Ven et al. (1984) stressed the role of organisation for the planning and 
initial development processes of new ventures. They compared 14 educational 
software companies from an entrepreneurial, an ecological and an organisational 
perspective. The latter mainly tested how well the companies had planned their 
foundation and followed the Program Planning Model developed by Van de Ven 
and others (Delbecq & Van de Ven, 1971; Van de Ven & Koenig, 1976). 
However, they admitted that “no business, however well conceived and planned, 
is likely to be free of organizational design problems” (Van de Ven et al., 1984: 
99). As the other studies presented in this chapter, the authors limit their analysis 
to the Aston Studies’ dimensions.  
 
Overall, there are several aspects to be criticised in these studies. First, they are 
typical examples of using known dimensions and results from studies regarding 
established companies and transferring them imprudently on new ventures. 
Rather than trying to derive at genuine entrepreneurial dimensions being suitable 
for small ventures, known concepts and dimensions from organisation theory are 
transferred. However, ‘children are not ‘little grown-ups’’ (Dandridge, 1979) and 
thus new ventures need to be analysed with different concepts and need to be look 
at with different eyes. Second, these studies are based on a positivistic perspective 
taking structures and rules for granted. The organisation is regarded separately 
from its members and (relational) processes are disregarded. Third, these studies 
regard the new ventures at one point in time. Developments over time had not 
been taken into consideration. But, especially new ventures change considerably 
in the beginning and internal and external changes are constantly occurring. Thus, 
there is a need for a dynamic examination of organisational aspects in new 
ventures. And a constructivist point of view would overcome the distinction 
between structures, processes and people.  
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In the next section, growth models will be discussed. They can be situated in 
between entrepreneurship and organisation theory studies as they try to link both 
and as they aim at a dynamic perspective.  
 
2.3.2 Growth models  
According to Shakespeare, every man proceeds through seven stages: infant, 
schoolboy, lover, soldier, justice, pantaloon and second childhood (Shakespeare, 
2000: Act II, Scene vii). This idea of different is often transferred to the 
development of organisations. As a result, a vast variety of growth models have 
emerged (e.g. Greiner, 1972; Galbraith, 1982; Quinn et al., 1988; Churchill et al., 
1983; Scott & Bruce, 1987; Kazanjian, 1988, and many more). There exist a 
variety of ways in which management theory depicts these. These models 
generalise the (early) life of firms. The difficulties is to sort them and set up a 
categorisation. The first step could be by using the concept of process logic and 
process dynamic.17 For the process logic, “the central focus […] is on 
progressions (i.e. the nature, sequence and order) of activities or events that an 
organisational entity undergoes as it changes over time” (Van de Ven, 1992: 172) 
whereas the process dynamic “explain[s] how and why a process unfolds over 
time” (Van de Ven, 1992: 174). Thus each model could be classified along the 
classes within the process logic and its dynamic. Taking Van de Ven’s 
categorisation, these models cover three of the four categories: life cycle process, 
dialectic process and evolution process theory.  
However, in the following, not Van de Ven’s categorisation will be applied, but a 
different one. Just a simple differentiation between life cycle models and stage 
models will be used. This is the result after having analysed several categorisation 
of which some are shown below.  
 
                                              
17 This concept is based primarily on Durkheim. See also Van de Ven (1988; 1992). For a 
concise overview, see zu Knyphausen-Aufseß (1995: 167-171). 
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Figure 2: Categorisation of growth models by various authors 
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Stage or life-cycles models discuss the entire life span of organisations, and thus 
also new venture organising. They provide a dynamic view on the development of 
organisational structures and processes (cf. discussion in Aldrich, 1999: 196-201). 
Usually, life-cycle models abstractly represent a cycle of emergence, growth, 
maturity, and decline, whereas stage models usually focus on the generic 
problems organisations encounter during growth. Firms are assumed to grow in 
distinct stages, each stage concluded by a set of typical problems and 
organisational responses. With each stage, the organisation would adopt to a 
specific configuration. Thus, these models largely share the configurational 
approach of e.g. Mintzberg (Wiklund, 1998: 29). The phases depicted in stage 
models are often similar. In the initial phase, an owner-manager might lead the 
firm informally. When a certain size is reached, a management crisis would 
occur, leading to the introduction of more structure and centralisation. The next 
crisis would occur when decision-making by the owner-manager became the 
bottleneck and more delegation was called for. This would eventually lead to the 
control crisis, asking for more coordination, and so forth (e.g. Greiner, 1972). 
Barry (1980) argued similarly by stating that during the venture’s maturity, the 
personality of the founder would no longer match the new organisational 
requirements and the founder/manager needs to be replaced. The new phases 
would demand more delegation, planning and informal relationships, as the 
organisation becomes more formal and structured. All of these models simplify a 
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vast amount of facts associated with change and reduce a complex process to a 
uniform, predictable and deterministic pattern. 
 
These stage or life-cycle models are on the one hand intuitively appealing as they 
directly address the issue of new venture growth and accurately point at the 
gradual nature of firm evolution. However, life-cycle models only conform to a 
uniform path of growth in a deterministic way (e.g. Fombrun & Wally, 1989). 
They assume that organisations pass through all the stages of the life cycle and 
that there would be an optimal configuration for each stage (cf. discussion in 
Wiklund, 1998). But, young ventures might simply experiment with new 
organising principles within the same stage, and these would not be accounted 
for. Life cycle models especially see the process as primarily dependent on the 
time factor. In other words, organisations follow the same time consistent pattern 
as they grow and decline (Hofer & Charan, 1994). The models mainly focus on 
the evolving of formal structures. They therefore neglect informal structures and 
processes. And they oversimplify the nature of the role of the entrepreneur or the 
entrepreneurial team. But the founders’ motivations, decisions and actions have a 
great impact on the growth process, but are hardly considered in these concepts 
(Achtenhagen & Moehle von Hoffmannswaldau, 2003). In addition, a number of 
these models share the problem of lacking empirical evidence (Gibb & Davies, 
1990).  
 
2.3.3 Dynamic views on entrepreneurial organising  
More dynamic views on organising and entrepreneurship look beyond the 
structural and configurational dimension and focus on organising as a process in 
new ventures. “Entrepreneurial behaviour is about exploring ‘how’ various 
activities undertaken by individuals emerge into organizations” (Gartner & 
Carter, 2003: 2).  
As a notable exception to the lack of studies in this area, Bouwen and Steyaert 
(1990a) showed how the construction of organisational texture can help to 
analyse the entrepreneurs’ motivation and how they try to transmit their initial 
ideas and logic to the organising processes. The focus is on what the entrepreneur 
thought and did in interaction with co-workers to create an organisation. Two 
developmental processes were identified. One reflects the emergence of a social 
network, while the other reflects the emergence of a task domain. The concept of 
‘organisational dialogue’ was introduced to describe the action strategies through 
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which these two processes were connected. One finding states that the 
entrepreneur who initially acts as an inspirer, links his organisational members 
and sets the initial logic to the organising process. This study clearly showed the 
importance of the entrepreneur on the organising process. However, what 
happens if the venture is not founded by a single entrepreneur but by a team? 
Who then sets the initial logic or are other processes taking place instead?  
In their second study, Bouwen and Steyaert (1990b) looked again at the creation 
of the social system which emerges during the organising process and which 
needs to be organised. The authors addressed five dilemmas which oscillate 
around the tension of creation and integration. The entrepreneur’s constant task is 
to decide between staying in the initiating mode or to move into the organising 
mode as he is confronted with the transition between starting and organising. 
Bouwen and Steyaert concluded that creating a business and organising a firm are 
governed by different rules. This means that learning processes need to take place 
in order to manage both modes.  
 
This scarcity of dynamic studies regarding organisational aspects in new ventures 
points to the need of further research in this area. One problem is that many 
theories are based on static concepts and therefore difficult to apply.  
 
2.4 Conclusion: the lack of organising studies in entrepreneurship  
This chapter depicted the developments in entrepreneurship research from a 
historical and from a current perspective. In the historical part, the perceived tasks 
of an entrepreneur were described. These had changed over time from a risk taker 
over a coordinator to an innovator. Today, the focus has moved towards the 
management side. The first authors were coming mainly from the economics’ 
field, today these are mainly management scientists, psychologists and 
sociologists who research this subject. The variety of recent entrepreneurship 
definitions mirrored this and the section drew a picture of what entrepreneurship 
means today.  
Entrepreneurship is a research field which covers a vast variety of topics all being 
linked to new ventures. Among these is research about personal characteristics, 
about factors affecting new ventures’ performance, about venture capital and 
finance and about the influence of social networks which were described in detail. 
An additional topic is the organisational development of new ventures and their 
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organising processes. However, organising processes is not a prominent topic in 
entrepreneurship research so far. Most studies view the organisation as a static 
body rather than studying the new venture’s organising processes which are 
dynamic and relational. One of the reasons is that organising itself is not seen as a 
key to new economic activity, which is at the heart of entrepreneurship studies. 
The knowledge of the early-stage processes of organising, in which the 
foundation for future structures and processes is built, is very scarce. In addition, 
none of the studies on new ventures took into consideration the fact that a high 
percentage is started by a team. Thus, team aspects in organising processes are 
relevant and need to be considered.  
For conducting a study about organising processes in new ventures, a detailed 
look at organisation studies is crucial. Therefore, the next chapter will give an 
overview of organisational theory and an introduction to the concept of 
organising.  
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3 From organisation to organising 
As organising in new ventures touches upon entrepreneurship and organising 
theory alike, both research areas need to be analysed. As organisational aspects 
have hardly been regarded in entrepreneurship, the question is to what extent 
organisation theory can provide explanations. The focus in this chapter will be on 
organisation design theory first and then shift to more constructivist approaches. 
Finally, organising as a concept will be displayed and especially the theory 
developed by Weick.  
 
3.1 Traditional organisation theory 
Organisation theory has many different facets. There simply is not the one theory 
but a variety of different (Scherer, 2001). Choosing a possible organisation 
theory is dependant upon the unit of analysis, i.e. the behaviour of the individual 
within an organisation, the relationships between different organisations or the 
structures of organisations (e.g. Pfeffer, 1982; Astley & Van de Ven, 1983). As 
this study aims at analysing organising processes in new ventures, the 
organisation design perspective comes closest. Before giving an overview of its 
development, basic questions about the character of an organisation will be dealt 
with first. 
 
3.1.1 What is an organisation? 
Writing about organisation theory, the first thing to do would be to give a 
definition of an organisation. The word ‘organisation’ is derived from the Greek 
word ‘organon’, i.e. tool or instrument (Brunsson & Olsen, 1998: 14). But what 
is and what constitutes an organisation? Which are the elements that differentiate 
an organisation from other social forms? As these questions touch already upon 
epistemological and ontological problems, the answers vary according to one’s 
perspective. 
 
Max Weber, as one of the ‘scientific godfathers’ of the concept of the 
organisation, defined an organisation (1978: 48-50, 34, 212, 1404) to have clear 
and definite boundaries with a central coordination system, internally 
differentiated, legitimated, malleable and part of a societal transformation. Many 
later efforts to understand organisations have dealt with the dimensions 
suggested by Weber’s ideal model. Organisations have been seen as an ideal 
FROM ORGANISATION TO ORGANISING   33 
 
 
research object for studying general prerequisites to rational action. Two main 
ones have been identified. First, the ways in which predetermined goals may be 
attained and second, the ability to control others whose actions are needed in 
order to bring about a desired state of affairs (Brunsson et al., 1998).  
 
However, already Weber (1922/1990) was concerned about the organisation as 
such as he viewed an organisation as a rational tool which is at the same time 
coercive, inhuman and a threat to a civilised society. During the last decades, 
Weber’s organisation model has been challenged on all his described dimensions 
(Brunsson et al., 1998). Organisations’ boundaries have been described as being 
unclear and permeable (e.g. Ashkenas et al., 1995; March & Olsen, 1976). 
Organisations have been shown to be conflictual, polycentric and loosely coupled 
rather than coherent, hierarchical and tightly coupled units. Management and 
leaders have only limited command and control over behaviour, identities, causal 
and moral beliefs and incentives (Cyert & March, 1963; Cohen et al., 1972). It is 
uncertain under what conditions decisions at the top of an organisation will 
actually govern organisation behaviour. The latter is often driven by rules of 
appropriateness (cf. March & Olsen, 1989) rather than the calculation of 
expected utility. Rules and standard operating procedures are often based on 
identities, inalienable rights and historical experiences largely beyond the control 
of the management (March et al., 1976; Brunsson, 1985). Organisations cannot 
take their legitimacy for granted, they need to consider the potential effects for 
legitimacy of their talk and action. The interest in sense-making and the 
construction of meaning has also led to a renewed interest in how participants are 
educated and socialised and the mechanisms by which identities, loyalties and 
boundaries are developed, justified and changed through processes of interaction 
and interpretation (Weick, 1979; March et al., 1989).  
 
All these criticism have challenged Weber’s basic assumptions and show that the 
forms, processes and roles of organisations have changed fundamentally (Fenton 
& Pettigrew, 2000). However, there is no new coherent, theoretically oriented 
and empirically based research program (Scherer, 2001). Therefore, one cannot 
expect a single, dominant organising principle or logic of action but the aim 
should be to understand the competing ordering principles, the institutional 
complexity and the co-existence of different partial orders that exist (Brunsson et 
al., 1998). 
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Organisational theory in general distinguishes between three different 
conceptualisations of an organisation (e.g. Bea & Göbel, 2002; Bühner, 1999; 
Manstedten, 1997):  
(1) The instrumental definition in which a company has an organisation. The 
organisation is the system of lasting rules and means for optimising its 
goal-oriented processes. The results of organising, e.g. structures and 
processes are subject of studies. Specialisation, coordination, 
configuration, delegation and formalisation are elements to analyse the 
organisation.  
(2) The institutional definition meaning that a company is an organisation. 
The organisation is a socio-technical system and the relationships 
between its different elements are the main characteristics. These 
elements can be people, rules, boundaries and goals which are all in place 
by intention.  
(3) The function-oriented definition in which a company is organised. Here, 
organising is an activity or function with the aim to create order. A critical 
aspect is the differentiation between the formal and the informal 
organisation.  
 
The intensity of attention for each definition has changed over time. The first one 
was especially emphasised by early organisation researchers (e.g. Weber, 
1922/1990). Later on, the institutionalists (e.g. North, 1992) and new 
institutionalists (e.g. Powell & DiMaggio, 1991) focused on the second 
definition. Finally, the third definition is more recently accentuated and tries to 
incorporate dynamic elements. 
As a modification, zu Knyphausen-Aufseß (2003) altered the categorisation by 
adding a methodological definition. This does not approximate the definition by 
describing what an organisation is but how it is like. This follows March and 
Simon’s (1958) notion which states that organisations are apparently omnipresent 
and thus important. As organisations are so manifold it is hardly possible to find 
one definition which covers all aspects and differences at the same time.  
 
There are many more organisation definitions, many of them depending upon the 
epistemological stance one takes. Aldrich for example based his definition of an 
organisation on traditional Weberian dimensions but enriched it by a 
constructivist element.  
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“Organizations are goal-directed, boundary-maintaining, and 
socially constructed systems of human activity” (Aldrich, 1999: 2).  
This definition pays attention to the social processes involved in the genesis and 
persistence of organisations. Other definitions add other criteria such as 
deliberate design, the existence of status structures, patterned understandings 
between participants, orientation to an environment or substitutability of 
personnel (Meadows, 1967; Scott, 1998). However, for this study, Aldrich’s 
definition will be used.  
 
3.1.2 Research on traditional organisational forms 
Continuing with this traditional approach towards the basics of organisation 
theory, the next focus will be on different organisational forms in which 
organisation researchers have shown interest in over time. The research streams 
in organisational design covering the years 1950-2000 will be illustrated (cf. 
Fenton et al., 2000).  
 
Figure 3: Theoretical perspectives on organisational design 1950-2000 
Source: Fenton and Pettigrew (2000), modified 
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Fenton and Pettigrew (2000) argued that organisational design is characterised by 
the changing interest in aggregated and disaggregated conceptualisations of form. 
It basically started with the universal forms18 of Weber’s bureaucracy 
(1922/1990) which was based on the machine model of organisational behaviour 
in which the independent variable was some form of organisational procedure 
designed to control the activities of its members. Later on, Chandler (1962) 
introduced the multidivisional form, the M-Form, in which the creation of 
multiple divisions was due to the diversification of products for which resources 
had to be managed effectively. Both universal forms were based on hierarchy, 
formalisation, the division of labour and specialisation.  
 
These two initial forms led to contingency theory. Its researchers created 
theoretical models derived from statistically established patterns of relations 
between contextual and organisational variables. The main interpretation was that 
there is no single best way of organising a business (Pfeffer, 1978). The 
structurally determined models posited associations between dimensions of 
organisational structure and contextual factors such as environment 
(Stinchcombe, 1965; Burns & Stalker, 1971; Emery & Trist, 1965; Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967b), technology (Woodward, 1965, 1970; Perrow, 1967) or scale of 
operation (Pugh et al., 1969; Blau, 1970; Blau & Schoenherr, 1971). In all of 
these studies, structure was seen as being dependant upon the specific 
circumstances the organisation faces. However, as the focus was on structures, 
processes were completely neglected. The studies also denied decisions-makers 
to have any choice between different options. 19 
 
Especially the Aston studies (Pugh et al., 1963; 1968) and a number of Harvard 
doctoral students (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967a; 1967b; Rumelt, 1974) developed 
the notion of ideal types by recognising the greater diversity of organisational 
forms. They pursued the idea of dimensions as variables rather than the unitary 
conceptualisations Weber and Chandler had introduced. The Aston studies took a 
disaggregated approach by deconstructing the bureaucracy model into 26 
constituent characteristics (Pugh et al., 1963; 1968). Thereafter, they combined 
                                              
18 For a discussion about the pros and cons of “idealtypes” in organisation research, see a 
concise summary by Heidenreich (1991). 
19 For a critical essay on contingency theory, see Pfeffer (1978). 
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their characteristics to four bureaucracy models which were workflow 
bureaucracy, personnel bureaucracy, full bureaucracy and finally non-
bureaucracy. They validated the notion that organisational structure is made up of 
the following five dimensions: specialisation, standardisation, formalisation, 
centralisation and configuration.20 
On the aggregated forms, the Harvard researchers mainly equated strategy and 
structure with diversification and divisionalisation. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a) 
focused on design principles of differentiation and integration.  
 
In parallel to the Harvard school, another stream of research focused on ideal 
types of organisations, i.e. the configurational approach. Its researchers looked 
at strategy and structure from a multidimensional point of view. Miles and Snow 
(1978) showed that organisations adapted their unique configurations of strategy 
to their environments. They also indicated that this influenced the organisation’s 
technology and structure. It resulted in four different organisational types, i.e. 
defender, analyser, prospector and reactor. Miller and Friesen’s (Miller & 
Friesen, 1977, 1978) ten archetypes were derived from an empirical taxonomy of 
organisations. They had looked at common adaptive strategies and their 
structural and environmental correlates. Mintzberg (1979b) identified five 
structural types (simple structure, machine bureaucracy, professional 
bureaucracy, divisionalised form and adhocracy). Later, Miller (1986) reduced 
this to four strategy-structure types. The argument of the prevalence of common 
configurations was based on the population ecology’s (Hannan & Freeman, 
1977; Aldrich, 1979) premise that firms will converge upon viable 
configurations. Thus the repertoire of strategic and structural configurations was 
limited.  
 
Due to the strong influence of (economic) sociology, network concepts  
(N-Form) have been introduced into the organisation design field (e.g. Powell, 
1990; Burt, 1982, 1992; Salancik, 1995; Ahuja & Carley, 1999). Network 
theorists brought a more social and relational perspective to the study of 
organisations. The approach focuses on the identification of patterns of direct and 
                                              
20 Heidenreich (1991) criticises the endeavour to find acontextual factors in international 
comparative organisation studies as these can never be acontextual from the beginning on. 
However, this is what Pugh, Hickson et al. (1969) had aimed at.  
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indirect linkages among persons and positions. As a result, networks of work and 
authority roles arise from an interdependence of individual lines of actions. 
Lincoln (1982) described the relationship between distributional form and the 
internal network structures of organisations as being complex and reciprocal. As 
classical management theorists were in part seeking solutions to the problem of 
managing relational complexity, the prescribed principles of formal structuring 
were based upon early management writers’ conception of network form. 
Lincoln (1982) argued that the network form has shaped the modern 
organisations’ distributional forms. Basic concepts in social network analysis are 
strong and weak ties as well as the dyad, the network and the node (Wasserman 
& Faust, 1994). The concept of embeddedness distinguishes between relational 
embeddedness which captures the quality of dyadic exchanges (Uzzi, 1997) and 
structural embeddedness which referres to the entire network system 
(Granovetter, 1992). If there was too much relational embeddedness, i.e. 
overreliance on strong ties in an organisation, the formation of cliques can act to 
isolate parts of the system and prevent integration which results in 
overembeddedness.  
 
Recent new forms of organising have been described e.g. by Denison (1997) 
who proposes a process-based theory of organisational design which is built on 
the concepts of the value chain and networks. Ghoshal and Bartlett (1998) made 
a case for the individualised corporation as one where people and their 
management are central to the achievement of organisational success. Ashkenas 
et al. (1995) proposed the boundaryless organisation where goods and services 
move freely across borders within and between firms to achieve competitive 
advantage. Another new type is the virtual organisation as described by Handy 
(1996) which can be seen as a box of contracts. He suggested that organisations 
should be viewed as patterns of relationships rather than role positions occupied 
by people.  
 
The problem with these traditional organisation design theories is that their 
structural categories refer mainly to formal organisational characteristics. These 
studies say little about the ways in which managers and members behave within 
them. Motivation, decisions, and actions have a great impact on the growth 
process, but are hardly considered in these concepts. Thus, conceptualising an 
organisation in terms of processes rather than static entities seems more suitable 
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for new ventures. Brunsson states that “formal organizations do not always work 
in as organized a way as they say they do or as others describe them as doing” 
(1999: 120). This means that an organisation is not only dependent on its formal 
structure. Instead there are more ways of analysing an organisation than by 
simply looking at authority and governance structures. There are organisational 
activities that lie outside traditional formal organisations which need to be 
described and that informal organisations create rules that are followed. 
In order to understand organisations better and to see them not merely as 
consisting of authoritative structures, the next section will introduce the 
subjective perspective of organisations and will discuss what elements are 
needed when studying new ventures.  
  
3.2 Different conceptualisations of organisation  
As traditional organisation design theories lack a dynamic perspective which is 
needed for studying new ventures in their early years, a subjective approach to 
organisations is going to be specified in this chapter. As will be explained later, 
such an approach should be accompanied by the use of a processual language and 
by paying attention to dilemmas, dualities and paradoxes.  
 
3.2.1 Objective versus subjective conceptualisations  
There are many ways of classifying organisational theories and paradigms (e.g. 
Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Astley et al., 1983; Scott, 1998; Brunsson et al., 1998; 
Fenton et al., 2000). One of them is the distinction between objective and 
subjective or constructivist approaches as described by Burrell (1979). 
  
In the objective approaches, “organisations are fairly autonomous and consistent 
phenomena that can be described by a set of measurable attributes” (Bouchikhi, 
1998: 229). The characteristics of organisations can be grasped due to the 
existence of a reality that is external and independent of the knowing subject 
(Landry, 1995). These organisational characteristics are mostly structures which 
mean in this context e.g. systems of hierarchy, job descriptions, task delegation 
rules, process flows and regulations regarding competences. It is generally agreed 
that a causal connection can be drawn between structural characteristics as such, 
as well as between external factors and structural characteristics (Kieser, 1998).  
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This objective view is especially difficult to apply if trying to depict how people 
in organisations act because organisations are viewed as the context which is 
independent of the human actor. Both, organisations as well as the individuals 
are regarded as separate entities independent of each other. There are two 
fallacies with the way how people in organisations are depicted.  
The first focuses solely on the person. Allport (1963: 192) has argued that those 
studies commit ‘the individualistic fallacy’ because they view “personality as a 
unit in isolation” without any “reference to its setting in, and dependence upon, 
the social environment”. People are the centre of interest and persons as well as 
organisations are viewed as being independent of each other. Favourite topics in 
these studies include individual motivation, leadership, group dynamics or job 
designs. The second type of theories emphasises the context and the organisation, 
neglecting the people connected to the organisation. This is the ‘culturalistic 
fallacy’ (Allport, 1963: 192). As a result, organisations are taken for granted 
because they exist independently of actors and actions.  
 
In studies which theorise organisations as objectives, the employees are often 
viewed as working in and for the organisation. By setting organisations and 
persons apart, organisations are treated as though they themselves are actors. One 
example is the study of Allison (1969) in which organisations were invested with 
intentionality and in which they were given motive force or goals. 
 
Rather than taking an objective approach to organisational analysis, relational 
processes are better for understanding an organisation. This is done in subjective 
or constructivist approaches in which the organisation is constructed in the 
organisational members’ minds. All interaction patterns within an organisation 
have been built in the course of communication between these interacting 
partners (Kieser, 1999). This communication is based on mutual creation, i.e. 
persons build their own context, but these people are at the same time 
constructed by the context as well. This is due to the persons’ relationships with 
their context and with other people. The relational processes are characterised by 
the activities of sense-making (Weick, 1979). This requires attention to 
organising as an activity which is achieved in and through cognitive and social 
processes. Structures are the results of the actions and the constructions of the 
participants (Levitt & March, 1988) and not because they are needed by the 
system. Persons, through their social relations, create more or less widely shared 
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constructions of their contexts (Hosking & Morley, 1991). This inevitable means 
that organising cannot be performed by a single actor. Hence, the emphasis in 
this study will be on the processes through which organising is achieved. 
However, I am not much interested in the substantive content of what emerges. 
The content is only needed so far, as it helps to understand the process of 
organising. The interest is in “patterns of interaction amongst people, patterns 
which both create individuals as individuals, and which stem from their 
activities” (Gerson, 1976: 796).  
 
In shifting attention to processes, the emphasis should not be on outcomes as the 
end products of inputs from persons and organisations but rather on the 
complexities of social phenomena. This is not trivial as changing rather than 
stable relationships are at the centre of interest which are more difficult to grasp 
and to depict. The mutual and reciprocal characteristics of relational processes 
have to be acknowledged and their ongoing qualities should be captured (Weick, 
1974b; Steyaert, 1997).  
This can best be depicted by process thinking which is linked to the flux 
metaphor (Chia, 2002; Morgan, 1986). One of the first to recognise this was 
Heraclitus who introduced the image of a river. He transferred the ‘panta rei’, i.e. 
‘everything flows and nothing abides’ to the flowing river saying “You cannot 
step twice into the same river, for other waters are continually flowing on” 
(quoted in Morgan, 1986: 233). This can be interpreted as a process of becoming 
being the basic reality of the world.  
The metaphor of flux is taken up again by Morgan in his book ‘Images of 
Organization’ (1986). This metaphor, one out of eight in his book, represents the 
change from a static to a dynamic vision of organisations, from a variable to a 
process approach. For such an approach, two characteristics are proposed. These 
are the use of a process language and the use of dilemmas which both 
demonstrate the process’ dynamics (Steyaert, 1997).  
 
3.2.2 The need for a process language 
In order to concretise the process, a process language should be used. One 
example is Weick and his book ‘The social psychology of organising’ (1969; 
1979) in which the word ‘organisation’ disappears. He instead used the word 
‘organising’ to create a dynamic conception. For Weick, verbs are crucial in 
describing process: “Motion, change, and the flow of time would not be apparent 
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without the verb and verb forms” (Weick, 1979: 43). This is similar to Bateson 
who coined the motto “stamp out nouns” (1972: 334). Using nouns rather than 
verbs implies that we try to stabilise everything. However, this covers up the 
fluid processes underlying all things (Weick, 1974b). Instead, ‘organisation’ 
should become ‘organising’ and the gerund should be used as often as possible. 
 
The development of organisational theories involves the language we employ. 
Gartner argued in his article ‘Words lead to deeds’ (1993) that the words we use 
influence our ability to think about the certain phenomena and our subsequent 
research. The use of a process language implies that members of an organisation 
are sensitive to the way the meanings of utterance can shift and flow. In this 
connection, Weick (1967: 68) refers to Vickers (1967):  
“The proverb has it that we never step twice into the same river. It is 
equally true that we never go to work twice in the same undertaking. It 
is equally false; for these words ‘river’ and ‘undertaking’ do not 
denote unchanging substances, but continuing forms. The language of 
business and administration is full of such words. […] All are 
descriptive of relationships. There is nothing unusual in this. The 
familiar forms of language conceal from us the extent to which the 
objects of our attention are not ‘things’ but relations extended in 
time.”  
The aim is to apply such a process language for the subsequent study to stress its 
processual characteristics.  
 
3.2.3 Dilemmas as the dynamics of the organising process 
A second way to approach the idea of a dynamic process is by describing 
dilemmas, dualities and paradoxes. To grasp the process character, a description 
of how the dilemmas function and how they shape the organising process should 
be given (cf. Janssens & Steyaert, 1999). Challenges of organisational life are 
more and more approached in terms of bipolar concepts (Pettigrew & Fenton, 
2000; Pettigrew et al., 2003; Achtenhagen & Melin, 2003) such as dilemmas 
(Hampden-Turner, 1990), paradoxes (Cameron & Quinn, 1988; Poole & Van de 
Ven, 1989) and dualities (Evans & Doz, 1992; Janssens et al., 1999).  
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A dilemma is an either-or situation in which one alternative has to be preferred 
over the other (Hampden-Turner, 1990). A paradox can be defined as an 
apparent contradiction or an antinomy (Quinn et al., 1988).21 One cannot choose 
between the contradictory elements as these operate simultaneously. Finally a 
duality is defined as opposing forces that have to be balanced (Evans et al., 
1992), e.g. analysis versus intuition. Both its alternatives seem contradictory but 
can in fact be balanced, they are even complimentary.  
To sum up, paradoxes emphasise the simultaneous presence of contradictory 
elements, dilemmas accentuate the impossible choice-situation and dualities 
stress the complementarities. 
 
For Hampden-Turner (1990), a company gains value through its ability to 
reconcile dilemmas strategically. He argued that dilemmas appear and reappear 
in constantly changing forms. Evans and Doz (1992) regarded dualities as a 
“pervasive feature” (1992: 85) in the development of complex organisations. 
After a period of structuring and ordering in the 1950s and 1960s (e.g. Pugh et 
al., 1963; Kosiol, 1962) and after the principles of fit, match and consistency in 
the 1970s and early 1980s (e.g. Woodward, 1970; Blau et al., 1971; Mintzberg, 
1979b), dualities are seen as an appropriate principle for theorising about 
organising. They especially are confronted with the turbulent, complex and 
highly competitive environment which characterises the high tech context in 
particular. Evans and Doz (1992) argued that dualities reflect a way of thinking, 
that they are some sort of mind-set.22 Janssen and Steyaert (1999) added that the 
articulation of a duality is closely linked to its context and its conceived process 
of organising. “Dealing with dualities thus becomes a complex organizing 
principle instead of simply a strategy” (Janssens et al., 1999: 136). 
 
All these concepts are bipolar with two distinguishable and indissoluble parts. 
Together with the introduction of such notions as dilemmas, paradoxes and 
dualities, many related terms like tensions, opposites, contradictions, 
dichotomies, polarities and ambiguities can be noticed in the vocabulary of 
organisation theory. These bipolar concepts become more and more important in 
organisation theory, especially in post-modern theory (zu Knyphausen, 1999). 
                                              
21 For an elaborate discussion of paradoxes, see zu Knyphausen (1992) 
22 For an elaborate history of dualities in social systems, see Evans (1992: 88). 
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For Krippendorf, the paradox “has important morphogenetic dimensions and 
might be a stimulus, if not the stimulus, for human cognitive growth and for 
social-organizational development” (1984: 46). Steyaert and Janssen (1999) 
argue that the challenges of organisational life such as internationalisation, 
structural transitions and technological complexities require the building of 
tension into the process of organising.  
There are two studies which deal with organising dilemmas in new ventures. The 
first is the study by Bouwen and Steyaert (1990b) who have come up with five 
different organisational dilemmas:  
? the motivation dilemma concerns the entrepreneur who is asking himself 
whether he should or should not start a new venture,  
? the root dilemma describes that the new venture builds its strength on its 
specific background knowledge and logic, however, new perspectives 
have to be brought into the venture which can be in opposition with the 
venture’s roots,  
? the route dilemma depicts the choice-problem between broadening and/or 
stabilising the new venture’s activities,  
? within the time dilemma there exist tensions between the short-term versus 
the long-term orientation of the entrepreneur and  
? the management/non-management dilemma describes the relation either 
between management and non-management members or between those 
present at the start and those joining later.  
 
Bouwen and Steyaert subsume these five dilemmas under the general dilemma of 
creation and integration. They argued that understanding entrepreneurship needs 
to take its dilemmatic nature into account. Although thinking in tensions and 
paradoxes contradicts the scientific logic of causality and determinism, it could 
signify a major breakthrough in searching for new pathways. However, the 
dilemmas should be embedded in descriptions of their social contexts.  
The other study is by Brytting (1991) who ran a longitudinal grounded study of a 
small Swedish firm. He arrived at the idea of a ‘basic dilemma’ which 
distinguishes between two different types of organising processes: one that “is 
spontaneous, non-analytical, and sometimes surprising. […] The other type of 
organizing process is planned and analytical” (Brytting, 1991: 135). These two 
organising processes occurred at the same time in the new venture. However, he 
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did not further explain why he saw these two organising processes as a dilemma 
or how the venture coped with it.  
 
To conclude, we can say that in order to study organising in new ventures, we 
need to pay attention to the language used and to look out for dilemmas, dualities 
and paradoxes. For using the flux metaphor, we need go beyond objective 
approaches as well as beyond static, reifying concepts (cf. Meyer et al., 1985). As 
a consequence, this implies reconsidering the idea that we can ‘design’ 
organisations (cf. Kieser, 1998). To think of organisations in terms of building 
and buildings is difficult to combine with a process approach. Going beyond 
objective approaches means searching for a new, suggestive language which 
allows to speak of movement and transition (Weick, 1969; Hosking et al., 1991).  
Most organisation theories have been directed towards stability, even the ones 
about change in organisations. Change projects are being regarded as temporary 
transitional periods in which an organisation is shuttled from one stable situation 
to the next. Organisations are striking in their seeming stability, but their 
mutability and fluidity should be seen as the norm and not as the exception. A 
small part of organisation theory (e.g. Weick, 1969; Hosking et al., 1991; Sims et 
al., 1993) is being reappraised, giving the idea of flux its due importance. This 
builds the transition to organising which will be depicted in more detail in the 
following chapter. 
 
3.3 Organising as a process orientated concept 
In order to develop a process-oriented conceptualising of the organisation and its 
processes, organising and its concepts will be introduced more in detail. This will 
be followed by Weick’s organising concept (1969; 1979) which can be seen as 
one of the most thoroughly worked out process theories (Colville, 1994).  
 
3.3.1 The organising process  
In general, organising can be seen as the dynamic and action-based definition of 
an organisation. The notion of ‘organising’ is used by a variety of authors 
although many do not specify it. Even in different organising concepts, a 
distinction between static and dynamic categories can be demonstrated.  
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The simplest definition of organising is probably that it serves “to create order 
out of chaos” (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1996: 3978). Löwstedt focuses on the 
change of structure but acknowledging the process character by stating that “The 
organising process can now be defined as the process in which an organization, 
or part if it, develops and changes its structure, either gradually or in dramatic 
leaps” (1993: 506). However, organising should move beyond the concept of 
structure and rather focus on structuration. In terms of Giddens (1984), structure 
needs to be conceptualised as being dualistic. Structures are media and 
prerequisite at the same time. Delmar increases the action-orientation of 
organising by saying that “Organizing involves establishing the set of routines 
and structures that support a goal-directed, boundary-maintaining system of 
activities. In contrast to much of the static description of organization theory, 
organizing is a process not a state” (Delmar & Scott, 2001: 4). This last quote is 
focused on the definition of an organisation which is in line with Hosking (1990) 
as well as Bouwen and Steyaert (1990a) who emphasise that organising results in 
the creation of an organisation in action. However, it is finally Weick for whom 
organising is a truly processual approach based on constructivism. “Organizing 
consists of the resolving of equivocality23 in an enacted environment by means of 
interlocked behaviors embedded in conditionally related processes” (Weick, 
1969: 91). This organising process describes how the actions of individuals 
create an ordered and lasting process which finally constitutes the organisation 
(Neuberger, 2000). 
 
Departing from this section, these very broad descriptions of organising need to 
be enriched with mechanisms and underlying concepts to understand it better. 
Analysing organisation theories in terms of organising aspects, two basic 
approaches to the process of organising can be discerned in literature (Ortmann et 
al., 1997; Czarniawska-Joerges, 1996). Organising can be either the effect or the 
cause of an organisation. In everyday language as well as in research, 
organisations are often described as objects within which various forms of work 
are performed. The organisation is seen as the reason of, or the frame for the 
organising process, i.e. the objective approach. However, if organisations are 
seen as socially constructed, the organisation becomes a result of the organising 
                                              
23 In his later works, Weick uses sometimes ‘uncertainty’ or ‘ambiguity’ instead of 
‘equivocality’ (Colville, 1994). 
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processes, i.e. the subjective approach.24 The focus is then on the organising 
process itself, how people contribute to it and jointly develop their understanding 
of the process. In such a case, it would be interesting to understand which 
definitions of an organisation emerge and which are used by people engaged in 
organising. It is organising which makes an organisation and not the other way 
round. 
If people’s actions lead to an organisation, the traditional literature on 
organisation theory and organisation behaviour is challenged (Hosking, 1988). 
The organising’s focus is on the dynamics of interactions between parts as 
opposed to the conception of parts as relatively independent sub-systems. The 
actions of organising contrast the static state of organisation (Emery et al., 1965). 
As the organising process leads to a state of being organised, its state becomes 
reified linguistically and will be regarded as an entity, an object or a structure. It 
assumes a quasi-independent existence (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1996). The 
organising perspective leads to a change of focus from structures to processes. It 
changes to an active perspective on organisational activities. This phenomenon is 
therefore ongoing, it is a process and it consists of a continuous set of activities.  
As Weick (see especially 1969; 1979) has probably had the largest impact on the 
organising principle, his ideas will be presented in more detail in the next 
chapter.  
 
3.3.2 Weick’s theory of organising 
The ‘organising as a process’ view is well known from Karl E. Weick’s research. 
His book ‘The Social Psychology of Organizing’ (1969; 1979)25 can be seen as a 
reference to Katz and Kahn’s book ‘The Social Psychology of Organizations’ 
(1966) which regards organisations as open systems and which is a critique to 
neo-classical economics. The title of the books is taken up again in a variant by 
Hosking and Morley (1991) ‘A Social Psychology of Organizations’. All three 
books point to the idea that social processes constitute the dynamics of 
organisations, regardless of whether one is speaking of political (Hosking et al., 
1991), cultural (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1992) or learning (Argyris & Schön, 1978) 
                                              
24 See subchapter 3.2.1. for details. 
25 Weick initially published ‘The Social Psychology of Organizing’ in 1969 in a very comprised 
and abstract form. The 1979 version bears the same title, but is otherwise a completely 
reworked edition.  
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processes. These studies show that one cannot conceive of power, culture or 
learning as separate phenomena from social interactions.  
Weick’s books (1969; 1979) charted a new course for the construction of a 
process-oriented theory of organisation. In addition, it entailed a refined language 
for the conceptualising of organisational processes. Weick specified that he is 
dealing with a grammar which, just as in language, consists of agreed rules by 
which ambiguities can be cleared as organisational members test them out. 
Organising is thus a social process in which unequivocality is searched within a 
broad spectrum of meanings.  
 
Weick defined an organisation as something that “is fluid, continually changing, 
continually in need of reaccomplishment, and it appears to be an entity only 
when this fluidity is ‘frozen’ at some moment in time” (1969: 91).26 He argued 
than an organisation has to be defined in terms of organising. “Organizing 
consists of the resolving of equivocality in an enacted environment by means of 
interlocked behaviors embedded in conditionally related processes” (1969: 91). 
Thus organising for him is mostly about information processing. Enactment, 
selection and retention are the three processes comprising organising.  
 
The organising process as enactment/selection/retention 
For Weick, organising is a cyclical process which consists of enactment, 
selection and retention mechanisms. This approach can be seen as an 
continuation of the Darwin model (1859) of natural selection in social terms 
rewritten for the context of organisations. Through enactment, episodes are 
created. Due to their ambiguity, they need further interpretation. These enacted 
episodes are created by generated changes or by bracketing a significant change 
in the environment. Through selection, an attempt is made to reduce equivocality 
by imposing or applying certain interpretative schemes or structures or enacted 
ambiguous episodes. Through retention, the products of successful sensemaking 
are stored in the form of enacted environments or causal maps. The result is a 
meaningful version of the ambiguous situation, reduced through action and 
communication. A precondition for enactment is the so called ecological change. 
                                              
26 Weick ended his book with yet another definition of organisations: “Organizations keep 
people busy, occasionally entertain them give them a variety of experiences, keep them off the 
streets, provide pretexts for story-telling, and allow socializing” (1979: 264). 
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Without discontinuity, difference or any other form of variation, there is no 
enactable environment which is needed for sensemaking. This process of 
sensemaking with its four components is represented in the following schematic 
diagram. 
 
Figure 4: The arrangement of organising processes  
Source: Weick (1979: 132) 
 
Each of the three organisational processes can be linked to a basic mechanism. 
This is ‘bracketing’ for the ‘enactment’ process, ‘retrospective sensemaking’ for 
the ‘selection’ process and ‘(dis)crediting’ for the process of ‘retention’.  
 
‘Enactment’ by ‘bracketing’ 
‘Enactment’ is the process by which reality is created and structured. The 
environment cannot be passively or objectively observed, but is actively 
constructed. ‘Bracketing’ plays an important role in this active construction. A 
person takes in only part of the environment, which then becomes his 
environment. “Once something has been isolated, then that is the environment 
momentarily for the organization and that environment has been put in place by 
the very actions of the employees themselves” (Weick, 1979: 154). In speaking 
and dealing with one another, people make their own and others’ environments 
which they then observe, name or they take up action. “It is that initial 
implanting of reality that I preserved by the word enactment” (Weick, 1979: 
165), and “people in organizations need to find out what they have done” 
(Weick, 1979: 152).  
The enactment process provides a considerable different view of the relationship 
between organisation and environment. Both have long been seen as clearly 
separable entities, with the organisation obliged to attune itself to the changing 
Ecological Change Enactment Selection Retention+ ++
+
(+, -)
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environment (cf. Ch. 3.1.2).27 Instead, Weick believed that an organisation 
actively chooses its environment, shapes its content and interprets it. The same is 
applied when creating its internal environment. Morgan’s idea (1986) that 
organisations construct their environments as projections of their own identity or 
self images is implicit in Weick’s idea of enactment as bracketing and occurs on 
the basis of existing images and interpretations.  
 
‘Selection’ via ‘retrospective sensemaking’ 
The enactment process results not in one reality, but in many often ambiguous 
realities which demand a further reduction of ambiguity. People attempt ‘to see 
what they say or do’ and they try to come up with an answer to what they see. 
Ambiguity is reduced in the selection process by allowing interpretations from 
isolated fragments. This results in an agreement over a particular definition of 
reality.  
The interpretations which are tested refer to previous interpretations, stored in 
cognitive maps, or are implicitly present in the enactments themselves. In the 
first case, influence proceeds from retention to selection through which new 
events or utterances are fitted into older and apparently successful interpretations. 
Thus, selection consists of the search for a possible consistence with existing 
frameworks and information. If this is not successful, meaning that “if retention 
is discredited, then people, events, and actions that differ from previously 
enacted environments will be given greater attention, fresher labels, newer 
connections, and will have more likelihood of being stored where they will then 
assimilate and accommodate to whatever content remains in retention” (Weick, 
1979: 187). In the second case, categorised episodes serve as a sort of pre-
interpretation, ready for further interpretations. The difference between 
enactment and selection is often rather small, since both imply a form of 
sensemaking and ambiguity reduction. The more the episode catches the 
attention, the greater the chance that new and adapted interpretations will be 
selected.  
For Weick, selection is a form of retrospective sensemaking. Whatever 
organisation members see, understand, hear and feel is available for 
                                              
27 See open system approach (e.g. Morgan, 1986; Scott, 1998). For a review of different views 
on the environment and their impact on strategic management, see Smircich and Stubbart 
(1985). 
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interpretation. Communication which reach each member are open messages. 
There are numerous meanings which cannot be reduced to equality with one 
another. However, the process of organising is loaded with equivocality and 
many actions which are meant to reduce this are the occasion of new and 
different ambiguities. These occasions are e.g. meetings, memos or reports.  
Sensemaking is retrospective because it follows actions and because organisation 
members try to reflect upon what they were doing. This reflection assumes the 
form of “writing plausible accounts, histories, and sequences for enactments” 
(Weick, 1979: 195). Through communication, an agreement is reached what an 
action, a decision, a project or a career has been in the past and thus what it is in 
the process of becoming. Although organisations are to a certain point directed 
towards the future with their planning and strategic activities, they are indeed 
seen to be directed to the past as they are historising activities.  
But what happens if such a common organisational history does not exist because 
the organisation has just come into existence? This is the case in this empirical 
study in which all new ventures do not share a common organisational history. It 
has to be analysed which mechanisms the organisation members use instead. 
 
‘Retention’ through ‘discrediting’ 
Retention is about the memory processes in the functioning of organisations. 
There are two sides of the organisational memory. On the one hand, memory is 
indispensable for creating meaning. On the other hand, forgetting is crucial, too, 
as it creates new space for new actions and new interpretations. How does an 
organisation store, apply, and destroy its retained interpretations? And how is the 
organisational memory organised?  
Through retention, ambiguity and uncertainty are to a large extent cleared. This is 
mainly done in recorded form as e.g. in cognitive maps. “An enacted 
environment is a historical document, stored in the retention process, usually in 
the form of a cause map, that can be superimposed on subsequent activities“ 
(Weick, 1979: 229). Through discrediting, organisation members can determine 
whether this knowledge can remain unaltered. ‘Discrediting’ remains mainly as a 
verb belonging to people who “oppose, argue, contradict, disbelieve, doubt, act 
hypocritically, improvise, counter, distrust, differ, challenge, vacillate, question, 
puncture, disprove and expose” (Weick, 1979. 229). This brings ambivalence 
and equivalence into the organisational process once again. Discrediting means 
both delaying retention for as long as possible and questioning previous 
FROM ORGANISATION TO ORGANISING   52 
 
 
retentions. Weick situates discrediting in the tension between flexibility and 
stability, between multiplicity and uniformity. With discrediting, a company is 
caught up in an interplay of doubting what it knows and what it doubts. 
However, these doubts become the motor of organisational change. This is rather 
unusual for organisation theories as certainty is normally the prevailing principle. 
Through discrediting, one can acquire a fuller meaning and a variation in the 
interpretation which each experiment brings with it. This results in the possibility 
of new actions.  
 
Organising as a social process 
The organising process consists of enactment, selection and retention and takes 
place in the interactions implicit in acting, interpreting and understanding 
(Weick, 1979). Organisational actions, interpretations and knowledge do not take 
place in a vacuum but they are all social acts. In these, organisational members 
come to agreements about their perspectives. The activities of an organisation 
come into being through a flow of interactions between individuals, groups, 
departments, cultures and organisations. Thus, an organisation is a social 
construction. Organising is the process whereby people continuously make their 
organisation. They question it, rediscover it, confirm it, present it, establish it and 
break it open. In other words, they invent it on the basis of interactions between 
individuals and groups of individuals. Weick introduced a relational language 
since “most ‘things’ in organizations are actually relationships” (1979: 88). 
These are relationships between events, variables and social relationships. The 
latter are characterised by interdependence, a term that emphasises the circular 
nature of interaction. He describes the organisational flow in terms of everyday 
interactions. The basic unit to look at organisations are double interacts and 
interlocked behaviour cycles as Weick calls it. The double interact is the minimal 
form of a social process, namely when a person acts in relation to another one 
who is responsive to the first person, who is again responsive to the second 
person.28 This double interact is the minimal form in which equivocality can 
become reduced. It is the unit in which the actions of persons become mutually 
meaningful. This is a minimal social situation or a form of pure organising. 
Without the possibility of a double interact, as in the situation of authoritative 
                                              
28 The double interact is what Parsons has called double contingency (Parsons & Tolman, 1951: 
3-29). See also Luhmann (1984: Ch 3). 
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power or bureaucratic activity, no open responsiveness and no redefinition is 
possible and the social process becomes reified. 
Double interacts can also be seen as repetitive cycles of double interactions, 
which Weick called a cycle of interlocked behaviours. Double interacts become 
cycles of interlocked behaviours when they assume the notions of ‘assembly 
rules’ and ‘grammar’. From this consecution of double interacts and cycles of 
interlocked behaviours, Weick tries to explain how longer sequences of 
organising can become intelligibly understood. He assumes that collective 
structures evolve from the repetition of cycles of interlocked behaviours and 
double interacts. He constructs the rise of organisations out of minimal social 
situations which is a useful approach to take in a thesis of entrepreneurship. A 
new organisation comes into being out of the interaction of one or two 
entrepreneurs and a handful of co-actors (Bouwen et al., 1990a).  
 
The concept of collective structure was first used by Allport (1962). Whenever 
there is a “pluralistic situation in which in order for an individual (or class of 
individuals) to perform some act (or have some experience) that he ‘desires’ to 
perform (or for which he is ‘set’) it is necessary that another person (or persons) 
perform certain acts (either similar or different and complementary to his own), 
we have what can be called a fact of collective structure” (Allport, 1962: 17). He 
gave one answer why people come, work or live together. Weick developed this 
further towards a group model which can be applied to young ventures as well. 
People meet each other initially not around social goals, but around social means. 
“Partners in a collective structure share space, time, and energy, but they need 
not share visions, aspirations, or intentions” (Weick, 1979: 91). Interdependence 
is more readily found in the area of means than the area of intentions. When we 
look at new ventures in their initial phase, we can see that partnerships arose 
because two or more people have often worked together for a time in another 
company and discovered that their combined competencies and sheer presence 
together could form the basis for their own company. However, they have never 
spoken of shared visions or objectives. Weick sees social structures as coming 
into being in this way. “Perhaps the most important consequences of treating the 
developmental sequence as starting with diverse means (towards) common 
means is that it preserves the crucial point that people create social structure” 
(Weick, 1979: 92). Only later do these structures begin to evolve towards social 
objectives of which the first is the preservation of the group. As a result of this 
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process, different intentions will appear. Organising consists of the alternation 
between collectivity and diversity.  
With this social conceptualisation of organising processes, Weick went beyond 
the individualised conception of organising on the micro level and also avoids 
the macro level. He argued on the meso level on which people make agreements, 
show leadership, negotiate and communicate. 
 
Figure 5: An exemplifying study using Weick’s concept 
 
Weick’s theory (1969; 1979) on organising is very intriguing and has inspired many 
researchers. However, his ideas are used as a perspective rather than a theory and no 
study shows how to apply it rigorously. In addition, all these studies refer to 
Weick’s concepts of organising and sensemaking at the same time. He elaborates on 
sensemaking in his last two books “Sensemaking in Organisations” (1995) and 
“Making Sense of the Organisation” (2000). Sensemaking is based on the concept 
of organising as a process, but can be seen as an advancement of his first two books. 
Studying his own research, the majority of articles published are conceptual and 
only very few are empirically based. Looking at his book “Making Sense of the 
Organization” (Weick, 2000) which is a collection of his major articles, the 
impression prevails that there is not one empirical study which covers all of his 
concept. Instead each paper deals with one of the major components of 
sensemaking. Thus there are papers about the ecological change, some about 
enactment, selection or retention. 
For an illustration of the organising/sensemaking perspective by Weick, the study 
by Porac, Thomas and Baden-Fuller (1989) “Competitive groups as cognitive 
communities: The case of Scottish knitwear manufacturers” will by exemplified. 
The article explores how the mental models of organisational strategists determine 
perceptions of competing organisations and responses to competitive conditions. 
The authors have studied 17 Scottish companies manufacturing ‘high quality’ 
knitted outwear over a period of three years, conducting extensive semi-structured 
interviews. It is suggested that the Scottish knitwear sector exists as it is because the 
mental models of the decision makers intertwine to create a stable set of transactions 
in the marketplace. Core identity and causal beliefs allow managers to define 
competitive boundaries and make sense of interactions within these boundaries. The 
authors suggest that such beliefs are reinforced by a mutual enactment process. In 
this the technical choices (i.e. resource exchanges) of firms constrain the flow of 
information back to decision makers, thereby limiting their vision of the 
marketplace to that which has already been determined by existing beliefs. 
 
Source: Author, based on the article by Porac, Thomas and Baden-Fuller (1989)  
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3.4 Conclusion: disregard of new ventures in organisation theory  
This chapter started by discussing different definitions of an organisation and the 
implications of the differences. Afterwards the development of organisation 
design theory was depicted. It has been shown that most theories are based on an 
objective and static perspective of organisations. However, analysing new 
ventures and their organisational properties and developments, more dynamic 
approaches are needed. Thus a general dissatisfaction with the objective 
approaches to organising can be seen. First, these theories are a simplistic notion 
of ‘fit’, i.e. either mission fit, goal fit, structure fit or the like. And second, 
traditional organisation theory has been merely developed for large organisations. 
The studies hardly take any specific characteristics of new or small ventures into 
consideration.  
In contrast to this, the subjective view focuses on a constructivist perspective on 
organisations allowing for seeing the patterns organisational members create 
through their interactions. However, two needs were articulated which 
accomplish this subjective view to be better suited for new ventures. These are 
the use of a processual language and the acknowledgement of dilemmas. 
 
To apply an ‘organising as’ perspective on new ventures makes up for the 
inconsistencies and criticisms identified before. Following Weick, organising is 
the “resolving of equivocality in an enacted environment by means of interlocked 
behaviors embedded in conditionally related processes” (1979: 91). To stronger 
emphasise the dynamic perspective on organisations, Weick’s theory of 
organising was introduced. The cyclical process comprises selection, enactment 
and retention as the three main concepts. The selection process is based on 
retrospective sensemaking which needs to be critically assessed in new ventures, 
as these do not have a history of their own in which to base the retrospective 
view. Therefore this study tries to find out how new ventures compensate for it 
and on which mechanisms they base their selection on.  
 
To complete the discussion of organising in new ventures, the next chapter will 
focus on the emergence of organisations in general and organising principles in 
particular. The emergence perspective could be seen as an addition to 
organisation theory to pay attention to new ventures.  
CREATION AND EMERGENCE   56 
 
 
4 Creation and emergence  
“Rather than asking, e.g. if strategy or technology determine structure, we need 
to ask how these emerge, are maintained, abolished, or aligned in the flow of 
members’ actions and interactions.” (Bouchikhi, 1998: 229). However, 
emergence is a multi-level phenomenon.29 Regarding organisations and their 
existence, emergence can be analysed on three levels. The first is the emergence 
of new industries and populations of organisations as analysed by Schumpeter 
(1912) and later evolutionary theorists (Aldrich, 1979; Hannan et al., 1977). The 
second level analyses aspects regarding the emergence of single organisations as 
such, e.g. what are factors enabling a foundation? The last level is a micro-level 
describing the emergence of structures, routines and other social phenomena 
within the single organisation. In the following, all three levels will be discussed, 
although the emphasis will be on the second and especially the last aspect. 
However, before doing so, general thoughts about emergence as a phenomenon 
and its assumption from a social constructivist perspective shall be made.  
 
4.1 Chia’s process approach 
What is emergence? Where does it start and where does it end? The meaning of 
emergence is often vague and varies in literature, usually emphasising bottom-up 
processes, self-organisation, internal dynamics and the absence of central design 
and determination (Van de Ven & Garud, 1989). Stein (2000) defines emergence 
as the turning up of not noticed and thus new or witty characteristics, thoughts, 
concepts or strategies. Mintzberg can be named as one example who 
differentiated between intentional and emergent strategies (1978: 945; 1994: 23-
25). For him, organising is not only the result of planning but can be seen as an 
emerging pattern.  
Prominent accounts of the emergence of organisations are population ecology 
(Hannan et al., 1977; Hannan & Carroll, 1995) and punctuated equilibrium 
(Gersick, 1988; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). However, these ‘traditional’ 
theories are built on the idea of stasis or equilibrium as the natural state of the 
social world (e.g. Chia, 2002; Weber & Vogus, 2002). Organisational features 
are seen as developing from the “interactions of individuals much in the same 
                                              
29 For different forms of emergence from a systems philosophy approach, see Laszlo (1972: 
176). 
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way that snowflakes or ice-crystals develop from interactions of molecules” 
(Sandelands & Drazin, 1989: 473). As such, the language of agency, 
intentionality, choice, consequentiality and meaning dominates the organisation 
theory literature.  
 
The underlying view is that the world is an ontology of being. “If the emergence 
of novelty has to do with time and paradoxy, you can see why wherever the 
emergence of novelty is the matter, traditional theory cannot contribute much. 
Traditional theory is grounded on a logic of being, but not on a logic of 
becoming.” (zu Knyphausen, 1992: 146, translated by author). One way of using 
the ontology of becoming is by applying a genuine processual and emergent 
approach as e.g. described by Chia (2002). He articulated a comprehensive 
exposition of a process approach to the understanding of organisation as a social 
phenomenon. His approach is based on process metaphysics seeing the reality as 
continuously changing and in flux. Social entities such as individuals and 
organisations are manifestations of an underlying fluxing and transforming 
reality. Identities and attributes are themselves emergent qualities and they reflect 
our own temporarily stabilised conceptualisation. Individuals and organisations 
emerge as the loci of development within relational fields of social interactions. 
They are an outcome of unfolding events and happenings. As a consequence, 
events and occurrences rather than things are the basic unit of reality.  
Change is the pervasive phenomenon whilst stability, order and organisation 
represent the productive efforts of human intervention to temporarily push back 
the immanent forces of change. In that sense, an “organisation is nothing more 
than pockets of artificially stabilised patterns of interaction amidst this sea of 
ceaseless change” (Chia, 2002: 13). However, organisations aim at fixing, 
stabilising, ordering and regulating human interactions so that predictability and 
productivity in social exchange can be achieved. 
 
The couplet of structure and process is a major analytical axis for explaining 
organisational reality in mainstream organisation theory. Traditionally, structure 
and form are conceived as objective facts, existing independently of the observer. 
And process is thus what a structural form undergoes during transition or it is 
that what goes on within established structures. In Chia’s approach, structures 
and processes are both based on events as is illustrated in figure 6 below. For 
Chia, structures are then “events that manifest relative stability either because 
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their rate of change is slow in relation to the observer, or because their change is 
linear and rhythmic and hence uniform” (2002: 15).  
 
Figure 6: The relatedness of events, structures and processes 
Source: Chia (2002: 16) 
 
In this sense, organisations are event-structures that guide future human actions. 
And “organizational emergence is the re-weaving of actors’ webs of beliefs and 
habits of action as a result of new experiences obtained through ongoing 
interactions with ‘its’ environment” (Chia, 2002: 21). Thus, emergence is an 
ongoing process in which actors try to make sense of it and try to act coherently.  
 
As in other fields of social science, the focus shifted from “nouns to verbs, from 
being to becoming and from what (traits you have) to how (you make this work). 
These studies can be described as an opening for a weak ontology, or weak 
thinking in theorising” (Hjorth, 2001: 203). This can also be seen in 
entrepreneurship as in writings of Gartner et al. (e.g. Gartner, 1993; Gartner & 
Gatewood, 1992b; Gartner et al., 1992a) where the attention to the emerging, 
mutually creative relation between context and problem are acknowledged. 
 
This means that stability and structural patterns are seen as the unproblematic 
essence of organisation, while emergence and change is problematic or even 
opposite to organisation. Rather the natural state of the world is regarded as a 
flux, a contourless flow of action and experience.30 Organisation becomes thus an 
ongoing accomplishment that is actively contested and negotiated among 
                                              
30 See also explanation about the metaphor of flux in chapter 3.2.1. 
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participants. It thus reflects a practice centered study of social life (cf. Schatzki et 
al., 2001).  
 
4.2 The emergence of new industries 
Schumpeter (1929) argued that the creation of new technologies is largely 
responsible for the development of new industries. Periods of rapid and 
discontinuous change fosters this (Scott, 1998: CH. 7).  
However, the creation of new industries requires the development of an entire 
new community of single organisations which in total form the community. 
Certain financial, political and social institutions are needed to support these 
foundation efforts (Scott, 1998: Ch. 7; Stinchcombe, 1965). This is either done 
by motivating individuals to form and join such social units or by improving the 
chances that these units, once formed, will survive.  
Due to similar societal circumstances, cohorts of new ventures tend to exhibit 
similar structural features. Evolutionary theories argue that basic characteristics 
present at the time of foundation tend to be imprinted and thus retain. As a result, 
there tends to be a strong correlation between the structural form exhibited by an 
organisation and the date of its foundation (Scott, 1998: Ch. 7). 
 
This development can be demonstrated for Germany in the late 1990s. The rise 
of the internet enabled new and unforeseen economic opportunities. Complete 
new industries, job profiles and relationships emerged. All this met in the 
creation of vast numbers of new ventures. But, the financial possibilities were 
limited in Germany in the sense that venture capital on an institutionalised basis 
was hardly existing (Hellmann et al., 2001). The first foot on the venture capital 
market had been set by ‘Technologieholding’ which was founded in 1987. 
However, not before the late 1990s, the venture capital market had been fully 
established.31 The government tried to support venture capital by providing 
federal funds. Initiatives such as the tbg (Technologie-Beteiligungs-Gesellschaft) 
and the KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) granted financial resources. And 
the opening of “Neuer Markt” in March 1997 created an ideal exit option for 
venture capitalists.  
                                              
31 For an overview of German venture capital market, see Hellmann and Fiedler (2001), and 
Koehnemann (2004) and chapter 6.1.3.  
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The above illustrates how the internet revolution has led to the emergence of a 
complete new industry, i.e. venture capital. And this also resulted in new 
business models and new ventures alike (Hellmann et al., 2001). The aspect of 
new ventures emerging will be the focus of the next section. 
 
4.3 Creation processes of new organisations 
General economic and societal factors (Stinchcombe, 1965; Hanlon & Saunders, 
2001; Aldrich & Whetten, 1981) play an important factor in the foundation rate 
of new ventures. But what are reasons for and against the foundation of a new 
venture from the point of view of the single organisation and its possible 
founders?  
The basic reason for founding an organisation is the division of labour, argued 
Adam Smith in 1776. However, work division also entails overhead costs. 
Someone must design, control and coordinate the divided work. Coase (1937) 
and Williamson (1975; 1996) introduced the reduction of transaction costs as an 
alternative explanation for the emergence of organisations. The coupling of 
cognitive limitations with high levels of uncertainty and complexity encourages 
individuals to move the affected transactions out of markets into organisations.32 
Later, (new) institutional theorists argued that the existing organisations and the 
general broad belief in these organisations are the main reason for new ones to 
found. “The growth of rationalized institutional structures in society makes 
formal organizations more common and more elaborate. Such institutions are 
myths which make formal organizations both easier to create and more 
necessary. After all, the building blocks for organizations come to be littered 
around the societal landscape; it takes only a little entrepreneurial energy to 
assemble them into a structure” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 345). 
 
The process of creating a new organisation is an individual level phenomenon. It 
is the individual’s actions which lead to a new organisation (Delmar et al., 2001). 
However, the formation of a new organisation occurs within a particular context 
(Gartner, 1985; Schoonhoven & Romanelli, 2001) which is influenced by 
environmental, economic, social and political factors. But the founder’s actions 
are also embedded in this context. And these behaviours are seen as a process as 
                                              
32 For a historical overview about the emergence of organisations as an institution in Germany, 
see Kieser and Kubicek (1992: 3-4). 
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they occur over a period of time, although they convey the impression of limited 
and concrete events. But in fact, they require series of actions (Gartner et al., 
2003). 
 
Recent studies have analysed single steps an entrepreneur takes when founding a 
new venture. Birley (1984) proposed eight different events in the incubation 
process. These events are assumed to occur in the following order: (1) owner’s 
decision to start firm; (2) owner becomes self-employed; (3) incorporation; (4) 
bank account established; (5) premises and equipment acquired; (6) first order 
received; (7) tax first paid and (8) first full-time employees hired. Reynolds and 
Miller (1992) reduce this enumeration to four events with personal commitment, 
financial support, sales and hiring. When all four events have occurred, they 
speak of a fully established firm. Delmar and Shane (2001) posed the question 
whether the choice and order of such firm organising processes have an influence 
on the survival of new ventures. They found out that undertaking activities to 
generate legitimacy reduces the hazard of early disbanding. And that the initial 
survival fitness of new ventures depends on evolutionary processes prior to the 
legal foundation.  
Factors and causes that might lead to the initiation of organisation formation 
activities have also been the subject of two special issues of ‘Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice’ (1992; 1993) with a total of nineteen articles addressing the 
topic. However, Gartner and Starr (1993) already indicated that “the 
predominant way in which entrepreneurial activity was construed involved 
viewing the process of organization creation in a mechanistic way (Morgan, 
1986), that is, seeing entrepreneurial activity as a set of behaviors involved with 
assembling various resources that can ultimately be combined into an 
organization” (Gartner et al., 2003: 16).  
 
Rather than discussion a prevailing order, Katz and Gartner (1988) identified four 
characteristics of ongoing organisations instead: intention to achieve an explicit 
organisation purpose, assembling resources like financial support and expertise, 
creating a boundary e.g. incorporation and finally exchanges, i.e. trading 
resources across the boundary. They have shown that the organisation’s 
emergence is a chaotic and uneven process which often does not succeed. To pay 
tribute to this circumstance, rather than speaking of birth which implies a smooth 
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process, founding and constructing are the terms used. Through this, language 
already shows the disorderly process (Aldrich, 1999: 77).  
 
Two general problems should be mentioned which are linked with the analysis of 
emerging organisations. First, there is automatically a ‘success bias’ as most 
studies are based on successfully founded organisations (Aldrich et al., 1989; 
Katz et al., 1988). Second, there is the question, when a new organisation is 
founded. What is the proper point of time to speak of a new venture’s 
foundation? “The most important implication is the importance of separating the 
founding process into two parts. The gestation period, from conception to birth, 
should be treated separately from the post-birth period” (Reynolds et al., 1992: 
416). However, this differentiation is often difficult to do (Gartner et al., 2003).  
 
4.4 Emergence processes within the single organisation  
After the previous section has answered the question why organisations as such 
would emerge, the emergence of internal organisational processes will now be 
analysed. This encompasses the emergence of structures, rules and routines 
within a newly founded venture.  
 
“Studies of emerging organizations show that most grow opportunistically, 
rather than by following a pre-set plan. Opportunistic growth […] threatens the 
coherence of new organizations” (Aldrich, 1999: 119). This quotation implies 
that organising needs to be organised and that it should receive some attention. 
As Blau (1970) noted, growth tends to increase horizontal and vertical 
complexity in organisations which creates a major administrative challenge for 
its managers.  
Aldrich (1999) showed why the majority of new venture founders reproduces 
existing organisational forms. He argued that fundamental rules of organising 
exist in all modern societies. However, these may vary across societies and 
states. Strategies of action are generated by “the symbolic experiences, mythic 
lore, and ritual practices of a group or society [that] create moods and 
motivations, ways of organizing experience and evaluating reality, modes of 
regulating conduct, and ways of forming bonds” (Swidler, 1986: 284). These 
rules are part of the behavioural repertoire of socialised people who understand 
and use these rules as guides through most social situations. As an organisation is 
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a social model based on rules of any society, an entrepreneur builds his 
organisation on these rules as he takes them for granted.33 As most entrepreneurs 
simply try to reproduce most common organising principles, the knowledge to do 
so must be widely available. One source for rules is knowledge and contacts 
made in a previous job. But what happens if the founders have hardly any work 
experience, e.g. if they are university graduates?  
Next to organisational forms and rules, structures emerge, too. Giddens (1984) 
argues that structures exist only because of structured organising. And 
organisational structures exist only in the form of organised organising. 
Structures can be changed and thus emerge if organising is changed. The duality 
of structure means that structures are the means and the product of organising 
alike. They are enabling and restricting organising (cf. Ortmann et al., 1997).  
 
If an entrepreneur organises his company, he relies very much on his experience 
when structuring processes. Löwstedt (1993) found in his study that the way in 
which entrepreneurs think about organising affects the eventual structure of their 
emergent organisations. To a certain extent, founders try to reproduce existing 
forms when founding a new venture, but they are nonetheless engaged in a 
discovery process, facing the challenge to create new knowledge on organising 
themselves (Aldrich, 1999). When trying to ‘objectively’ capture the emergence 
of organising in new ventures, one would overlook how and why these emerged.  
An entrepreneur needs to improvise a lot when founding a new venture. Hardly 
any organising processes are fixed. The founders need to recall, develop and 
apply knowledge under extreme time pressure (Moorman & Miner, 1998). As 
soon as an organising process has been thought out conceptually, it is already 
implemented and executed. In contrast to established organisations in which 
managers have time to contemplate about their options, the entrepreneur must act 
immediately and has no time for reflection. However, this provides better 
learning opportunities (Sitkin, 1992). Lant and Mezias (1990) showed how this 
improvisation process allows for blind variations and novelties through which 
new organising processes can emerge. But this period of improvisation and 
possible emerging of new organising principles is limited to the beginning of the 
new venture (Gersick, 1994).  
                                              
33 For rules and their origin, see Geertz (1973) and Giddens (1984). 
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Rather many organising processes are inevitably linked to the hiring of the first 
employee. Already early decisions, e.g. which applicant to hire or which tasks 
and jobs to give to whom, have lasting impacts on the new venture. If the 
organisation has hired its first employee, a division of labour and tasks begins to 
form alongside the emergence of a community of practice (Hanks & Chandler, 
1994). The latter is the patterned social interactions between organisational 
members that sustain organisational knowledge and facilitate its reproduction. 
“In the uncertain atmosphere of a startup, an organization’s structure bears only 
a remote resemblance to the pictures painted in management or human resource 
textbooks” (Aldrich, 1999: 127) 
The first jobs to offer are mainly idiosyncratic jobs, i.e. jobs that are created 
around individuals. It is a matter of getting to know the new employee’s abilities 
and competencies and later creating jobs around those. These new members are 
often hired without existing job descriptions. A labour division is mainly the 
result of the emergence of idiosyncratic jobs, the responses to organisational 
problems encountered during the beginning and the founders’ initial plans 
(Aldrich, 1999). 
New and existing organisational members construct their roles through frequent 
interactions. Eventually, a shared understanding is developed that facilitates the 
reproduction of organisational routines. The patterned social interactions between 
the members constitute a community of practice. Organisational coherence 
emerges as members’ activities begin to involve them more deeply in 
communities of practice.  
 
4.5 Conclusion: emergence processes in team based ventures 
need more attention 
This chapter introduced emergence and emerging processes in organisations. 
Emerging as an ongoing phenomenon should not be seen from an ontology of 
being as most traditional theories do. Instead an ontology of becoming is 
proposed as the reality is constantly changing and in flux. And emergence is 
viewed as the result of social interactions. It is an ongoing process of which the 
founders and organisational members need to make sense of. More attention on 
this perspective should be paid when analysing new ventures and their organising 
processes. Especially as new ventures start from scratch, the emerging organising 
processes need to be looked at.  
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Organisation theory has identified three different levels on which emergence is 
important. These are the emergence of complete new industries, the emergence 
of a new organisation and the emergence of processes and patterns within a 
single organisation. The first is important insofar as external factors need to be 
identified which have enabled the emergence of each single venture. The 
question is whether the founders would have founded a company irrespectably of 
the general economic situation. On the second level, the traditional theory keeps 
lower transaction costs as the reason for founding a venture. However, the study 
aims at exploring whether this is a prerequisite or at identifying other reasons. 
Some entrepreneurship studies have taken a rather mechanistic perspective when 
looking at different steps leading to the foundation of a new venture. The 
question arises how a new venture which does not show these steps comes into 
being and how it copes with the uneven process instead. On the last, the 
individual company level, research suggests that founders are copying existing 
organising rules. These are mainly acquired during the founder’s previous work 
experience. What if the venture is founded by a team? Do all founders have 
adopted the same rules? As the empirical study is based on founders which 
hardly have any work experience, which organising rules do they adopt? 
 
In the course of the analyses of entrepreneurship, organisation and emergence 
theories in the previous chapters, many unclear aspects and questions were 
identified. It is therefore necessary to conduct an empirical study and explore 
how the founders and organisational members in new ventures have dealt with 
them. Therefore, the following chapter will focus on the research questions and 
the epistemological and methodological implications resulting from them.  
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5 Research questions and methodology  
A researcher needs to be a master of questions: research questions, operational 
questions, interview questions or questions of interpretation (Steyaert, 1995). In 
this chapter, the research questions as well as questions concerning the research 
strategy will be answered. The purpose is to give the reader an understanding of 
the methodological reasoning that forms the base for this research project. Given 
the weaknesses of the theory and the studies conducted so far, an exploratory 
study was designed. Therefore a comparative case study method combined with a 
narrative and process analysis focus was applied. The aim has been to get the 
perceptions and logics of those directly involved in the organising processes in 
recently founded companies and to understand these. This chapter also contains 
an epistemological comment to ground the methodology. First, the research 
questions are going to be presented as they form the link between the theoretical 
chapters above and the methodology resulting from these questions.  
 
5.1 Research questions 
In the previous three chapters, the current research in entrepreneurship and 
organisation theory regarding the emergence of new ventures and its organising 
processes have been reviewed. Several shortcomings and open questions were 
identified which have led to the following research questions guiding this study.  
 
Which organising principles emerge in new ventures? 
As the literature review has revealed how little we know about organising in new 
ventures, this basic question needs to be illuminated. An explorative study should 
unfold principles or mechanisms that are of importance during the becoming of 
the venture and its early survival. Which principles can we identify that are 
typical for new ventures in their early phases? What are the reasons for the 
emergence of certain principles? 
 
A very high percentage of new ventures in fast growing industries is not founded 
by a single founder but by a team. The underlying assumption is that team based 
ventures develop differently compared ventures founded by only one individual. 
Rather than an individual entrepreneur who tries to realise his idea of how to set 
up and run a new venture, the entrepreneurial team needs to organise itself first 
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before organising the venture. Therefore another research question deals with 
differences in the organising processes between a single entrepreneur and a team.  
How does the fact, that the new venture was founded by a team rather than by 
one individual, influence the emerging organising processes?  
 
The previous chapters have made clear that most studies in the entrepreneurship 
field are based on concepts from traditional organisation theory. It is mostly 
taken for granted that these automatically fit to new ventures as well. The 
question to ask is whether this transfer is legitimated or whether new ventures 
need to be looked at with different eyes. So far, there hardly exist organising 
principles especially developed for new ventures. Neither have traditional 
organisation theories be evaluated for new or small ventures. Thus besides 
identifying new venture organising processes, traditional concepts need to be 
evaluated to what extent they can be applied to new ventures. As a result the 
following research question arises:  
To what extent can traditional organisation theory be applied to new ventures 
and their organising processes? 
 
Having developed the research questions, a useful research design needs to be set 
up. This starts by defining the research strategy and its methods. These will be 
introduced next.  
 
5.2 Research foundations 
The following section depicts the fundamental ontological and epistemological 
foundations for understanding the assumptions underlying this study. Burrell and 
Morgan point out that one’s “frame of reference, mode of theorising and modus 
operandi” (1979:23) depends upon the basic meta-theoretical assumptions the 
researcher takes. Most studies test theories based on verification or falsification 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Trial-and-error processes are used in order to test and 
modify ideas. Most of those studies are grounded on a positivistic paradigm34 
which assumes that reality is objectively given and can be described by 
measurable properties which are independent of the observer or researcher and 
her instruments. However, this study will be based on an interpretative paradigm 
                                              
34 For detailed information in the concept of a paradigm, see Kuhn “The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions” (1962). 
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which denies the existence of an objective reality but postulates subjective, 
individual and social constructions of the world (Burrell et al., 1979; Morgan, 
1980). Within the interpretative paradigm, the researcher tries to observe on-
going processes to better understand individual behaviour.  
The epistemological and ontological understanding which is depicted above, has 
implications for theory and praxis alike. If everything is constructed, generating 
and testing hypothesis does not make sense. Research can only provide theories 
and constructs which gives others an idea how to see things differently  
(zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, 1995). Giving food for thought is thus one outcome 
theory can accomplish.  
 
As there do not seem to be meaningful concepts or theories regarding organising 
processes in new team-based ventures, their behaviour stands out as being 
irrational, complex and difficult to understand. I therefore find it appropriate to 
conduct an explorative study with the aim to come up with patterns, issues and 
assertions in order to discuss organising processes from a management 
perspective. The purpose is to map out and elaborate on the issues I am studying. 
Having that in mind, a deductive approach is considered inappropriate and an 
inductive approach is chosen instead. To look at an organisation as a complex 
sensemaking process involves the interplay of individuals and social processes. 
Instead of starting with theoretically deducted hypothesis, I start from the actual 
actions and perceptions of the new ventures’ founders and managers. The 
ambition is to explore the issue concerning organising processes and not 
necessarily giving a firm answer. I therefore ground the study on the empirical 
material I collected. Four new ventures were studied closely. The findings will 
not be tested on a large empirical basis afterwards.  
 
Grounding the study on an interpretative and inductive paradigm, a qualitative 
approach is considered to be appropriate. One way of distinguishing between a 
qualitative and quantitative research is to look at the difference between: 
(a) explanation and understanding as the purpose of inquiry,  
(b) a personal and impersonal role for the researcher, and  
(c) knowledge discovered and knowledge constructed (Stake, 1995).  
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A qualitative approach is needed if the following is true (Creswel, 1998): 
? The research questions ask how or what questions instead of why35 
questions. 
? The study is of exploratory nature which means that variables cannot 
easily be identified. This implies a theory-building instead of theory-
testing approach (Eisenhardt, 1989; Snow & Thomas, 1994). The idea is 
to generate new concepts and theories rather than testing existing ones. 
? The study calls for a detailed view of the topic. This is in contrast to a 
quantitative study in which the phenomenon cannot be studied from 
outside and within its context at the same time (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). Conceiving organising processes only from organisational 
snapshots of the topic is hardly possible. The aim is to be able to see 
patterns and links between problems, people, decisions and settings in the 
organisation.  
? It is important to study organisational members in their natural setting. 
Removing them from their usual environment can lead to out-of-context 
results that distort them. In addition, the environment as such can be an 
influencing factor not to be missed.  
 
As all these aspects are in line with the research questions mentioned before. 
Therefore a qualitative, inductive study based on interpretative paradigm will be 
conducted. Deciding for a qualitative research design implies that the study will 
be taking place in its natural setting, i.e. the new ventures. The researcher’s task 
is to collect the data, to analyse it and to focus on the meaning of the participants 
(Creswel, 1998; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994b). Within a qualitative research setting, 
case studies are a well accepted qualitative method (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994a; 
Creswel, 1998; Yin, 1984), especially in organisation research (Ghauri & 
Gronhaug, 2002). The same is true for entrepreneurship research where case 
studies have been well accepted, too (e.g. Eisenhardt et al., 1988; Bouwen et al., 
1990b; Levesque, 2001; Perren & Ram, 2004).  
 
                                              
35 In contrast to this, Yin (1984: 13) also included “why” questions as being suitable for 
qualitative research. This can be explained by a rather positivistic case study approach which 
he proposes. 
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Qualitative research does not only differ from quantitative research in terms of 
methodology but also in the criteria assessing the empirical data. Traditional 
validity and reliability considerations are inadequate in their quantitative 
notions.36  
 
The question of validity in a quantitative research setting concerns the choices of 
the parameters and the representativeness of the sample. In other words, validity 
evaluates whether the research method is capable to measure what it alleges 
measure. Regarding qualitative research, the criterion should asses how well the 
research method corresponds to the studied phenomenon. There should be a 
balance between the research problems and questions, the data gathering and the 
analysing methods. This inner-logic is a major criterion for quality.  
Regarding quantitative research, “reliability is the degree of consistency of 
instances when measured on different occasions by different or the same people 
and with different instruments of the same kind” (Achtenhagen, 2001: 98). 
Reliability refers to the reproducibility and consistency of the data’s processing 
and analysing. Regarding an interpretative approach, it is not that easy to 
reproduce the same results, especially when the researcher moves from 
empiricism to theory, i.e. from the empirical data into the interpretation through 
analysis. It is thus important that during the interpretative process, the reader 
should have the opportunity to follow the researcher’s reasoning. This implies 
that the procedures taken are well documented and comprehensible (Miles et al., 
1994). Another way of achieving a high reliability is triangulation (Jick, 1979). 
Multiple perceptions and methods should be used to gather data in order to 
clarify meanings and to verify the repeatability of the observation or 
interpretation (Stake, 1994). 
 
5.3 Research methodology  
In the following, the research methodology will be introduced more in detail. Out 
of several possible qualitative research approaches such as an ethnographic 
approach, an qualitative experiment or a document analysis (Mayring, 2002), the 
comparative case study approach was chosen and combined with a narrative and 
a processual analysis.  
                                              
36 Note the discussion whether one should apply the same criteria to qualitative research as those 
employed in quantitative research (Denzin et al., 1994a: Part V).  
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5.3.1 The comparative case study approach 
The case study method’s objective is to carry out an intensive study on a specific 
object, usually a social object such as an individual person, a group or a company 
(Stake, 1995). The case study method can be described by gathering data in 
several different ways at a company and thus examining a specific present-day 
event or action in a limited environment (Yin, 1984). The object is studied from 
outside as well as within its context. The research should lead to a holistic, 
thorough and exact description of the object and the factors affecting it. To 
increase the understanding of a phenomenon or to further theory, more than one 
case should be examined (Eisenhardt, 1991). Case study research as an intensive 
method enables to identify essential factors, processes and relationships. An 
additional strength of the case study is its possibility to allow for different 
sources of evidence (Yin, 1984). The aim in conducting a case study is to 
understand the phenomenon from the point of view of the participants and its 
particular social and institutional context. This would be lost if the data was 
quantified (Myers, 1997).  
 
Stake (1994) differentiates between three different case study types: the intrinsic 
one, in which the emphasis is on understanding one particular case without the 
aim to further develop theory; the instrumental type which analyses only one 
case but with the aim to gain further theoretical insights; and the collective type 
in which a number of instrumental studies are carried out. The collective type can 
also be titled a comparative case study. This is especially obvious when cross-
case comparisons lead to a refinement of theory and a drawing of conclusions 
beyond a single case (Eisenhardt, 1991).  
 
Three on-going discussions regarding case study methodology can be identififed. 
The first discussion regards the number of cases needed. Eisenhardt (1989) 
postulates the range from one to ten cases, however favouring between four to 
ten cases. Dyer and Wilkins (1991) argue for a single case study as it contains 
richer data. But Eisenhardt (1991) replies that a single case will not enable 
comparative case studies. In order to combine both arguments, four case studies 
will be conducted. This number of cases still allows for comparisons, but is still 
small enough to enable a thick description and a thorough understanding of each 
case (Rumpf & Zaby, 1997; Zaby, 1999).  
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The second discussion is about whether or not to enter the research field with a 
theoretical concept in mind. Yin (1994) explicitly states that the relevant 
theoretical field should be studied before entering the field. He contrasts this with 
other qualitative methodologies such as ethnography or grounded theory. For him 
no previous theoretical knowledge could be misleading. However, Eisenhardt 
(1989; 1991) is in contrast of the opinion that the researcher should enter the 
field ‘theory-free’, which means that the researcher should not have a theoretical 
concept or proposition in mind but be guided by the cases and their content. 
However, no researcher can be theoretically naïve and there is no way of 
observing the world independent of theory. Not only theoretical discussions but 
even empirical data are theory-laden. Still, the idea to generate theory from 
scratch is tempting because it might promote novelty. The purpose of conducting 
explorative research is to generate concepts and theories that make it possible to 
see things in a new way. However, the theoretical field can still be analysed prior 
to entering the empirical field.  
The last and probably biggest discussion is about the issue of generalisability 
from case study research. The question is how much one can generalise from 
case studies in general and beyond the single case in particular. Yin states that 
“case studies (as with experiments) rely on analytical generalization” (1984: 
39). This is in contrast to other methods, e.g. surveys which rely on statistical 
generalisations. Before the researcher can try to generalise findings to theory, he 
should particularise to show the case’s uniqueness. That makes clear how one 
understands the case and then later how one derives its findings from it (Stake, 
1995). Thereafter, the researcher captures assertions, issues and patterns and 
interprets them. A case study is suitable for enhancing general judgement 
(Rumpf et al., 1997), for refining theory, hypothesis building and revealing 
complexity (Stake, 1994) and for building general arguments (Rumpf et al., 
1997). A thick description can also convey the reader a feeling of having 
experienced the situation himself and thus enable learning and knowledge. The 
cases’ comparison leads to further insights (Stake, 1994). To sum this up, case 
studies enable to show patterns within organisations and facilitate the building of 
concepts and theory in order to see things in a new way.  
 
As the case study approach is a rather broad concept, it makes sense in applying 
special analysis methods which can be combined with it. For studying organising 
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processes in new ventures, a narrative and a process analysis focus were chosen. 
Both complement and enrich the case study approach.  
 
5.3.2 Narrative analysis 
Hjorth (2001: 197) claims that  
“There seems to be an advantage, when making sense of 
entrepreneurial processes, to adopt a narrative approach as the 
emerging shares the ongoingness (temporality) of the stories of the 
self and the world.” 
But what is a narrative? There exists a fast variety of definitions (Achtenhagen & 
Moehle von Hoffmannswaldau, 2002) and most authors use the concepts without 
giving any definition. For example, narratives can be seen as a type of data (cf. 
Pentland, 1999), as the stories told in organisations (e.g. Boje, 1991), stories told 
about organisations (e.g. Calori et al., 2000), the telling about organisations (e.g. 
Steyaert, 1997), as a tool to gather stories in organisations (e.g. Boyce, 1995), 
and as a method of writing up research (e.g. Czarniawska & Wolff, 1998). 
Narrativity is viewed as a specific form of reality construction (Steyaert, 1995). 
Some authors claim narratives to be acontextual (Manning & Cullum-Swan, 
1994) but most authors seem to agree that narratives can link stories to the 
context (e.g. O'Connor, 2000; Steyaert & Bouwen, 1997). In a broad definition, 
narratives “are an account of events or experiences, fact or fiction, long or short, 
detailed or plain” (Phillips, 1995: 629).  
In narrative theory, stories can be viewed as a representation of the events of the 
past (Steyaert, 1995). With other words, a story is one individualised version of a 
narrative (Pentland, 1999). Schwartzman (1993: 44) points out that stories fulfil 
different purposes within an organisation. He lists six reasons for why they are 
important. Stories are  
1. communicating historical experiences and provide individuals with a way 
to weave this experience into discussions of current activities; 
2. distinguishing one’s organisation as the best and/or worst and also for 
stereotyping other organisations; 
3. socialising new members into an organisation; 
4. documenting successes and failures and drawing conclusions (morals) 
from these examples; 
5. indirectly communicating information to individuals about a range of 
issues that may be too sensitive or threatening to discuss directly; 
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6. shaping and sustaining individuals’ images of the organisation in which 
they work. 
Taken together, all these six aspects could play an important role for the 
organising processes in new ventures, too. It will be interesting to see which of 
them can be detected in the empirical study.  
 
Concerning organisation studies, Czarniawska (1998; 2003) differentiates 
between three approaches regarding stories in organisation research. 
1. Research that is written in a story-like way (‘tales from the field’): this 
can especially be seen in case studies used as a teaching method. The 
students are given the circumstances and the problem and they have to fill 
in the action that would be possible. The general assumption with this 
form is that conveying the content via a storytelling mode is more 
effective than via the traditional scientific mode. 
2. Research that collects organisational stories (‘tales of the field’): here, the 
stories told in and by an organisation are being researched. Instead of data, 
the researcher collects accounts. The stories are a way of constructing 
meaning in an organisation. This form received much influence from 
Weick’s sense-making works (1995). Stories do simplify reality but 
actually less than formal models do. Phillips (1995) argues strongly for the 
legitimacy of narrative fiction in organisation studies, not only in form of 
stories, but also in form of plays, songs, poems etc.  
3. Research that conceptualises organisational life as story making and 
organisational theory as story reading (interpretative approach): Similar 
to interpretative approaches like organisational symbolism, the aim is to 
engage in a dialogue with the field via a story. This is in a way research as 
sensemaking à la Weick.  
 
These three approaches should be regarded as ‘ideal-types’ and we will often find 
an overlap between them. In this study, I will focus on the second approach in 
which I will reconstruct the stories told by organisational members about the 
organisational settings and interpret them. However, I will also refer to stories 
told in the organisation. I consider this approach most useful for my purpose as I 
want to reconstruct what organising means in new ventures. I have argued above 
that the static view on organisations fails to grasp the emerging elements of 
organising processes. Using stories allows for a “multiplicity of events to be 
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flexibly connected along time” (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997: 667) and which 
results in producing more dynamic theories (Calori et al., 2000). Following 
Steyaert (1997), stories are a fruitful approach to cope with an organisation’s 
complexity as they deal with the inner as well as the outer context and address 
conscious and unconscious levels within an organisation. This is supported by 
Hjorth (2003) who claims that storytelling contextualises the events of 
entrepreneurship rather than constructing normative and idealised knowledge. 
 
5.3.3 Process analysis  
As the entrepreneurial context is highly dynamic and entrepreneurship has been 
described as a process in chapter 2.3.3., a process analysis seems more than 
appropriate. But what is a process and what is a processual analysis? Van de Ven 
(1992) identified three different meanings and ways in which the concept of a 
process is used in research: 
1. as a logic used to explain a causal relationship in a variance theory; 
2. as a category of concepts that refer to actions of individuals or 
organisations; 
3. as a sequence of events that describe how things change over time. 
 
The focus in this study will be upon the last two aspects. Process analysis means 
not to focus on one point of time but rather on the sequence of events, actions 
and changes that occur during a longer period. A dynamic rather than a static 
perspective is to be taken. But it is crucial to note that it is not a matter of simply 
describing the historical sequences but to identify the patterns within these 
processes. Special consideration will be given to the inner and outer context 
within which the new ventures emerge and develop. A certain degree of 
embeddedness enables interconnectedness between the different contexts and 
points in time (Pettigrew, 1992).  
In order to emphasise a study’s process character, attention should also be paid to 
the use of a process language (cf. Gartner, 1993; Steyaert, 1997; Pettigrew, 1997) 
as the choice of words have an impact on the perspective and way of thinking. 
This need has already been elaborated in chapter 2.3.3.  
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5.4 Research design 
In accordance with the research questions and the subsequent methodology, the 
research design will be deducted and explained. This encompasses the choice of 
the case study companies as well as how to collect the data and afterwards how 
to analyse it.  
 
5.4.1 Choice of case study companies 
Sampling the cases is of great importance when conducting qualitative and 
especially case study research. However, as Stake (1995: 4) puts it “Case study is 
not sampling research”. One way of choosing the case companies is by 
searching for those which represent extreme positions in the field (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Pettigrew, 1990) in order to gain a high variance. On the other hand, the 
foremost aim is to understand the case thus the selection is only of relative 
importance (Stake, 1995). As organising processes take place in all new ventures 
alike, extreme positions do not exist within this field. However, to make 
comparability easier and to comply with the research questions, certain criteria 
were developed which the companies should match. These selection criteria are 
the following:  
? The companies have to be founded by a team. The reasoning for having 
chosen team-based foundations was to avoid that the company is mainly 
influenced by one dominant person. It is assumed that a venture that is 
founded by only one individual founder and not a team is much more 
stamped by his ideas, ideals and visions. I think it is more interesting and 
important to analyse how a team of founders thinks, feels and acts when 
shaping the organisation together. Thus their interactions are an important 
factor in the organising processes. In my study the size of the founding 
teams vary between three and eight founders. 
? The ventures should not have been founded before 1999. Otherwise the 
founding period would be too long ago to recall and remember events and 
lines of action that occurred. And 1999 was still in the midst of the 
internet hype in Germany which had created certain external factors such 
as the possibility to attract venture capital. Out of the four companies 
chosen, three were founded in 2000 and one already in 1999.  
? The new venture should not be a spin-off from an existing company as 
otherwise the incumbent’s organising processes and culture are transferred 
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too easily. This was true for three companies. One company 
(technology.com) was actually based on an existing company. However, 
only the name was transferred. Otherwise the first company continued to 
exist. In that case, the new company can be regarded as a new venture.  
? The majority of the founders should more or less just have graduated or 
been working at university. This should enable findings which are not too 
much influenced by previous work experience from being a member of a 
company.  
? To eliminate certain industry specific characteristics, all four ventures 
should be situated in the internet industry.  
? Finally, the companies should show a sign of rapid growth in terms of e.g. 
employees. Assuming that certain organising processes and structures are 
linked to a certain company size, there should at least be twenty people 
working at the company at one point in time.  
 
Having set up these requirements, there was the question of getting access to four 
young companies. Two companies (x-it.com and letters.de) were chosen as there 
had been a contact from previous research. The other two ventures 
(technology.com and talk-to-me.com) were identified with the help of the 
regional business plan competition which was regarded as a suitable information 
source for relevant companies. The companies were contacted and asked for 
cooperation. From the beginning, it had been made clear that interviews with all 
founders should be possible and that recording the interviews will be allowed.  
In the end, four case companies were identified which supported the study. The 
following figure gives an overview of the ventures that had been studied. 
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Figure 7: Overview of the case study companies37 
 technology.com x-it.com letters.de talk-to-me.com
Industry  
Software 
development & 
consulting 
Software 
development & 
consulting 
B2B bookseller 
Natural speech 
dialogue 
systems 
No. of founders 5 3 5 8 
Month/year of 
foundation August 2000 June 2000 September 1999 March 2000 
Legal form AG GmbH GmbH AG 
Highest No. of 
employees with 
company 
43* 
in April 2002 
24 
in March 2001 
20  
in March 2001 
22 
in June 2002 
No. of employees in 
Dec. 2002  
(end of study) 
20* 7 10 22 
No. of people 
interviewed 3 3 4 3 
No. of interviews 
with company 5 3 5 3 
Research period Dec. 2001 – Dec. 2002 
Feb. 2002 – 
Dec. 2002 
Sept. 2001 – 
Dec. 2002 
Sep. 2001 – 
Dec. 2002 
Source: Author      * not including the US subsidiary 
 
5.4.2 Collecting the data 
Choosing the data collection method depends on the paradigm of the discipline, 
the nature of the research object and the research questions. It is therefore not 
merely a means for carrying out the research project. Regardless of the chosen 
methods, it is important to remember that the researcher’s personal influence is 
always crucial. She decides how the data is gathered, which aspects are taken 
into account, what is emphasised and which factors do not require as much 
attention and consideration. Dey (1995) has pointed out that data is not ‘out 
there’ waiting to be picked. On the contrary, data gathering means not only the 
choice for content but also the influence of several technical factors, such as 
making notes, recording, photographing, etc. 
 
For this study, the data collection took place between September 2001 and 
December 2002. The method chosen is mainly interviews but enriched with 
                                              
37 All company names and those from its members have been made anonymous.  
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company and secondary material such as web based-information, company 
brochures and business plans. Company documents do not present an 
individual’s opinion or impression but rather the company’s official perspective. 
They are an information source to add to the interviews. Current and former web 
pages had also been a rich data source. The internet archive (www.archive.org) 
has been a useful information source. To have the possibility to fall back on all 
these various data sources allowed for triangulation. Building the study on 
different types of data can improve the accuracy of the study by better 
judgements and a more holistic view in general (Jick, 1979). 
 
An interview is considered to be especially suitable if the information needed 
relates to attitudes, opinions, experiences and observations of events, phenomena 
or organisational developments. The main attention should be paid to the 
interviewee’s verbal expressions but any non-verbal expressions such as 
gestures, emphasis, various unintentional and intentional sounds should also be 
noted and taken into account. However, there exists a wide range of different 
kinds of interview forms, ranging from very structured interviews with closed 
questions to unstructured open or group interviews. For this study, a very open 
and only loosely structured interview form was chosen, i.e. the narrative 
interview. In these narrative interviews, the interviewee is asked to tell stories 
regarding the research questions (Mayring, 2002). The narrative interview is 
appropriate when subjective incidents and phenomena are of interest, i.e. 
perceptible transformation processes, projects or crises. The aim is that the 
interviewee is not only reporting, describing or arguing but reconstructing self-
experienced events and phenomena. Very general questions such as ‘How did it 
all start?’ or ‘How did the venture or project develop over time?’ are used to get 
the interview started and going. The interviews were thus conducted in a 
conversational style (Burgess, 1988). Closed questions should be avoided if 
possible. Asking the interviewee to give examples or illustrations often lead to 
stories (Schwartzman, 1993). Holtgrewe (2002) claims that narrative interviews 
thus enable sensemaking à la Weick in real time. In addition, the narrative 
interview’s advantage is the interviewer’s ability to gain additional and new 
information about the phenomenon in question which she was unaware about so 
far. This is an advantage if the case study method is used because Yin (1984: 23) 
says that “the boundaries between phenomena and context are not clearly 
defined”. An interview guide can only be regarded as being preliminary and most 
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questions will only arise when starting to look at the field and being in it. In the 
end, a very thick description of the phenomena and of different events is 
possible. This comes “near to an everyday account and therefore to direct 
observation” (Czarniawska, 1997: 29). 
 
All interviews were conducted face-to-face and lasted on average about 90 
minutes, ranging from 60 minutes to more than two hours. They all took place at 
the interviewees’ premises as this enhances credibility and fosters familiarity. 
The interviews were run in a quite similar way every time to facilitate 
comparisons. I would generally start with open questions about the company’s 
historical development including aspects like the idea, the founding team and its 
forming, setting up the business, getting financed, the first employees and the 
development up to the present day. The aim is to get the interviewee talking. He 
should narrate his accounts of the company’s development. I then would ask 
more specific about certain events and streams of activities to gain more depths. I 
let interviews develop in line with the aspects described by the interviewee as 
specific to the company’s development and try to pay attention to themes he 
personally found problematic or difficult. A direct question reflecting theoretical 
concerns might not be the best way of finding out what organising looks like in 
practise. It seems more fruitful to learn how the interviewee expresses his 
interests and opinions in their own vocabulary. At two case study companies I 
conducted the interviews together with another researcher. At the first case 
(technology.com), we partly ran tandem interviews. At the second company  
(x-it.com), both of us conducted our own interviews, however afterwards 
discussed our findings with each other and exchanged information. This was 
known to the company. 
All interviews were taped and fully transcribed.38 Taping the interview instead of 
just taking notes enables the interviewer to concentrate on what is being said, 
rather than being continuously distracted by note-taking. This procedure also 
strengthens internal validity and reliability. The interviewees received copies of 
the transcripts with requests for approval. If they objected to certain parts of the 
transcripts they were asked to mark the parts which were then omitted from the 
final transcript. Interviewees were also asked to make additions or clarifications 
                                              
38 Citations from interviews conducted in German were translated into English. 
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which were then integrated into the final transcript version. All transcripts are 
included as part of the case study data base. 
 
In all four case companies, I was shown around the premises. This was another 
information source as the way people were distributed in the rooms represents 
yet another structural component. The architecture of the offices can foster or 
hinder communication, culture and identity. At talk-to-me.com, I even took part 
at their weekly lunch that they have together.  
 
5.4.3 Analysing the data 
After having collected all the data, the researcher is rewarded with a pile of data, 
mainly texts such as interview transcripts and documents. The next task is then to 
interpret the information and to come up with a new text that will bear the 
interpretations and findings. The presentation of the data is a very important part 
in qualitative research (Mayring, 2002). Analysing and presenting the data is 
closely linked to generating theory at the same time. I will therefore also add 
some ideas about theory formulation.  
 
The method used to develop theory about organising in new ventures drew on 
existing descriptions of how to generate theory from qualitative data. These are 
in particular writings by Glaser and Strauss (1967), Mintzberg (1979a) and Miles 
(1979). In general, this means that theory and data were continuously compared 
until new concepts had emerged. It is a very iterative process. The aim is then to 
build a data-based theory.  
The interpretation can be done by the grounded theory approach introduced by 
Glaser and Strauss’ (1967). However, this method is best used in field work, e.g. 
ethnographic work as the possibility to constantly go back to the field is better. 
One example in entrepreneurship research is the study by Brytting (1991). 
Strictly speaking this method is not possible with interview methods. However, 
the basic idea of the iterative process between theory and data when contributing 
to our understanding of organising processes in new ventures is adapted for this 
study.  
 
The other method used is social hermeneutics. This analysis is based on the 
written text which makes it very suitable for open and unstructured transcribed 
interviews. In the strict sense, there should be at least two researchers interpreting 
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the texts and asking each other questions. In those two of my case studies in 
which I had conducted tandem interviews, this was possible. I had the chance to 
discuss my interpretations with the other researcher for refinement. Czarniawska 
(Czarniawska, 1998) refers to Hernadi (1987) who classified hermeneutic 
interpretation into three steps: explication (the interpreter stands under the text), 
explanation (the reader stands over the text) and exploration (the reader stands in 
for the author).  
 
For each case company, a thorough case story was written which provided a 
thick and extensive storyline. The narrative form has the advantage of leaving 
more room for the reader in the construction of knowledge. A story in particular 
offers more to hold on. As often as possible, the interviewees were quoted to 
convey their actual saying. In the end, the researcher writes his own story about 
the case. “The case narratives are actually an attempt to re-live the stories of the 
interviews in a new story, which re-installs the different voices, their differences 
and resemblances” (Steyaert, 1995: 466). The danger of a presentation in the 
form of interpretative charts is that it can be turned into an absolutism or reified 
as a model without taking the context into consideration. Such a model is then 
passed on without the reader having any perspective on how the development of 
knowledge took place, not to mention being able to have the researcher’s own 
voice heard in the process. 
 
Qualitative research in general does not aim at verifying hypotheses which have 
been generated from theory (Mayring, 2002). This would only be the case if 
following Popper’s critical rationalism. Rather than theory-testing, theory-
formulating is the aim. “The idea that the essence of re-search is creating 
knowledge more than verifying it, and acknowledging the work of the researcher, 
who is more ‘truth-maker’ than ‘theory-tester’ or ’fortune-teller’” (Steyaert, 
1995: 97). Theories have traditionally be seen as being and meaning structures 
which aim at generality (Steyaert, 1995). However, Geertz has pointed out that 
these meanings are to a large part locally circumscribed (cf. Denzin et al., 
1994a). He argues that “the shapes of knowledge are always ineluctably local, 
indivisible from their instruments and their encasements. One may veil this fact 
with ecumenical rhetoric or blur it with strenuous theory, but one cannot really 
make it go away” (Geertz, 1983: 4). Thus, all knowledge is always local, situated 
in local culture and embedded in organisational sites. Generalisability is a form 
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of context-independence or even of a-contextuality. A local theory can take many 
forms: it can be a metaphor, a mini-theory or a story. The latter is bound to 
context and audience without preventing us from re-telling the story somewhere 
else.  
To sum up, the theory of generalisability becomes almost a reductionist principle, 
through which the world is not enriched with greater knowledge but is in fact 
reduced to more minimalist proportions. But the aim was to generate knowledge. 
Weick (1979) suggested the use of mini-theories or metaphors when applying 
local knowledge. Within organisation research, metaphors are increasingly seen 
as adequate forms to organise and generate knowledge (Morgan, 1986; Tsoukas, 
1993; Alvesson, 1993). There are two different ways of using metaphors in 
theory development. On the one hand, the various theories of organisation can be 
conceived of according to the researcher’s metaphorical perspective: “Schools of 
thought in social sciences, those communities of theorists subscribing to 
relatively coherent perspective, are based upon the acceptance and use of 
different kinds of metaphor as a foundation for inquiry” (Morgan, 1980: 601). In 
this way, Morgan (1986) arrives at a re-grouping of the organisation literature 
around eight basic metaphors. On the other hand, organisation researchers 
employ metaphors as a form of theory development, as a synthetic and powerful 
manner of generating theory. The language is used figuratively rather than 
literally. An analogy between two systems of meaning is laid down so that an 
attempt can be made to transfer the central characteristics from one phenomenon 
to a second.  
 
As the research questions and aspects concerning the methodology have been 
elaborated on and as the research design has been developed, the next chapter 
will present the empirical cases.  
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6 The (hi)stories of the new ventures  
This chapter mainly consists of all four empirical cases. Thorough case studies 
will be given analysing the new ventures’ beginning and their first years. But 
before describing and analysing the ventures’ developments, a small introduction 
of the internet industry and contextual developments will be given first.  
 
6.1 Contextual factors and developments 
The industry’s context covers aspects such as the evolution of the internet 
technology and venture capitalists, the ‘Neuer Markt’ in Germany and the Green 
card for IT-specialists. This is merely a small section but helps to better 
understand certain developments within the companies’ cases.  
 
6.1.1 A typology and classification of the internet industry 
To enable an overview over the e-commerce and internet industry, the 
segmentation developed by Krafft (2000) will be used. That is based on data 
from about 15,000 new ventures within the internet industry, collected in 1999. 
The data was analysed along two characteristics: turnover sources on the one 
hand and technology/marketing competencies on the other. This resulted in three 
large segments: content providers, service providers and platform providers. 
Within these three segments, a total of eight classes emerged with examples of 
companies given for each. Figure 8 on the next page depicts this framework.  
 
The platform provider segment is seen as the initial enabler of the internet. 
Infrastructure companies provide access technologies for the internet and deliver 
the different components of which the internet is composed of. Probably due to 
the time advantage, US companies dominate this sector, genuine German 
companies only fill niches. Slightly more German companies have been founded 
in the software class. Some of these have even been successful on the American 
market such as Intershop or Brokat.  
 
With 77%, the service provider segment has generated most of all companies. 
These companies either enable access to the internet via internet-service-
providers or run the web pages via hosting. The integrators generate complex 
applications based on existing software. Multi media agencies focus on the 
customers’ interface design and marketing activities. They sometimes create 
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Figure 8: Framework of the e-commerce and internet industry 
Source: Krafft (2000: 8), translated by author 
 
 
simple customised applications, too. The transition between all three business 
models is smooth. To satisfy customer needs and wishes effectively, most of 
these companies operate in two or three classes. The fourth class within this 
segment emerged only when the industry had reached a certain degree of 
maturity. These specialised service providers concentrate on one step of the value 
creation chain solely. As specialists they can offer cheaper or better services.  
The largest media interest, however, is aroused by the last segment, that of 
content providers. These offer products or services via the internet. First, these 
are information based services with a portion of 5% of all companies. These are 
mainly financed through advertising. One can distinguish between companies 
offering orientation on the internet via search machines on the one hand and 
content companies such as stock market information (gatrixx.com) or family 
related information (urbia.com) on the other. The other class in this segment is 
made up of companies which are transaction based and which create turnover 
either directly by selling or by taking provisions. Business-to-consumer 
companies make up 8.5% and business-to-business companies 1.5%.  
Service Providers
(internet)
Content Providers
( e-commerce)
Platform Providers
(internet)
Information
Navigation
Multimedia-
Agencies
750
5 %
1.550
10 %
8.000
54 %
1.900
13 %
1.200
8 %
70
< 1 %
760
5 %
350
2 %
Internet
user
Internet-Service
Providers
Integrators
Content
• Web.de
• Endemann!!
• Hurra.com
• Allesklar
• Bin Tec Communications
•Tixi.com
• PolyTrax Information 
Technology
• Teledis
• eCircle
• Urbia.com
• Gatrixx
• Ciao.com
• Kabel New Media
• Pixelpark
• I-D Media
• WWL Internet
• ISION Internet
• Cybernet
• Strato Medien
• Europop
Infrastructure
Information
B2C B2B
• Ricardo.de
• Artnet.com
• Vitago.de
• Buecher.de
• goindustry.com
• Newtron
• DCI
• Web2CAD
Technology competence
Specialised
Service-Providers
• Webmiles
• Webvertising
• DocCheck
• Link4Link
Software
Proximity to internet user or customer
• Articon Information 
Systems
• GFT Technologies
• GEDYS Internet Products
• Avinci
• Intershop
• Brokat
• living systems
• Hyperwave Information
Management
Sales/Marketing competence
THE (HI)STORIES OF THE NEW VENTURES  86 
 
 
Taken together, the distribution of the companies can be depicted as following. 
 
Figure 9: Internet landscape sorted after business models 
Source: Krafft (2000: 8), translated by author 
 
The four companies of this study can be located in different segments and 
classes. As part of the interviews, the interviewees were asked to mark their 
company within this framework.  
? x-it.com started as being a web-design agency and is therefore located in 
the multimedia-agencies class within the service provider segment. 
However, the venture later developed its own software which draws the 
link towards the software class within the platform provider segment. The 
interviewees marked two segments and created a new intersection.  
? technology.com on the other hand is a representative from the platform 
provider’s segment and the infrastructure class as it provides solutions for 
the planning, the operation and the optimisation of networks.  
? letters.de is an online market place for used, rare and out-of-print books. 
As such it is clearly to be located within the content provider segment and 
the B2C information class.  
? The only case company which does not exactly fit the classification is 
talk-to-me.com as this venture is not directly internet based but technology 
based. It offers solutions for voice controlled services by phone. From its 
structure and business model it is most likely comparable with companies 
from the technology/software segment.  
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Taken together, all three segments are covered by this study with one 
technological driven venture in addition. Just below, the known framework is 
depicted again. This time, all four case companies are included in the framework.  
 
Figure 10: Case companies added to the internet industry’s framework  
Source: author, based on (Krafft, 2000: 8) 
 
The aim was to give an overview of all four case companies and their position 
within the internet industry. Next, a short introduction of the industry’s context 
and the venture capitalist’s industry development will be given. This lays the 
ground for better understanding the case studies.  
 
6.1.2 Short history of the internet 
The internet has not emerged overnight in the mid 1990s. Already in the 80s, 
quite a large distribution within universities and other research centres can be 
noticed. It had started as a project of the U.S. Defence in 1973 that had tried to 
develop communication protocols to allow different computers to communicate 
with each other. It resulted in the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and the 
Internet Protocol (IP). In the 1980’s, public and commercial implementations of 
roughly hundred TCP/IP protocols became available. The breakthrough 
happened in 1993, when the research centre CERN (Corporation for Research 
and Educational Networking) announced, that there would be no patent or 
copyright fees to be due when using the world-wide web technologies. In 
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addition, ‘mosaic’, a much more user-friendly interface had been published 
which enabled non-experts to use the internet, too. Thereafetr, the University of 
Illinois sponsored the development of the first browser. This enabled 
nontechnical users to use the world wide web through graphically-based tools 
(Cerf, 2003; Connolly, 2000; Krafft, 2000). 
 
Following the study of Krafft (2000), the technological development can be 
mirrored for the industry’s development in Germany. It started in Germany with 
the platform provider’s segment. This segment had its peak counted in 
companies on the market in 1996, followed by service providers (peak in 1997) 
and last the content providers (peak in 1999).  
At the end of the 1980s, it were the platform providers that developed and sold 
modems to facilitate access to the internet. The foundation’s peak of provider 
companies was in 1996/97, followed by a slight decrease whose figures then kept 
mainly constant. Due to the very specific technological knowledge needed, these 
companies are typically university or research spin-offs. The software companies 
of the same segment started with developing small software tools after the world 
wide web (WWW) was commercialised in 1993. This was followed by the 
development of shopping systems, online banking and customer management 
systems. Today, the buzzword is content management systems which enable the 
administration of complex web pages. The constant identification of new market 
opportunities allows for a constant number of newly founded companies in this 
segment.  
This contrasts the segment of the service providers as its number of newly 
founded businesses is decreasing. And a strong consolidation trend can be seen 
with service providers, integrators and media agencies. The only exception 
within that segment are specialised service providers. 
Last of all three segments have new ventures within e-commerce emerged. First, 
information providers, then B2C companies and, since 1998, B2B ones. 
Especially large media companies have invested heavily into this segment which 
made it increasingly difficult for new ventures to compete. As many B2B or B2C 
ventures have difficulties in creating their turn-around, venture capitalists are 
reluctant to invest in that segment which leads to less newly founded ventures.  
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6.1.3 Venture capitalists in Germany 
There are three different aspects which should be considered under this heading. 
These are the emergence of venture capital in Germany, the creation of Neuer 
Markt (NEMAX) in March 1997 and its link with the emergence of internet/e-
commerce ventures in Germany.  
Venture capital in Germany began in 1965 when the first four funds were 
organised. The next milestone was ten years later, when in 1975 the Deutsche 
Wagnisfinanzierungsgesellschaft mbH (WFG) was created. All leading German 
financial institutions and the federal government supported the organisation. 
However, the WFG proved a complete failure and soon abandoned its early stage 
technology investment strategy (Becker & Hellmann, 2000). In the eighties, a 
number of venture capital firms followed the U.S. model and emerged with 
moderate success. Despite new federal initiatives to foster start-ups in high 
technology, such as the ‘Beteiligungskapital für junge Technologieunternehmen’ 
(BJTU), venture capital investments remained stagnant. Overall, the growth of 
the venture capital industry before 1997 had been slow (Bundesverband 
Deutscher Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften, 1998: 74).  
The situation changed abruptly when the Neuer Markt opened in March 1997. 
Neuer Markt is a special segment for technology and growth-oriented titles on 
the German stock market, comparable to the NASDAQ. Venture capitalists 
regarded the IPO at the stock exchange as the preferred option for an exit. This 
resulted in an increase in membership figures of 20% per year within its industry 
association BVK (Bundesverband Deutscher Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften) 
(Hellmann et al., 2001). The Neuer Markt had started fulminatory and created 
much public interest. However, in March 2000, the market broke down and lost 
its sexiness nearly overnight. In the end, the Neuer Markt was closed on the 5th 
June 2003. 
The study by Klandt and Krafft (2000) shows that the venture capital firms’ 
boom to invest in internet/e-commerce start-ups Germany started in 1997. This 
newly created exit option for venture capital is seen as the major reason for the 
explosive growth. However, the venture capital investment boom is not the 
trigger for the internet/e-commerce foundations. Klandt and Krafft argue that the 
internet/e-commerce boom had started four years in advance, thus in 1994. It was 
rather customer needs which were the main reasons for new internet/e-commerce 
ventures to be founded between 1994 and 1997. This is supported by Hellmann 
and Fiedler (2001) saying that it was not only the creation of the Neuer Markt but 
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also the internet as providing an extreme rise in entrepreneurial opportunities and 
activities which gave rise in these new ventures. 
Nevertheless, by late 1990, a diversified and international venture capital 
industry had emerged in Germany.  
 
6.1.4 The German Green Card 
Due to a shortage of IT-specialists and a lacking immigration law in Germany, 
the government had passed an IT-Specialists Temporary Relief Program as per 
August 2000. The aim was to meet the growing demand for highly qualified 
personnel by the information and communications industry. Via this program, 
IT-specialists from non-European countries were allowed to apply for 
employment. This temporary work permit is called ‘Green Card’ and lasts 
maximum for five years, latest until December 2004.39 The applicant needs to 
have a degree in computer sciences or earn at least 100,000 DM (or an equivalent 
of 51,000 Euro) with his German employer. In addition, he needs to sign a 
working contract with a German company to the same conditions as employees 
from the German labour market. The work permit is issued in accordance with 
the length of the employment contract, but may not exceed five years 
(Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 2001).  
Within the first 100 days, nearly 3000 work permits had been issued. And after 
two years, 12,500 non-European IT-specialists had received a green card. But 
20,000 green cards were available and many thus not asked for. Since the 
beginning of 2003, the initial high demand has slowed down. This was mostly 
due to economic reasons. The general employment figures in information and 
communication industries were decreasing, too. Nevertheless, the government 
claims that on average each green card has created two to three additional jobs in 
that sector (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, 2003c).  
 
The following four subchapters will present the case studies. For each case, a 
short introduction of the company will be given in the beginning, covering the 
milestones and presenting its founders. Afterwards, the venture’s history is 
described by its idea, the coming into being, the legal foundation as well as its  
 
                                              
39 In July 2003, the program has been prolongued for another 1.5 years until the end 2004 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, 2003b).  
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further emergence and development. For each company, a time period of two to 
three years is described and analysed. The focus will be mainly on its organising 
processes.  
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6.2 technology.com 
technology.com provides solutions for the planning, the operation and the optimisation 
of networks. The new venture develops a software suite with three modules all of 
which are already for sale. The company was founded by former informatics 
researchers and graduates and it is located in a Bavarian university town. The 
company grew rapidly in terms of employees after they had been financed by a 
Venture Capitalist early on. However, as they lacked turnover, they faced severe 
financial problems and nearly closed the company down. They finally managed 
to survive by exerting severe cost cutting and re-organisational activities.  
 
The company was founded by six persons which now will be introduced.  
Professor is head of a computer science chair at a German university. He has been 
active in the area of Software Development since 1977 and gained a lot of business 
experience when he worked for companies like Alcatel or IBM. This together with his 
academic career gave him 15 years of experience in personnel management and 
leadership. He became the CEO of the company.  
Simon graduated in Physics and Informatics. He was writing his PhD in 
computer sciences and ran his own small company doing computing systems 
consulting. He gained business experience through cooperation with several 
scientific institutions and industrial enterprises like Siemens AG and Nortel 
Networks. Having brought in a major patent, he became the CTO. 
Michael had studied informatics and was then one of the professor’s PhD 
students at the university. In the new venture he became responsible for HR, 
administration and finance as being the COO. 
Mark as well as Johannes were both employed at technology GmbH 
beforehand. Joining the business plan writing team, they also became co-
founders of the new venture. Mark became head of development and Johannes 
head of consulting. Both had studied informatics at that university.  
Suresh is one of the Professor’s nephews who owned and ran a small network 
consultancy company in the United States. This company was eventually 
incorporated in the German technology.com AG and this resulted in Suresh 
becoming one of the six founders of the AG. 
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Figure 11: Milestones in the history of technology.com 
  
1996 technology GbR was founded by the professor for accounting reasons 
  
1998 May: the GbR was changed into a GmbH for liability reasons 
  
2000 Regional Business Plan Competition Manager visits the professor and 
suggests the foundation of a separate software development company  
 March: a team of four starts writing the business plan and winning a 
second price in the regional business plan competition 
‘Foundation’ September: foundation of the technology.com AG with six founders 
 American sales company becomes wholly owned subsidiary 
 Small turnover is generated with consulting services 
  
2001 First employees are hired 
‘expansion’ February: VC buys shares 
 March: first booth at the CeBit 
 June & August: Marketing and Sales mangers are employed 
‘1st product’ October: module 1 is ready for sale 
‘strategic change’ New business plan speaks of separate products, rather than one big suite 
 November: difficulties in selling the product, more marketing resources 
invested 
 December: money from first finance round is used up 
 Moving into a larger office in a new Technology Park 
  
2002 February: new director for sales is employed 
 Failure of running a second financing round, first VC helps out with 
intermediate round 
‘2nd product’ March: 2nd product is launched 
 American subsidiary dismisses all employees except the founding 
manager 
‘crisis’ April: as no turnover is generated, all employees agree to wage reduction
 June: employees have to be laid off due to bad economic situation 
 Marketing manager dies unexpectedly 
 New CVC drops out in the last minute 
 July: CFO is laid off 
‘gleam of hope’ September: project partnership with university is started 
 New marketing manager is hired 
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6.2.1 The company’s development 
It all started with a conversation between the manager of the Northern Bavarian 
Business Plan competition and the Professor. The manager had visited the 
Professor at his university in November 1999 to introduce him to the concept of 
the business plan competition which had been set up in 1998 in northern Bavaria. 
The manager pointed to the chances new technological based venture had at the 
moment for receiving Venture Capital and other governmental support. The 
professor was not aware that the technologies he was developing at his university 
chair were likely to get financed. He had already founded a small company called 
‘technology GmbH’ in Mai 1998 in order to manage and balance smaller 
consulting projects for industry. As universities were not allowed to issue 
product guarantees, this deficiency was compensated by launching the GmbH. 
Depending on the current project, students, graduates or research assistants were 
part- or full-time employed for the duration of the project. 
“Because of my personal contacts to national and international IT-
companies I was asked frequently for network consulting services. At 
some point we were not longer able to meet the demand due to short 
resources. We had the choice between turning down enquiries or 
outsourcing. We decided for the latter and founded the ‘technology 
GmbH’ for network management consulting. Now our developers and 
net-specialists at the university were able to make profit from their 
ideas and gained professional recognition.” (the Professor in an 
interview, 29th April 2002, presented on the homepage) 
 
The conversation with the manager made the Professor think about an additional 
venture. He decided to write a business plan and to participate in the business 
plan competition. It was a sort of test. The idea was to evaluate the possibility of 
founding a company for computer network software. He thus asked Simon and 
Michael, two of his research assistants, and Mark, one employee from the 
GmbH, to write a business plan for developing and selling network software. It 
took them about three months to finish it. With this business plan they then took 
part in the second phase of the business plan competition. For this second of 
three phases, detailed financial data were not yet required. The task was rather to 
think about market structures and competition, the business model as well as 
marketing and sales.  
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“The business plan competition manager said, that what we have 
done so far in the service sector is pretty good and that we have good 
ideas in general. He suggested to try this at a bigger scale in a 
different setting for software development. As a result the business 
plan was written and we were looking for funding.” (Michael, 
interview 3) 
 
Unexpectedly they were one of the winners of the second phase in May 2000. 
This made them think seriously about the possibility of actually founding the 
new venture. So far, it was more an idea and a game. Being a winner of a 
business plan competition’s phase in those years automatically drew the attention 
of Venture Capitalists. However, the latter were always asking for a full business 
plan, especially one which showed detailed financial data for the next five years. 
In the end, Simon and Michael wrote a complete business plan.  
From then, things happened rather quickly. Receiving Venture Capital was not 
that difficult and in September 2000, a private venture capitalist agreed to invest. 
As a result, the technology.com AG was founded on the 26th September with six 
founders: the Professor, Michael, Simon, Johannes, Mark and Suresh. 
technology.com was born. Michael and Simon were the Professor’s research 
assistants of which Simon had mainly developed the technology during his 
assistantship time. To take advantage of the already existing GmbH’s name and 
its reputation, the Professor outsourced the network management section of his 
GmbH and transferred it into the AG. Both current GmbH employees, Johannes 
and Mark, were asked to change to the new AG and became co-founders. As it 
happened, the Professor had a nephew in the United States who ran a small 
computer consultancy company. This company was eventually incorporated in 
the technology.com AG and it became a wholly owned subsidiary. Suresh, the 
Professor’s nephew, joined the founding team and the US company functioned as 
a sales and consultancy subsidiary.40  
 
With the legal foundation of the venture they immediately faced the problem of 
organising themselves within the management team. It was clear that the 
                                              
40 In the course of this research, this American subsidiary will be neglected as far as possible. It 
will only be mentioned if necessary for the understanding of the American subsidiary’s 
development. In addition, employment and other key figures will only be relevant for the 
German venture.  
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Professor was going to be the CEO. However, he stayed at the university in order 
to run his chair. The other positions were the result of the Professor’s saying and 
the candidates knowledge and interests. It was first decided that Simon became 
CTO and Michael COO.  
“I think, somehow it was a logic consequence that I shifted to the 
technical/product development department and Michael managed 
organizational things. Mark at first was appointed Head of 
Development, however it soon became clear that although he is a very 
good programmer and also a very good team leader, he is not really 
the best Head of Development. […] Johannes used to be a consultant, 
and has also kept doing consultancy but has not held a management 
position so far. He also has only few shares which reflects his small 
claim of leadership.” (Simon) 
 
Simon had mainly developed the technological basis as a research assistant at the 
Professor’s university chair. He held a patent in that technology since January 
2000 which he sold to the AG in the course of the foundation. Mark, who 
formerly was responsible for the implementation of an early system at the 
GmbH’s main customer, became department head of development. Johannes had 
first to finish his current project in the GmbH before starting to work for the AG 
in February 2001. He became head of consulting services.  
 
Michael, Simon and Mark as well as two other employees who changed from the 
GmbH to the AG, started in autumn 2000 with the operational work. They were 
located at the same building as the GmbH which was an office block downtown. 
They started with renting one room and later expanded to three. When they 
started, everyone had many ideas, visions and ambitions. They were euphoric, 
very optimistic and had big plans in mind which were fostered by the VC’s 
commitment. The business idea was to develop a software suite for providing 
efficient and reliable solutions for planning, operation and optimisation of 
communication networks. The technological base had been developed at the 
university and first experience was gained from small consultancy projects at the 
GmbH. 
 
For carrying out these plans, employees were needed and had to be hired. The 
group of the four founders and the two former GmbH employees was not 
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sufficient. The growth in terms of personnel was quite fast. Eight employees 
were hired in the first months of 2001. And by November, technology.com had 
already 30 employees working there. These were mainly software developers and 
technicians working in the R&D department. They recruited many of the new 
employees via private networks such as employees working at other local 
companies or graduates which they still knew from university. Some of them had 
been student assistants at the Professor’s chair. Still, they were not able to fill all 
positions needed via these ways. They placed job offerings in newspapers but 
developers and technicians were scarce on the job market. 
“One typical example: we placed an expensive ad in CT thinking that 
CT was a renowned magazine and we could get someone to our town. 
However, we had two German applicants and about 200 with a Green 
Card”. (Simon) 
In the end, technology.com had no other choice than employing foreign 
employees via the green card regularities as there were simply no qualified 
domestic applicants with broad knowledge and some experience. The problem 
was that the green card holders’ education was not as good as a German degree. 
Nevertheless it started off quite well with the green card holders and they 
integrated quickly and were highly productive.  
 
By summer 2001, the management team acknowledged to lack specific 
experience and knowledge. The problem was that they officially had a CEO, 
namely the Professor, who should run the company. Especially outsiders 
expected this and asked for him. However, he only took a term off between 
September 2000 and March 2001 to help with setting up the company. 
Afterwards, he was mainly at the university and only able to spent one day per 
week at the office actually. This double track created problems for the other 
founders. They sometimes wished for more support, mentally as well as 
operational to know how to cope with their new tasks. The Professor was willing 
to share his knowledge with the young management team but could do so only 
sporadically. He acted as a coach being present at the first recruiting talks, 
running some talks with Venture Capitalists and being approachable for 
questions. To compensate their experience and knowledge, the young managers 
referred to the business plan competition’s coaching offerings and attended some 
of the seminars.  
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On the other hand, the strong link to the university was also an advantage. It 
enabled them to keep close contact to students as possible part-time employees 
and to be always informed about latest technological developments. They took 
the chance to acquire university research projects and to be part in some projects 
which were closely related to their own developments. In that way they financed 
some of their own projects and outsourced some development issues.  
 
The business idea was to develop a software suite consisting of three modules. 
Instead of developing and programming the whole software suite at once, they 
started with the smallest one, called module 1 in the following. The initial plan 
was to have it ready for sale in October 2001. As they also sold network 
consultancy hardware components, they had turnover from the first moment. To 
support the future sale of their software product, they started with sales and 
marketing activities in May. The plan was to create a network of sales partners 
which would distribute their software products in addition to their own sales 
staff. For all these marketing and sales activities, they needed qualified 
employees. The VC had made the requirement that a marketing and a finance 
manager had to join the management board as the founding team lacked finance, 
sales, and marketing expertise. Simon and Michael were trying hard to find a 
suitable candidate. As they were so young, they hoped for someone more senior 
with ‘white hair’.  
“[It] makes a difference whether a sales manager is 25 years or 50 
years old. This has nothing to do with performance or know-how but 
with trust.” (Simon) 
But it was rather difficult to find appropriate candidates.  
“One typical thing was to get an experienced head of marketing and 
Sales. We had human resources consultants and checked the market. 
We wasted a lot of time on that and then came Bernhard, who quite 
well fit into the company. But altogether, we wasted around 100,000 
[DM].” (Simon) 
They met Bernhard at the CeBit. He started in May as their Marketing & Sales 
Manager and began setting up sales activities.  
“In the next step a lot of work was done and Sales came in. Sales was 
supposed to do Sales and Marketing. However, this did not go too 
well, as Sales made no Marketing because they did not understand the 
product in the beginning. Thus, the technicians made Marketing as 
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well. Actually, we had quite good technical Marketing, but in order to 
convince another company’s management, you need typical Marketing 
phrases, and those came only after a while. This only happened after 
people had stepped back, looked at the charts and said that they had 
to make these statements as well. Meanwhile, we have achieved very 
good results.” (Simon) 
In August, the new CFO began his work. And in October, Boris joined them as 
head of indirect sales. Other than Bernhard, he was over fifty and thus complied 
with the white hair wish.  
 
In the course of the year 2001, technology.com changed its recruiting process. 
The first big wave of new employees had been hired by end of November and the 
immediate placements slowed down by number. Initially, all applicants were 
interviewed by all managers before being accepted or rejected. After a while they 
realised that this process wasted too much time and resources. Why should the 
CTO run an interview regarding a sales applicant?  
“I also had to accept that certain decisions were made without me 
where I thought I should have been asked. But very often that did not 
work because of the time schedule. In the beginning, I also employed 
people for Sales if they needed a new employee. But sometime down 
the road there were suddenly new employees I was not informed 
about. Maybe somebody had told me about it, but during this rapid 
growth period I just forgot about it because I had so many other 
things to do.” (Simon) 
This change in recruiting processes triggered a rethinking of other processes, too. 
It especially showed Simon that he needed to learn to delegate more, which was 
true for Michael as well. The company had grown too big that they were still able 
to deal with every matter and solve every problem. They had to learn to let go 
from certain topics. As a result, the recruiting processes changed and not 
everyone was involved in every decision any longer.  
 
This rapid growth in personnel led to problems half a year later. Most obvious 
was the change in atmosphere and identity. The beginning was characterised by 
an informal and relaxed atmosphere. Employees met after work and went out for 
a beer in the evening. This also fostered a quick integration of new ones. But this 
informal atmosphere and the friendship network disappeared. There were too 
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many new employees coming in and the existing ones were not able to keep up 
the speed to build friendship relationships with all the new ones. This was 
aggravated by employing more and more green card holders. The first green card 
holders made an effort to get integrated and succeeded. But as others from the 
same country and culture got employed, they stuck together and a separation 
began. The green card holders were not any longer in the need to build friendship 
networks with their German colleagues. Sticking together with the ones from 
your own country is much easier. Soon the Asian employees, coming mainly 
from Taiwan, built their own clique. Corporate culture was an issue the 
management did not pay attention to in the beginning.  
“At the beginning we did not really strive for a company culture. We 
just acted on instinct, always coordinated but not in the way that we 
had a document stating company functions, the culture or alike. It was 
clearly in our minds, but not formalised or coordinated. It just 
happened. Due to the preliminary work that was done, we meanwhile 
have noticed that there are gaps especially concerning company 
culture and the way we handled certain things internally.” (Michael, 
interview 3) 
 
At that time, more and more problems became apparent, especially organisational 
problems. The parallel product development of three modules for the suite had to 
be handled as well as increasing marketing and sales activities. And it became 
apparent that the informal communication and coordination mechanisms did not 
work properly any longer. The company was simply too big for informal 
mechanisms working quickly and sufficiently. The immediate response were 
additional meetings to serve communication, coordination and control purposes. 
So far, there was a management board meeting which had been started right from 
the beginning on. It took place every Monday morning as this was the best time 
for the Professor to join them. This meeting actually evolved out of a pre-
founding business plan meeting and lasted until the second quarter in 2001. It 
had mainly served to discuss business plan matters and early organisational 
aspects when setting up the company. In addition, the management had no 
specific process by which they informed the employees about important 
decisions or outcomes. It was rather handled in a word-of-mouth way. As the 
company was so small in the beginning of 2000, everyone knew the latest 
information quite quickly. The management meeting was supplemented by the 
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founder meeting. All five founders met on an irregular basis when important 
decisions had to be taken. It was especially important for the Professor who was 
seldom present at management meetings as well as for Mark and Johannes, who 
did not belong to the management team. They especially had to be informed 
about current management issues. This constellation of two founders not being 
part of the management team was a bit of a problem, as Simon acknowledged. 
“It certainly is not always easy for both of them and it implies quite a 
potential for conflict and frustration. [...] Most of the time, I try to 
inform them about the decision that have been taken. However, that 
does not always work frictionless or to my satisfaction.” (Simon) 
 
After the development department outgrew ten people, the management realised 
that more structures were needed. Especially coordination had to be enforced as 
people did not know who was working on which project. The management had 
lost the feeling for who was responsible for which tasks or groups. Neither did 
the employees know who to address for certain topics. This was partly due to the 
fact, that more than fifty percent of the workforce was working since less than six 
months in the company. The first measure the management introduced in 
summer 2001 was that every developer had to write a weekly report. They then 
introduced team structures. 
“There were similar trends in the development department. At first, 
we tried having a flat hierarchy through which all developers were 
informed about almost everything. But with more than twelve or 
thirteen developers, this no longer works. Currently, there are teams 
with team leaders and group leaders.” (Michael, interview 2) 
 
In autumn 2001, the management started reorganising and restructuring 
activities. It was a period in which the management deliberately thought about 
which measures to take and discussed different options. One issue was the ability 
of self-organising which they thought they could demand from such highly 
educated personnel.  
The management realised that some processes they had taken for granted did not 
actually happen. They had thought that the different project leaders in the 
development section would communicate regularly with each other. Instead 
information structures were built vertically, i.e. either top-down or bottom-up but 
never horizontal. In order to change that shortcoming, all project leaders had to 
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meet every other week. And once a month, the project leaders had to arrange a 
meeting with their team. As a result, the different projects were better 
coordinated.  
 
The management also introduced a sales, marketing and R&D meeting for every 
other Friday. The aim was to prevent marketing from promising customers all 
sort of functionalities which R&D was not able to deliver. Clients often 
commented on products and suggested functions they would like to have added. 
Sales had to communicate these suggestions to the developers which in turn had 
to comment if the changes were feasible. The meeting’s aim was to coordinate 
these adaptation matters better and in a more regulated way. The meeting was 
also used to decide between the different suggestions so that R&D knew which 
variant to develop and to incorporate into the product.  
“There is a meeting every Friday when Sales, Marketing and 
Research & Development meet in order to avoid that Marketing 
makes impossible promises to the customer. At the same time, the 
developers get to know what the customers want or what kind of 
projects they have to focus on. As we are only a small team we have to 
consider where to put our energy. If a customer says he would buy the 
software if this and that was working, then we have to see that these 
functions are implemented or adapted in order to work properly. 
That’s why there is a meeting every Friday where such information is 
exchanged, where you get information on the status of each big 
customer and partner and which projects are running or what is in the 
pipeline.” (Johannes) 
 
By the end of 2001, regular meetings had been implemented in every department: 
sales, marketing, administration, finance and development. These were intra- as 
well as inter-departmental meetings. They served not only a communication but 
also a control purpose. It gave the management as well as the department’s and 
project’s heads the opportunity to ask back and thus determine different projects’ 
progresses and detect problems early on.  
 
In summer 2001, technology.com faced a new situation. For the first time, an 
employee requested for redundancy. This came as a real surprise to the 
management. So far, they had thought that the team and the atmosphere were at 
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its best and that everyone enjoyed doing their jobs at technology.com. The 
management was aware that the salaries were not comparable to similar jobs at 
established companies. However, they thought, that the atmosphere compensated 
for it. This request for redundancy made them think about their HRM processes 
and activities.  
“And I will not hire anymore anyone applying just because he is a 
developer. Instead I will only hire a developer because there are 
certain tasks for him to do and because I can show him a perspective 
at the company.” (Simon) 
Up to then, they had been glad about every applicant willing to work for them. 
Although they had received an number of unsolicited applications due to their 
active press work, it was difficult to find good applicants willing to work for a 
start-up and which were in addition willing to move to a smaller university town. 
Many more preferred to live in a big city and to work for a well-known company. 
Their recruiting strategy was to hire generalists which they could employ for 
various tasks. As they needed so many new employees in the beginning, the 
specific future tasks for every applicant were seldom clear. It was simply a matter 
of hiring more people. The aim was to get projects going and to fulfil the VC’s 
requirements to fill two management positions. Later on they realised that such a 
vague job profile had led to hiring new employees with too unspecific abilities. 
By summer 2001 they knew which abilities were needed and what type of person 
was fitting into the team. They only handed out a contract when the applicant had 
exactly the abilities and qualifications needed. This ensured that the employee 
paid off more quickly, as VC money was too expensive to grant new members a 
long training phase. Especially new applicants for non-development tasks had to 
work rather independently and should be able to seize problems and develop 
solutions. Due to the lack of a profound hierarchy they did not have an elaborate 
control system or the time to give them a lot of training on the job. Creativity was 
another ability that facilitated to cope with the work in a small company.  
Another consequence of the sudden request of redundancy was the aim to 
introduce personnel talks in order to realise personnel problems earlier on. From 
autumn onwards, these talks took place every three months with each employee 
individually. It especially helped the management to recognise discontentment 
and to prevent requests for redundancies. They were astonished about the 
information they got through those talks. Most discontented employees were 
either bored or over-employed by their tasks. In the minority of cases it was an 
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issue of payment. These personnel performance reviews were also used to clarify 
who belonged to which department or project team and whom the employee had 
to report to.  
In the beginning of 2002, the management had started to split the employees’ 
salary into a fixed and a variable part. The latter was performance-based for 
which goals were defined on a three months basis. These were agreed in the 
quarterly personnel talks. Two or three goals were named by the management 
and one was defined by the employee. They had formalised the process by using 
an evaluation sheet on which aims and agreements were fixed. Beforehand, every 
bonus had been paid on a very informal basis. The quarterly personnel talks were 
also used for constructing job descriptions for every position. It was the 
employee’s task to set up a first job description which was later adjusted during 
the talks. These descriptions were used by Michael and Simon to facilitate future 
recruitment processes as they simplified the match between an applicant’s 
abilities and the needed requirements.  
Due to the employees’ organisational lack concerning the company’s general 
structure, Michael created an organisational chart. The management realised that 
too many employees did not really know whom to contact for certain matters. 
The organisational chart was posted in the intranet and regularly updated. It was 
thought to be very useful for new employees as these were in a better position to 
gain an overview about people and positions. New employees had stated that 
they were lost in the beginning as no obvious structures existed. And in cases of 
mistakes, the relevant manager could more easily determine and track whose 
responsibilities were breached and what had gone wrong.  
 
With an increasing number of employees and projects to handle, the management 
had less time to get involved operationally. Instead truly managerial and 
administrative tasks had to be dealt with.  
“You kind of loose the overview. In the past when we only had three 
customers, I always knew whether a solution I had developed 
somewhere else was applicable. With so many employees it is obvious 
that someone does not know what happened with another customer in 
the past and whether you can re-use former solutions without 
developing something new. This ability gets lost sometimes. (Michael, 
interview 3) 
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Simon found it more and more difficult to distinguish between his 
entrepreneurial and his managerial role. Due to his tasks and duties he had to mix 
both which made it very complicated. As entrepreneur he had to work very 
operational, support development processes and join the sales team as he knew 
the product best. But as manager he should be above the operational work and 
keep a distance to it. He should do more strategic work and management tasks 
such as leadership. It was especially difficult working on the one hand together 
with the developers and the sales team and on the other hand leading, i.e. 
praising, criticising and guiding the same people. Combining both roles was not 
feasible and he should take a decision. Part of the problem was linked to the 
difficulty to delegate. He found it hard to tell someone what to do, e.g. 
programming a specific feature, when it would be quicker for him to do it by 
himself. Only in the long-run will the other be as quick as himself and thus 
generate a true added value. He thought that delegation is linked to patience. But 
it is also dependent on the number of employees.  
“Meanwhile, we can delegate certain tasks, which was not possible 
with only five employees.” (Michael, interview 2) 
 
The employees lost an overview of what was and is going on, too. So far, 
everyone knew how one had dealt with the customers and what was done for 
each. They had tried to use already created solutions for as many customers as 
possible to avoid unnecessary duplication of work. This knowledge got lost as 
too many people were involved in too many projects. As a result, a similar 
solution got developed again due to the lack of knowledge about previous 
projects and solutions. It was clear that a knowledge management system was 
lacking.  
 
All these changes altered the company’s atmosphere substantially. The beginning 
was characterised by information being spread evenly in the firm by watering-
can principle. Everyone knew nearly everything which was strongly affected by 
the office structure. As all members were sitting in three offices, news and 
information spread instantly. And problems were handled very uncomplicatedly 
at that time. As soon as one emerged, it got solved. The management afterwards 
tried to standardise the decision to prevent similar cases.  
“We decided what to do at the moment when problems or questions 
arose. We kept that strategy and culture since the beginning. The way 
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we decided then, we would decide today, only that today we have it 
formalised and standardised.” (Michael, interview 3) 
The management’s aim was to grant the employees a large action radius and a 
high autonomy of decisions as far as possible. They only wanted to be informed 
how the employee had decided in that matter and what actions had been taken. 
As a young and rather inexperienced management team, the founders often did 
not dare to take tough decisions and to be more resolute as they regarded 
themselves too inexperienced to do so. Instead they had looked out for a 
compromise or did not act at all. They had thought that many things would 
resolve itself. This resulted in having a lot of confidence in their people. 
Eventually they overestimated it. Their idea was to avoid setting up a large 
framework of rules, instructions and prohibitions. They demanded from their 
employees the ability to take decisions independently. This had also become a 
requirement for new employees. However the employees’ behaviour changed. 
Due to the increasing number of employees and structures, the employees lost 
their sense of responsibility. As too many uncertainties were predominant, 
employees rather stuck to structures instead of thinking and taking own 
decisions. Instead of taking action and deciding or communicating with others, 
they waited for the management to take action or to call for a meeting.  
“Once or twice they were told that they are grown-ups and therefore 
had to do things independently. If they want something, they do not 
have to call an official meeting but can meet anywhere. Slowly, they 
began to organise themselves.” (Simon) 
The managers had to learn to take hard decisions and to be more resolute and 
consistent. They realised that it would also create a straighter atmosphere. 
Members which worked hard got acknowledged better and the others felt that 
they had to improve. This also fostered motivation.  
 
One of the founders characterised the autumn of 2001 as the time when the 
company changed from being a start-up to become a ‘normal’ company. The 
beginning was very informal and decisions were taken quickly. They all 
addressed each other informally by their first name. The workforce was very 
young with a lot of graduates. Until the first growth phase in March 2001, the 
very homogeneous workforce coordinated itself and self-organisation prevailed. 
This ability was lost during the rapid growth. As a consequence of the different 
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formalisation measurements, inactivity and inertia resulted. The employees relied 
on the new structures and stopped their own initiatives.  
“At the time of the incorporation, everybody talked to everybody. 
There was no CFO that drove a better car or who had power over the 
money, and whom I had to treat carefully because he paid my wages. 
People rather asked how to handle things and we had more of a 
community. When this ‘community feeling’ had disappeared, 
structural insecurities came up which dissolved when structures were 
created. Later on, these collapsed again, which is not totally wrong.” 
(Simon) 
The management had then to play down the importance of structures and 
procedures to activate and motivate the self-organising abilities again. After a 
while the employees got used to take responsibility and managed to think in 
bigger terms again. 
The management also realised that they had trusted the VC and its expertise too 
much. Eventually the VC did not really have such a good insight in the company 
to always give good advice. With hindsight, some pieces of advice were meant to 
be good but did not really suit technology.com’s situation. The management 
started to understand to be more critical and to use their own common sense 
much more.  
 
Parallel to these organisational changes, a strategic change took place in October 
2001. So far, they had aimed at developing the whole software suite parallel. As 
the product development processes matured only slowly and as they did not 
result in ready-for-sale products quickly enough, the management and the 
founders decided a change. The plan of developing the suite as a whole was 
abandoned and instead the three different modules were regarded as individual 
products which could be combined later in one suite. Focusing on the individual 
modules should enable a flexible market entry for each module and in addition 
lower the overall capital need. The immediate focus was then to finish the first 
module, a small and inexpensive tool for under 3000 €. It theoretically suited 
most middle-sized and large companies. They already had one big customer but 
faced problems selling it on a grand scale. The sales manager told how a lot of 
companies praised the product but in the end none of them bought it.  
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With all the new employees and the enlarged management, the office space 
downtown became crowded and at last too small. At that time, the city was 
building a technology park at the outskirts and asked technology.com to move in. 
It emphasised technology.com’s pioneer spirit as they were the first to move into 
the city’s first technology park. They agreed to move in but eventually faced the 
problem that the building was by far not ready and hardly anything worked in the 
beginning. A lot of improvising was needed after they had moved into the new 
rooms in December 2001.  
Instead of having three offices like before, technology.com then occupied two 
levels with a total of fifteen offices. They took the chance and placed the 
complete research and development department on the lower floor and 
administration, finance, marketing & sale on the upper level. They seated 
employees together who work on same projects. This enabled a better 
communication. To visualise general task structures, a magnetic board was set up 
showing the various projects with its team members. 
 
The idea for the first quarter of 2002 was to sell module 1 in large quantities and 
to arrange the market entry of the second module. To support the sales team, an 
additional sales manager was employed. At that time it also became clear that 
they would need a second round of financing in early summer to fully develop 
the whole suite. And the management realised that it had to concentrate much 
more on the market and its customers. To achieve the aim of selling much more 
of module 1, everyone in the company had to change their image of an R&D 
product company to a marketing-oriented company. However, such a change is 
difficult to get across. This mentality’s change was most difficult for the 
employees in the development department who had been there from the 
beginning.  
“The researchers, which have been with us from the beginning, simply 
continued as they were used to it. They have their projects which they 
want to bring to an end. They dislike each distraction from the 
outside. To develop and integrate as many functionalities as possible 
is what they wish. However, the new developers have been briefed 
differently by the head of the department. They much more consider 
the market in their actions. It is simply a matter of time until everyone 
has taken in that we do not develop for the sake of it but that we need 
to make our customers happy.” (Michael, interview 2) 
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This first quarter of 2002 was characterised by focusing on the development of 
key features of modules two and three as well as focusing on sales. As the chance 
to get fully financed by a second Venture Capital round was extremely low in 
general and as they did not succeed, they managed to get an intermediate 
financing round granted by the former VC. They calculated that the money 
would probably be sufficient until the end of the third quarter. Thus they needed 
to find a VC for the second round by the end of the second quarter. But 
technology.com had hardly any success selling its products which made 
convincing a VC even more difficult. But since it still had not generated any 
noteworthy turnover with module 1 in the first months of 2002 and the overall 
industrial and economic situation did not change, the management had to take 
action. These circumstances led to dismissing personnel in April 2002. They 
agreed on downsizing the American subsidiary. Nine out of ten American 
employees, i.e. everyone except Suresh, had to go. The American sales company 
was finally closed down at the end of that year. In addition, they dismissed some 
of the more problematic employees in Germany, of whom many were green card 
holders. It turned out that they were neither very productive nor motivated. This 
was partly due to the green card holders’ attitudes. For many or them this job was 
just a temporary international intermezzo before going back to the home country. 
There they will be highly regarded as they can claim foreign working experience.  
“In the beginning, Green Card holders are highly motivated, however 
this changes after six to nine months. Then they realise that they do 
not have to stress themselves as they are leaving after five years 
anyway. What kind of motivation can a Green Card holder have? He 
cannot achieve much in a company as he has to give up his career 
after five years anyway.” (Simon) 
 The official regulations state that a green card holder can work in Germany for 
up to five years. Thus some of them did not invest any emotional effort as they 
have to leave anyhow and it would not pay off in the long run. Therefore they did 
not show a strong effort to ‘invest’ in a lasting relationship with colleagues or the 
company in general. The other phenomena which was noticeable was that as 
soon as one of the ‘good’ green card holders met problems, he requested for 
redundancy and looked for a new job. The ‘less good’ ones knew that they would 
not find a job anywhere else and stayed. Thus self selection took place.  
As the company’s financial situation was still very bad, the management asked 
the remaining employees for a wage reduction of 20% in order to cut expenses. 
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They all agreed. To set an example, the founders themselves had cut their own 
salary already to a minimum. This crisis enforced the identification with the 
company and the whole team tried to work together to change the situation. They 
were aware that otherwise the situation would become worse and their jobs could 
be in danger.  
 
June 2002 was an eventful and crucial month. technology.com thought that it had 
succeeded in arranging a second round of financing. The VC assured that they 
would only need to sign the contract. However, in June the very committed 
Corporate VC suddenly put the financing negotiations to an end. The corporation 
behind had just sold one of their wholly owned companies. The latter had been 
the reason for the strategic investment in technology.com. But after the sale, there 
was no reason any longer to invest in technology.com. 
The month continued with the sudden death of the Marketing & Sales Director. 
This blocked the sales efforts for a fortnight. In addition, they had to dismiss the 
CFO whom they were not able to pay any longer. His main task in the last 
months had been to organise a second round of financing which he did not 
succeed but which was so vital. Thus, at the end of the month, both the Sales & 
Marketing manager and the CFO position were vacant. Simon and Michael 
realised that the management probably had been too big compared to the number 
of employees and the size of the company. Not only had they to pay the 
management salaries but the increasing number of divergent opinions in 
discussions made it more difficult to take decisions. Only if the company will 
grow over one hundred members again, could they imagine to enlarge the 
management board again. Nevertheless, they needed someone for marketing and 
someone for finance. They also realised that the administrative side was too 
strong as well. At the moment, they had one secretary per department which was 
simply too much. They were thinking of changing it to one main secretary for the 
whole management team. 
Due to all these negative aspects, the management had to take action. The only 
thing they could do was to dismiss employees. Eleven employees had to go 
which means that eleven employees were left who continued to work.  
“This step had to be taken a month ago as we could not keep the team 
any longer. Also, I cannot expect everybody to constantly forego 
twenty percent of their wages. So we dismissed some employees and 
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thus reached a relatively lean structure. And we were able to keep the 
best.” (Simon) 
The management had realised that it is more important to have good employees 
rather than many. And that one needs to take difficult decisions such as 
dismissing someone if he or she does not bring the expected performance. 
Dodging around does not help in the long-run and destroys more than it achieves. 
It is better to have a clear cut and save the money than keeping an employee. 
They also noticed that the productivity rate did not significantly decrease 
although they had dismissed so many. Some even performed better as there were 
less distractions through questions and the like and responsibilities were more 
clearly. Friction loss increases with increasing number of employees and 
relatively more coordination and administrative work is needed. 
“You need someone who attends to these employees, who supervises 
them and sees what is going on. The work has to be allocated and it 
always happens that things are made twice because one person does 
not know that the other already did it.” (Johannes) 
With the remaining employees, the management was just able to run the 
company and to continue with the product development. However, module 3 was 
completely put on hold although it was the company’s most distinguishing 
module. 
For the time being, the overall consolidation ended in September 2002 when 
good news were coming up. First, they finally managed to sell module 2 to a 
renowned German company. They then used the following two months for 
customising and adapting the product and for carrying out the order. Second, 
they were able to recruit an experienced sales manager which they poached from 
an established competitor. He was well known in that industry and enjoyed a 
good reputation with the customers. And finally, they received financial 
resources for a project which they carried out together with the university. They 
used the project and the money to continue developing module 3.  
In the following months, they planned to keep the number of employees constant 
to ensure profitability. They hoped for significant sales due to the renowned sale 
and the new sales manager. And with resuming the product development of 
module 3 they were able to increase the product variety and strengthen their 
unique selling proposition.  
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6.2.2 Summary of findings 
In the following I will point to the major findings which are prominent in this 
case study. As outlined in the research design chapter, the aim of this study is to 
examine organisational processes. Which organisational activities have evolved 
in new ventures over time and why they progressed as they did. Major organising 
principles were to be identified.  
 
technology.com’s foundation happened more or less by coincidence. The crucial 
event was the conversation between the Professor and the business plan 
competition manager. Neither the Professor nor any of his research assistants had 
the intention to found a company. The business plan competition was used to test 
the idea in a sort of game. In the case of a successful participation, they wanted to 
think about an actual foundation. Otherwise the ‘game’ would be stopped. As 
they won a price, they continued developing the idea. As predicted by the 
business plan manager, venture capitalists were eager at that time to finance 
technology start-ups. Thus it took not long until they received venture capital. 
However, the founder’s intentions and aims differed. For the Professor it was 
probably a chance to raise his reputation if new products would be linked with 
his name and last not least to earn more money. Although he invested his own 
money, too, he bore the least risk keeping his full-time employment as a 
university professor. Thus he probably would be pleased if the company 
succeeded and neutral if it would not. For the other founders, things were 
different. All of them gave up their job to switch it with an adventure. They 
invested their private financial resources although at their age they probably had 
no large savings. In the end, one can hardly speak of a gestation period and with 
about six months the planning period was quite short.  
The company was clearly technology driven, meaning that the management had a 
technological and no a business background, meaning that R&D was the most 
important department, meaning the vast majority of employees were technicians 
or computer science specialists. Thus the primary intention of most of them was 
to develop the product and get the software going. However, the business side 
was not in their range of vision. This led to problems as it was difficult to get 
across that they always needed to have in mind the customers’ needs and 
perspective.  
The company’s atmosphere was influenced to a certain degree by the general 
entrepreneurial hype, i.e. the idea that there is a team of young founders, a large 
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amount of venture capital available on the account and a promising idea leading 
to the creation of a venture which is rapidly increasing its numbers of employees, 
however hardly having any turnover.  
In the beginning, it was a very informal atmosphere and organisational 
mechanisms were hardly implemented. Decisions were taken by the complete 
management rather than by the relevant manager, information were spread via 
mouth-to-mouth process, coordinated coordination or communication did not 
take place. Instead a strong community emerged to cope with all uncertainty. 
This was important as neither the management nor the new employees had 
proper ideas which road to take. Due to active informal communication, a lot of 
equivocality was spontaneously resolved. However, the management often did 
not use new situations to extract more formalised procedure for similar situations 
to come. Rather, they were dealing with always new problems and new 
situations. This way of organising did work up to a certain company size. 
However, with increasing numbers of new employees, this active informal 
communication and network could not maintained any longer. As a result, the 
employees became insecure and problems accumulated. This was emphasised by 
the management’s lack to delegate. It created conflicts as the managers wanted to 
handle operational, strategic and administrative matters themselves. All this led 
to a change in identity and atmosphere. It began with the management who 
realised that some sort of professionalisation and organisational awareness was 
needed. Fuelled through external triggers, e.g. the notice of cancellation, no sales 
success and slow developmental progress, more formal mechanisms were 
introduced such as job evaluation talks, weekly developers’ reports, additional 
meetings and more delegation. Although this led to decreasing organisational 
pitfalls and processes running more smoothly, the business and financial aspects 
were still not as good as expected. Finally, employees had to be laid off. 
Unexpectedly, productivity rates hardly decreased. This made the management 
rethink many organisational and strategic aspects. However, they often did not 
dare taking drastic steps. In the end they stopped major development projects to 
aid the most advanced ones to succeed. A second group of employees were laid 
off just two months later and the management team was diminished. In the end, 
the rapid growth efforts especially in terms of personnel, were seen in 
perspective.  
Although in summer 2002, there nearly seemed to be the end of the venture, they 
managed to survive. Due to severe reductions in personnel they were able to keep 
THE (HI)STORIES OF THE NEW VENTURES  114 
 
 
expenses to a minimum and continued developing the current projects. The 
previous turbulent months had led to a new organisational understanding of the 
management. They had realised that running a company was not a game and that 
they should rather keep projects small in order to realise them. However, there 
was still the major problem of customers not buying the product. And as they 
were not granted a second round of financing, the management had to be content 
with small rather than big steps.  
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6.3 x-it.com 
x-it.com is an internet-based venture which was founded in a small Bavarian 
university town in 1999. It emerged slowly and was finally founded by a team of 
three. The venture started with providing web services and strategic e-business 
consulting. Later on they added software development. It grew quite quickly in 
its first year but faced major problems when the new economy bubble burst. 
However, it managed to survive by consolidating.  
The historic development can be seen as an overview on the following page in 
figure 12 followed by the detailed description of the company’s story. First, the 
founding and management team will be presented.  
 
Thorsten graduated in 2001 majoring Business Informatics. During his master 
studies he already carried out projects for larger companies. In his own company 
he became CTO.  
His buddy Martin graduated from the same university in 2001, majoring 
Business Administration and Economics. Parallel to his studies he had worked 
for 2.5 years in a marketing agency. He became responsible for administration, 
finance and web design and was titled COO. 
Jan, the third founder, was at the time of the foundation a research assistant at 
the local university writing his PhD thesis in organisation theory. He graduated in 
business sciences as well as in Badminton from the German Coaching Academy. 
He had worked as a badminton coach more than ten years.  
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Figure 12: Milestones in the history of x-it.com 
  
1999 
‘Start’ 
May: Thorsten accepts an IT-consulting project for a big company; he 
founds a private company in order to balance the cash 
 June: Thorsten employs his buddy Martin 
 July: a web-designer and a secretary (Thorsten’s fiancée) are employed 
 October: they approach the university for help to professionalise and 
participate in an entrepreneurship seminar 
  
2000 
‘First expansion’ 
February: acquisition of first big deal; university students are employed 
as part-time staff 
 May: second big deal is acquired 
 June: legal foundation of the Ltd. Company; university coach Jan 
officially becomes co-founder  
 Full-time and part-time employees are hired 
‘1st crisis’ October: biggest client goes bankrupt; x-it.com has liquidity problems; 
private investor provides bridge financing 
 December: employee for legal and HR matters is hired  
 Moving to new premises 
  
2001 January: a new private investor is found 
‘Strategic change’ Strategic change: own products are developed alongside consulting and 
services 
 May: two additional private investors come on board as a result of severe 
liquidity problems 
 Autumn: first preliminary version of in-house product turns out to be 
faulty 
‘2nd crisis’ October: employees accept wage reduction; all students working part-
time are dismissed 
  
2002 Continuous struggle for survival, a number of smaller deals are acquired 
‘Cost reductions’ Two employees are dismissed for job performance reasons  
‘Ongoing crisis’ A new trainee is employed  
 June: new investment round secures intermediary survival; financial 
situation allows to acquire new deals 
 October: main regional competitor is bankrupt, acquisition of new deals 
facilitated 
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6.3.1 The company’s development 
x-it.com was founded almost by chance. In June 1999, Thorsten, an informatics 
student in his late twenties, was recruited for a software-programming project at 
an established company and asked his pal to join him, when he realised he could 
not manage the size of the project by himself.  
“The project became bigger and bigger and I then coincidentally 
asked Martin to help. He lived in the same house and I knew that he 
was working for a local web agency. I needed someone who did this 
bothersome design stuff. And he said, he would do anything for 
money. So we were a twosome.” (Thorsten) 
This initial experience convinced the team that they actually had a skill they 
could sell. They decided to stay together as a team and to run more projects. 
After some time, they hired a web designer and with the help of Thorsten’s 
fiancée, they went on for almost half a year. However, they realised that they 
needed to professionalise in order to turn it into a real business. But they 
themselves had no clue how to do that. Thus, in autumn 1999 they approached 
the local university for help. In an entrepreneurship seminar, they were assigned 
to a coach who was not only skilled in IT, but also had extensive theoretical 
know-how in organisation and strategy. The aim of the seminar was to write a 
business plan and to take part in the regional business plan competition. In fact, 
the business plan for the second phase was not written by the two buddies but by 
the coach. Finally, they dropped out of the competition as they did not hand in a 
final version which would have included all financial data. They already had so 
much work with operational aspects, that they neglected the business plan. Small 
orders kept them quite busy. However, due to the lack of a unique selling 
proposition, they did not manage to attract venture capital through the business 
plan competition network. Instead, they were financed by business angels and 
their own personal capital. 
 
Though the company had already been running for months, in the stories of the 
founders the real start of the company was when the coach, more or less by 
chance, acquired the first major deal for them in February 2000. This deal 
allowed to finance all current employees for one year. The deal was made with a 
well known local medium sized company. The three also hoped that this would 
radiate positive signals to the environment and increase their reputation in town. 
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“Jan had this appointment with Mr. X, the CEO of a large local 
company. It was Martin’s birthday, and he was out partying. I had 
just gotten back from another appointment that day, and was still in 
my suit, when Jan called and told me to get in the car and come there 
immediately. But I didn’t have a car, as Martin had borrowed it. Jan 
said, then call Martin to pick you up and have him take you over here. 
Martin was dressed less than casually and was out partying in town, 
he came to pick me up, and we went to the company. I was wearing a 
suit, but Martin looked like a pig, but nonetheless he came, too. Then, 
the three of us were in the CEO’s office - that was great. The CEO, 
wow, we were nervous, and then we made a deal for an entire year, 
and later we got in a second deal and then it [the venture] went off. 
That was a funny story.” (Thorsten) 
This story of the becoming of the venture is told and retold in the company, and 
passed on to new employees as a means of conveying a certain start-up spirit. 
The acquisition of the first deal confirmed what the founders had already 
suspected. They would have difficulties to attract venture capital, but they could 
still survive if they were smart in acquiring projects. As hiring permanent 
employees was considered too expensive, a number of informatics students were 
recruited on a part-time basis since February 2000.  
 
In May 2000, a second and even larger project was acquired. The customer 
booked the entire team until the end of the year 2000, and the venture moved into 
the customer’s premises. So far they had worked in a backyard flat in which 
house both buddies had rented their own flats. The new office consisted of one 
large room where one desk next to the other was forming a ten meter long desk 
line. This formation enabled an active communication among all team members 
which helped to overcome organisational shortcomings. As the first project was 
still running, new staff had to be hired on a full-time basis. For cost saving 
reasons they did not employ head hunters but advertised in regional newspapers 
and offered open positions on their web page. To a certain extent, they were very 
surprised that people were interested in working for them. 
“It was hard to get employees at all because of the war for talents. 
Actually we were astonished that we did find someone at all.” 
(Martin) 
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Due to the general internet hype, software programmers were highly needed and 
thus difficult to get. This resulted in employing a lot of lateral hires. The 
founders argued that most people in that industry start from the beginning with 
no industry specific experience or knowledge anyhow. Learning by doing was 
thus the main ability needed. And they believed that employees foreign to the 
subject would foster creativity and inventiveness. They were looking for 
applicants which were not seeking quick (and dirty) money but who were willing 
to see their job within a long-term perspective. During the recruiting interviews, 
the founders paid more attention to the applicant’s character to fit into the team 
than to his qualifications which were presumably not fitting that well anyhow. By 
the end of 2000, x-it.com had nine fixed salaried employees and a couple of 
students helping out on an hourly basis.  
The company received the local newspapers attention by hiring the city’s first 
green card holder.  
“We had a guy from Russia whom we were very proud of as he was 
the first person with a Green Card in our city.” (Jan) 
They also hired local apprentices for two reasons. First, they hoped for 
acknowledgment from local companies as training them was politically well 
respected. Second, these apprentices spoke the ‘local language’, i.e. knowing 
cultural aspects and habits which were quite important as the company aimed at 
local and regional customers first. And they might bring them a small network of 
contacts which could turn out to be useful.  
 
The new deal put the venture into a remarkable situation as the company was 
financially secured for a number of months. Thus, the founders were not forced 
to focus on acquiring further deals. Rather, they could manage the venture – due 
to their lack of management experience – often by trial and error, and still grow. 
“In 2000, we were in the astonishing and lucky situation that we had a 
‘standing order’; we didn’t experience growth problems and could 
therefore grow without problems and could allow ourselves to deal 
with things differently, to have a less professional management, after 
the deal was secured.” (Jan) 
However, the ‘standing order’ enabled them to neglect many organisational 
topics. There was simply no need to think about organisational matters as 
everything seemed to function smoothly. While this situation was perceived as 
comfortable at the time, it backfired later. Management had not been forced from 
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the beginning to professionalise, as the financial situation appeared secured. 
Thus, on this stage little attention was paid to internal organising, and wheels 
were reinvented many times, for example in project work. The management 
simply did not fix processes or rules after a process had been run the first time. 
Thus the second time it came up again, the same questions arose and uncertainty 
retained.  
 
For that first year, the founders refer to the ‘Monday morning meetings’ as the 
most important coordination mechanism. The management was happy about 
having had the meeting from the beginning on as it guaranteed a constant flow of 
information. It was mandatory for everyone in the company. The meeting was 
used to inform everyone about the status quo and the employees in return 
reported about their previous week. Tasks were then scheduled for the next one. 
This frank information policy was not only seen as a coordination tool but to 
foster motivation as well.  
“The thing is, you can’t motivate people in a start-up by paying them 
little and telling them ‘Now drudge, slave!’. That doesn’t work. You’re 
much more dependent on their know-how than you initially think. 
There’s so much stuff that you need to trust them with it. Trust maybe 
is the major factor. You have to trust in the capabilities of the 
employees. Beyond that, there really is a second somewhat 
hierarchical arena in the sense that someone has to set the direction 
in which to march, but that is all and it could come from anybody.” 
(Jan) 
The management also believed that as much information as possible would 
prevent employees from harming the company. They believed in an ‘openness 
and transparency policy’ as a safety measure. Unfortunately, they later had to 
learn that this was only partially true. 
 
Slowly, signs of hierarchy emerged, however, at this stage based on competences 
and input into the venture’s development, rather than based on ranks. In June 
2000, in consequence of the acquired deals, a private limited company was 
founded, with the two initial founders and the coach as shareholders. The three 
had realised in February that it was too risky working on a GbR basis (civil law 
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association). Although simply being a juridical act, it influenced the founders’ 
attitudes to their venture.  
“Transforming the company into a limited company changed 
something. I thought to myself that this means leaving the children’s 
playground and really becoming an entrepreneur.” (Martin) 
 
This act also formalised the founders’ roles. Two became managing directors, 
one responsible for product development and technical matters, and the other for 
marketing and administrative matters.  
“Martin didn’t feel like doing my job and neither did I doing his. That 
was totally clear. We then had the separation given by education. 
Martin had the web agency around his neck and I managed the 
software development. This is also a typical split as you need more 
business economic know-how at the web agency for the Marketing 
concept etc.” (Thorsten) 
The third founder continued his research job at the local university and acted in 
the venture in a mixed role of a stakeholder, adviser and managing director. He 
regarded himself being responsible for corporate strategy, lobbying and 
networking. However, his intention was to become CEO after having finished his 
dissertation. So far he called himself ‘Chairman’ which does not exist in a 
limited company form as such.  
“For 3 ½ years now I am officially nothing. My business card says 
‘Chairman’, which is a role that does not exist within a GmbH. It was 
an subterfuge of my own: how can I hold a position without holding it 
legally?” (Jan) 
Later on, this rather unclear role led to some confusion and conflicts in the 
company, as it was difficult for the employees to understand his true role and 
responsibilities.  
 
The Ltd company contract was seen as more than a juridical contract. It was 
interpreted as an important structural feature, first to externally safeguard against 
litigation, and second as an internal manifestation of roles and responsibilities. 
The self-imposed contract set boundaries as well as codes of behaviour for the 
founders.  
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“We built the foundation of the company within three months. The 
funny thing is that I’m still proud of having done [the shareholder 
contract] so and not differently, even if the contract has some 
weaknesses. […] The contract as the basic structure carries the 
company until today, despite its growth. That means, new 
shareholders came in and we still didn’t have to change it much. Its 
structure remained the same; the way we restricted ourselves with 
muzzles and strait-jackets made sense, nobody could step out of line, 
nobody could say I’ll let the thing crash - it also persists in times of 
crises and that is something which maybe isn’t always thought about 
in the beginning.” (Jan) 
 
Until October 2000, things ran rather smoothly, even though in August and 
September both founders and the employed students had to take exams which 
lead to a reduced quality of work. In addition to the large projects, some smaller 
projects were acquired, leading to further growth. One of the founders compared 
the atmosphere and culture during that time with the military service’s time. At 
the time being it was not liked much but glorified in retrospect. The work load 
and the respective working hours were extremely high for everyone. Even 
weekends were often used for finishing urgent projects. The management then 
provided a crate of beer and lots of pizza. But this changed in the course of the 
venture’s development.  
“I liked that a lot, because I knew that at the weekend everybody 
would be there. [...] But now, this only happens once or twice a year. 
Only if termination of a project is at risk. Some are always saying, 
great, we could do that more often. But whenever it happens, they 
have no time. In the past it was clear that you came even if you had 
another appointment.” (Thorsten) 
This first year led to the creation of corporate stories which were still told one 
year later. They were told to new employees to illustrate what it had been like in 
the beginning. One story centred around long working hours. Whenever someone 
was going home before six o’clock in the afternoon, the others wished him a nice 
afternoon.  
”If someone goes home at six o’clock, there is still the saying that he 
took half a day off, although meanwhile almost everybody is leaving at 
six.” (Thorsten) 
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Unfortunately for the venture, its biggest client had considerable financial 
problems and filed for bankruptcy in late October. The growth phase, which in 
the meantime had led to employing 24 people (16 full-time, 8 students), came to 
an immediate end. The secured financing was missing and bankruptcy was 
impending, as the remaining months till the end of year could not be financed by 
themselves. Therefore, a local bank was approached for loans, but it rejected. 
Instead, a private investor could be found, who provided a bridge financing until 
the end of the year 2000. As the venture had been located in the bankrupt client’s 
premises, x-it.com was forced to move location, which happened in December 
2000. This time they moved into their own office space which was considered as 
an important sign of maturity.  
“It was a positive highlight of that year to move and then have our 
own entrance door for the first time. It is like a teenager leaving home 
and moving into your first flat. Suddenly you are grown up, having 
your own doorbell shows that it is yours. No one can suddenly come in 
and claim it not to be yours.” (Jan) 
 
In this period, the founders also realised that they needed a more strategic 
position and decided to develop software products in-house. A clear decision 
what to do was needed as most employees were unclear about the company’s 
goal after the loss of the main customer.  
“To some it was clear that we would proceed to Content Management 
Systems, others thought we would stick to web design, others meant 
that developing individual software would be the future. Certainly, we 
have missed out communicating things. [...] We did not succeed in 
communicating where we are and where we head at.” (Martin) 
This management decision about the product development was then broken down 
into single tasks and features the product should have. It happened in close 
contact with the employees as the latter had to say what they were able to do and 
which features were feasible. However, the product development bound many 
resources, and in consequence the next financial crisis was faced in May 2001. 
Two new investors were taken in to allow the venture to finish the product 
development. These investors were seen as an external signal for potential 
customers guaranteeing seriousness and a long-term perspective and it motivated 
the employees. Contact with the three investors was mostly limited to a meeting 
every other month at which the founders presented current developments. But it 
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was not as such that the investors tried to exert a lot of influence nor were they 
very interested in financial data. These meetings and the investors in general 
were rather an additional source of advice and information used by the founders.  
In autumn the new product’s first version was said to be ready. Unfortunately 
they realised that the uncontrolled development had led to an unsatisfactory 
result. The version contained far too many bugs but had consumed a lot of 
resources.  
 
In the entire year 2001, with the downturn of the economy, the deal inflow 
became more difficult and the financial situation became even harsher. The first 
measures taken were severe cost-cuttings and everyone realised that the initial 
‘good times’ were over. The rented office space was reduced to save costs, 
dispensable goods were cut and services such as the cleaning service’s contract 
and the supply of free drinks were cancelled. The second measure was to reduce 
personnel in October. They laid off all students with which they had problems 
anyway. Due to their exam periods, less and poorer work was done in 
March/April and August/September. And general productivity seemed to have 
been less with the students. Their lacking working schedules made it very 
difficult to coordinate work with others.  
In addition, two full-time employees were dismissed due to personal reasons 
such as lack of know-how. Getting to terms with the need to dismiss people was 
a difficult task for the founders who had built much of their identity as founders 
around the fact that they had created jobs in the region. Having to dismiss people 
triggered a feeling of complete failure and is still mentioned as the worst 
experience made during the venture life. The venture continued with 14 people, 
who in addition agreed to lower salaries. However, due to the burst of the new 
economy bubble, motivation was difficult to obtain. 
 
In October 2001, the previously mentioned lack of role definition escalated to the 
clear expression of distrust from the employees to the third founder, which led to 
his temporary resignation from office. Only after some effort was put into clearly 
communicating the roles of each member of the managing team, the situation 
could be smoothened. Yet, the team spirit was felt to be breaking apart. As a 
counter measure the management announced a monthly bowling event. Although 
being voluntary, peer pressure led to large participation.  
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The year 2001 turned into a long period of crisis, yet giving up was never an 
option.  
“It is like a child of your own, there are people you are responsible 
for. This is something of your own, you do not just give up and plunk.” 
(Martin) 
The founders realised that there will always be good and bad years comparable to 
summer following winter. One rather needs to learn from the mistakes. But 
forgetting could also help to cope with negative experience.  
“You don’t forget anything, on the contrary. But this might be 
individually. I think that Thorsten and Martin are perfect in 
repressing things. I cannot repress, on the contrary. I memorise 
everything, each situation and every single second. You always make 
new mistakes but you should not make the same mistake twice.” (Jan) 
The positive aspect was that professionalisation took place during that year 2001. 
The aim to survive increased the focus to improve at all levels. 
“That all developed in 2001, a year of crisis. When you’re in a crisis, 
you have to professionalise, otherwise you won’t survive. 
Professionalisation for us meant that we no longer ran blindly into 
serving new industries. We now take the time to gather industry-
specific know-how first, then we can achieve a competitive advantage. 
You notice a big difference when you can tell your customer, I know 
your industry, I understand what you want from us.” (Jan) 
This new focus on internal professionalisation also led to the hiring of a new 
employee with know-how in legal and HRM matters in October 2001. This new 
employee could give crucial support in contracting issues – as mistakes in 
contracting had caused the major loss in invoiced payments, for example with the 
bankrupt customer.  
“Before, these things were handled very amateurish. Further signs of 
professionalisation are that we conduct a priori workshops with 
customers before fixing the deal. We specify our obligations, but also 
services beyond those obligations. Professionalising means to 
introduce a clear pricing scheme. Pricing is an important topic. I bet 
you that you can ask 100 companies and not even five of them will 
know exactly how their pricing works.” (Jan) 
Next to legal matters, the new employee was also responsible for HRM. It was 
still the management’s responsibility to choose whom to employ, but everything 
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else was handled by the lawyer. She also became head of the web design 
department. This enabled one of the founders to focus more on sales and 
administrative aspects. However, the other employees working in web design had 
difficulties accepting her as the boss as she knew less in those technical matters 
than they did.  
 
Despite the economic downturn, the venture managed to survive. This involved 
the acquisition of smaller deals, the reduction of wages of employees and 
founders, as well as an increased commitment from the investors’ parts. Survival 
led to an increasing focus to improve at all levels. Reporting, controlling or fixed 
working hours are examples of traditional tools being implemented.  
“Before we did not have any fixed working hours. Today everyone has 
to appear by nine o’clock or the person is in trouble. There is a 
punishing fee one has to pay. Everyone being late or unprepared in 
meetings, has to pay, too.” (Thorsten)  
At that point, the venture was perceiving itself as entering a new stage, that of 
professionalisation. Part of higher levels of organising are set rules of the game 
for the employees. Before, much freedom was granted not only in terms of how 
to design the own work processes but also in terms of working hours. However, 
it was noticed that a lack of standardisation unnecessarily prolonged cycle times 
and posed problems wherever people had to interact, leading to a constant 
reinventing of the wheel. Standards, e.g. how to save files or presentation 
templates, were increasingly used to facilitate standardisation. Human resource 
management was improved as well. They started with obtaining job descriptions 
from every employee about his position. These were very insightful for the 
management as they reflected the employee’s understanding of his tasks and 
duties and the organisation in general. The job descriptions were then used to 
clarify misunderstood roles or tasks and to organise responsibilities more clearly. 
In addition to the internal application and generation of know-how, they drew on 
know-how from the outside. The father of one of the founders had recently 
retired from his former job as human resource manager for a large traditional 
company. To help his son and to apply his know-how and experience, he 
supported the venture in professionalising its processes, especially with setting 
up the job descriptions. The management used these descriptions for deciding 
who has to take over which job in case of vacations or illness. And it enabled 
them to delegate and control better. It also helped to specify open job profiles in 
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advertisements. But these functions and responsibilities were not visualised 
through an organisational chart.  
“We do not have an organisation chart as it is actually clear how 
everything is going. You could ask everybody to which department he 
belongs. Those two right here belong to development department, I am 
Head of Development and everybody else up there belongs to the web 
agency with Susanne as Head of Web Agency and Martin is the Head 
of Sales Department, where Dirk is working. We just don’t have it. 
Maybe Martin has one, I don’t know. Or his father drew one, but I am 
not interested in it, because it is obvious anyway.” (Thorsten) 
 
In addition to the Monday meetings, the employees had called for a Thursday 
meeting which was intended for personal feedback and for improving the 
communication. But instead of personal evaluations and problem solving, the 
meeting was used to discuss project work and to organise work processes. As the 
company climate was by now perceived to be dominated by prejudices and 
frontiers-building, management decided to hire an external trainer to conduct a 
communication training for the entire venture. 
“This training is going to help us a lot. There have been quite some 
things going wrong during the last one or two years, although we had 
a very open communication and everything was openly discussed. 
Maybe that had been the reason for the difficulties. Calling everyone 
informally by their first name and knowing the people privately as 
well makes it difficult to run disciplinary measurements.” (Martin) 
Everyone was very happy with the training. Especially the management realised 
many mistakes they had done regarding communications and culture. One topic 
was that they had hardly given feedback so far as they trusted the employees very 
much. They perceived it as a problem of drawing the line between being the 
manager on the one side and the friend on the other. They regarded it as being 
very difficult to utter objective criticism. This also included behavioural aspects. 
One founder realised that one cannot demand a certain etiquette from one’s own 
employees but disobeying them oneself.  
“Punctuality and respect for your company. I have often called it a 
chip shop or little rat-shop in the true meaning, which is totally 
wrong. I must not talk about my own company in such a cynical way 
as it is really something one should be proud of.” (Jan) 
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As a manager he had to set an example and act like a role model. They also 
learned that they often had misjudged the employees motivation. There are a lot 
of employees who see their job as the means to earn money. They are not as 
much intrinsically motivated as the management sometimes had wished.  
“At the beginning we misconceived that all employees are as much 
motivated as we are and that everybody can act on their own 
responsibility. But in reality, in practise, this is not the case.” 
(Martin) 
One of the founders regarded personal freedom as something very valuable. 
However, he had to learn that many of his employees thought differently. They 
rather wanted clear instructions and briefings instead of working independently 
and on their own. In order to learn more about the employees’ aims and 
problems, individual job evaluation talks were planed for the following year. 
Although there was a lively communication between management and 
employees, it was hardly on a professional basis. Thus the management did not 
give the employees detailed and constructive feedback which the employees 
asked for.  
 
In the first half of 2002, another two people were dismissed for personal reasons, 
i.e. for refusing to delete porn-movies from the server and for discussing 
company-internal matters with competitors. However, the management was 
astonished to notice that the loss of knowledge was less than expected. They 
often overestimated the employees’ abilities and knowledge. Thus they started 
thinking how to improve their recruiting processes to yield better results. But as 
they had not employed anyone during the last six months, a new recruiting 
strategy was not observable. 
 
The company has since then stabilised at ten people. In summer 2002, again a 
financial crisis was solved by persuading the shareholders to increase their 
investments. Since then, an increased focus on acquisitions had led to a number 
of small and middle-sized deals, mostly in the web design area. This was 
facilitated by the bankruptcy of the main competitor in the region. A new 
apprentice was employed at end of 2002 and plans were made for employing at 
least two people in spring 2003. In addition, the third founder started working 
full-time with the venture in early 2003, underlining the preparation for renewed 
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growth. But instead of becoming a manager as the other two founders, he worked 
as a free lancer for the company.  
 
6.3.2 Summary of findings 
The following main findings can be summarised from the x-it.com case.  
x-it.com came into being after a series of little successful steps. It had started with 
a successful consulting project of the first founder followed by the acquisition of 
little deals later with his buddy and by managing to employ a designer. In the 
end, they won the later third founder’s interest and finally acquired two big deals. 
However, this also shows, that it was not the founders’ genuine idea to found a 
venture. It more or less happened step by step. This was especially true as they 
had no unique selling proposition for which they could obtain venture capital. 
The idea was a generic one although e-business consulting and web design have 
been recently new phenomena.  
This image of the business model meandering along is also true for the founders’ 
motivation and intentions. At the beginning, all of them had still other 
occupations. The two buddies were regular students at the local university. To a 
certain extent they were not reliant on their manager’s income as they were still 
supported by their parents. The third founder had a full time PhD research 
position at the university. For all three of them, the venture was something 
alongside the other. But it turned out to be the other way around, i.e. the venture 
demanding most of their time and hardly leaving room for anything else. It was a 
sort of game and after having finished university, the world would be their oyster 
again. However, the venture developed and many employees were employed. 
This certainly changed the founders’ options as just closing down everything was 
not possible any more. The main motivation was probably to earn some money 
alongside and to take the chance the internet hype was offering to everyone.  
 
x-it.com’s evolution from foundation over the next three years to the end of the 
study had been a long struggle between filing for bankruptcy and surviving. The 
venture started in a very uncoordinated way and displayed little formal structures. 
Coordination mainly happened by mutual adjustment. As the founders were as 
inexperienced with their new role as most employees were, the atmosphere can 
be characterised by a big team in which everyone helps each other without 
differences. This muddling through is also true for acquiring deals as it happened 
more incidentally than through detailed planning. Nevertheless, the company 
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grew and in response to its growth, it had to increase the level of standardisation. 
This involved mainly the interfaces but not the work practices. Wherever work 
responsibilities overlapped, the interface was standardised to facilitate 
cooperation. The same reasoning is true for the introduction of fixed core 
working hours. In 2002, the process of customer involvement and project 
structure was standardised. Yet, standardisation did not lead to higher levels of 
formalisation which would imply written documentation and regulations. Rather 
the weekly meeting served as the tool to communicate about the work to be done. 
At the same time, delegation and specialisation increased as well. This was 
fostered by the legal employee who came in. All founders were then clearly 
responsible for distinctive task areas and had certain employees to delegate to. At 
the same time, the locus of control stayed largely with the three founders. Yet, 
the issue became more important after bad experience had been made. The 
specialisation or roles within the top management team had led to the 
uncontrolled development of a software product which turned out to have used a 
lot of resources with non-satisfactory results. In consequence, peer-to-peer 
control increased. Similarly, bad experience with some employees’ behaviour led 
to changes in control polices. Rather than introducing direct supervision, clear 
rules were set.  
 
A number of organising processes were implemented in a rather reactive way 
when an organisational member became fed up with inefficiencies. While the 
stories tell about the reactive approach to organising, they also tell about the 
attempt to store produced know-how both in terms of organising and operational 
know-how. In times of stagnation, this know-how was actively maintained and 
further fine-tuned and later served to support future growth. Thus the case 
suggests that stagnation or decline are not necessarily to be viewed negatively. 
Rather, these periods of stagnation or decline had been crucial for the later 
survival of the venture. During these periods, the focus was put on actively 
developing internal competencies.  
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6.4 letters.de 
letters.de is an online market place for used, rare and out-of-print books. The 
venture connects those who buy books with those who sell books. It was founded 
in autumn 1999 by a team of five guys who knew each other through university. 
They company grew constantly until sold to their main competitor in northern 
America in autumn 2002. The major milestones in the venture’s development are 
illustrated in the following figure. 
 
Figure 13: Milestones in the history of letters.de 
  
1999 
‘Start’ 
March: two friends have the idea of selling used and rare books via 
theinternet, they asked three friends to join them 
 August: Business Angels invest into the idea 
 September: foundation of the Ltd. Company takes place 
 October: booth at the Frankfurt Book Fair with launch of the website, the 
online platform contains 100,000 books in the database 
 December: CVC buys shares  
  
2000 January: first employees are hired 
‘First expansion’ March: internal reorganisation from market-based to functional-based 
structure 
‘Strategic change’ June: Internationalisation as English web page is launched and UK office 
is opened  
 October: an additional web page for new books is launched  
 change to brokerage fee business model 
 Carl leaves the company 
  
2001 March: French web page is launched 
 London office is closed 
 May: CVC finances intermediate round 
‘Merger’ October: selling the company to Canadian competitor 
 Matthias leaves the company 
  
2002 February: brand letters.de is dissolved  
 Franz leaves the company; top management is reduced to two 
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In order to get familiar with its key players, a small description of each founder will be 
given. 
Hartmut was working at his PhD. He graduated with honours in 1995, majoring 
in Industrial Engineering. In addition to his commercial education and 
internships all over the world, Hartmut worked for a management consulting 
company from 1996 to 1999. At letters.de, he was responsible for the commodity 
market and finance, administration and HR.  
Dr. Matthias was finishing his post graduate studies in logistics in 1996. Before 
that he graduated with honours majoring Industrial Engineering in 1993. In 
addition to his academic career, Matthias has also been a consultant between 
1993 and 1998. He was responsible for the contact with the antique book dealers. 
Franz graduated in 1999 with distinction, majoring business administration. He 
did several internships during his studies. He started with being responsible for 
the academic book markets, business development and later marketing. 
Carl had studied informatics and graduated in 1999. He then worked in a 
consultancy company which was founded and run by the Professor at which all 
the others had worked at. In this company he was responsible for hardware and 
other computer matters. At letters.de he became Head of IT and was mainly 
responsible for setting up the database.  
Dr. Benedikt successfully finished his post graduate studies in logistics in 1999. 
Majoring in Business Management, he graduated with honours in 1996. His 
studies included a one year dual diploma programme in France. In addition he 
completed a one-term programme in business administration in England. 
Benedikt was an independent consultant between 1998-1999. He started as being 
responsible for the commodity market and then changed to IT and later PR & 
business development.  
 
6.4.1 The company’s development 
The foundation of letters.de was the result of the general internet and founding 
hype which characterised Germany in the late 1990s. In spring 1999, two buddies 
were hooked by the foundation wave and started thinking about different 
possibilities.  
“It was a certain urge to make something of one’s own during the 
entrepreneurship wave [Gründerwelle]. There was only a relatively 
small window of opportunity to finance something. You have to admit 
it was a top opportunity to become self-employed with manageable 
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risk. You just had to write a good business plan. As a matter of fact, 
that was sufficient then.” (Hartmut)  
As they had no technological idea or patent which they wanted to commercialise, 
they focused and evaluated several B-2-C service ideas. They came across the 
idea of selling used books via the internet. Books were an ideal good to sell over 
the internet. 
“We looked at the market, how big it was and whether it was really a 
mere internet business, meaning an intransparent, fragmented and 
inefficient market in the offline world, so that with the medium internet 
a completely new market could be established.” (Hartmut) 
Hartmut and Carl then asked Matthias, Franz and Michael whether they would 
like to join them. The aim was to start with five founding members to have a 
strong starting team to get things going.  
“We thought that it is actually great with so many persons because 
you can achieve a lot of power very quickly. These are also people 
with the same thinking and you cannot have enough of those. You 
have so much work and spend so much time in your office that it is 
quite good to have motivated people, who are generalists and can get 
on with a number of things.” (Franz) 
 
These five then started writing the business plan in order to analyse the idea 
better and to present it to venture capitalists. But in that course, Hartmut and 
Michael did not get along well enough which resulted in Michael leaving the 
project in August. The remaining four immediately thought about who they could 
ask to join in again. It was Benedikt whom they asked and who agreed. All five 
knew each other as they were all connected to one university chair. Matthias had 
habilitated there, Benedikt had already finished his PhD and was now working as 
a consultant, Hartmut and Carl were still writing at their PhD and Franz had just 
graduated and intended to start his PhD with the same professor.  
They intended to set up a company in which all five founders would be equal 
managers, thus they would have no CEO. In fact, all of them were too power 
conscious to let someone else do the job. However, the company shares were not 
evenly distributed. Christian, Franz and Hartmut owned more than Matthias and 
Benedikt. This was due to the initial commitment and the personal input. 
Eventually, they redistributed the shares after two years.  
 
THE (HI)STORIES OF THE NEW VENTURES  134 
 
 
Next to writing the business plan, they had started developing the databank 
software which would be needed. The biggest event concerning books in 
Germany is the Frankfurt Book Fair which takes place every autumn. Just by 
accident, they managed to get a booth there which was a funny story often retold 
afterwards. Michael’s surname coincidentally resembles a renowned publishing 
family whose large publishing house has the same name and is extremely well 
known in the publishing industry. Just for fun he called the Frankfurt Book Fair’s 
office to ask for a booth reservation. Unexpectedly, he was simply asked for the 
size wanted and they neglected to ask for the company behind. It was quite 
astonishing as only member companies from the ‘Börsenverein des deutschen 
Buchhandels’ (association of Germany’s bookselling trade) are allowed at the 
exhibition. letters.de was not yet founded and thus not a member at all. But since 
then they had a booth at the book fair and suddenly a deadline by which they had 
to present the company and their service.  
 
Just before they were granted the book fair’s booth, a couple of business angels 
invested in the idea. This money was needed to develop the platform and the 
database and to run market analysis. It was sufficient to finance the next three 
months. As a result, they rented a small one-room-office in a city in the Rhine 
area. So far, they hesitated to employ anyone on a monthly salary as they had no 
long-term perspective nor run a proper financing round. This resulted in 
employing only interns for up to six months. But the founding team managed to 
get financed by a Corporate VC already in September. This led to the foundation 
of letters.de as a limited liability company at 13th September 1999. Exactly one 
month later, they launched their web page at the Frankfurt Book Fair with a 
database containing 100,000 used books. Many fair visitors were surprised to 
find a small booth which did not present books but only had a computer. 
letters.de was demonstrating their database and the idea to buy used and rare 
books via the internet. All in all, they received good press coverage at the book 
fair which helped them to get recognised and known.  
 
The remaining months of that year were characterised by setting up the company, 
improving the web page and enlarging the database. All this was done by the five 
founders and a couple of interns. The founders organised themselves around 
markets as they had learned from university. They distinguished between the 
academic market (Franz), the antiquarian market (Matthias) and the commodity 
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market (Hartmut and later Benedikt). The remaining two founders programmed 
the database. But a couple of months later they realised that it was better to 
divide the tasks by functions than by markets as it was too hard to separate the 
markets from each other. The market boundaries were blurred too often. Thus 
Carl became responsible for IT, Hartmut for finance and HR, Franz for business 
development, Benedikt for Marketing & PR and Matthias for the second-hand 
booksellers. However, none of the founders brought with them any experiences 
with the book market. Rather than regarding this as a negative aspect, the 
founders turned it into something positive. 
“None of us knew the book market. I don’t know, if that was not even 
a kind of an advantage. Someone coming from the book market who 
wants to build up something new in the book market might consider it 
too closely. But innovations stem from having no respect. That’s what 
brought us forward.” (Matthias) 
 
After the CVC had bought a minority of the stakes in December, letters.de hired 
their first full-time salaried employee in January 2000. Employing new members 
was a joint decision among the founders. Everyone had to agree as otherwise the 
applicant would be rejected. With hindsight they acknowledged that those 
applicants who raised disagreement among the founders but nevertheless have 
been employed, turned out to cause problems later on. It was startling how 
reliable and predictable the gut feeling had been, they said in the interview. Some 
applicants arose discussions among the five. They had difficulties deciding on 
those which showed no strong ambitions or mid-term goals. This was something 
completely unfamiliar to the five. In the cause of the venture’s development they 
learnt that quite a large number of employees simply regards a job as a means to 
earn money. Not every employee dreams of becoming manager one day. A lot 
were happy as it was. With their management consulting backgrounds, the 
founders were irritated but accepted these different motivations. Their general 
recruitment strategy was to hire those applicants who appreciated having a high 
degree of freedom regarding their work and who were able to work quite 
independently.  
“As all of us had so much operative work to do, we needed employees 
that could work independently. We would talk to them about different 
things for one hour a day, they get the work, we give feedback on the 
result or intermediary result and then it goes back. We have a core 
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team of people, who all have the same conception and have great fun 
working like that. [...] We have established an environment where we 
like to work: a lot of freedom, you ask if you want to know something 
and besides that, you can do your own thing. Of course we have 
looked for people who fit right in.” (Franz) 
Discussions between employees and the founders were extremely content 
focused and less dominated by hierarchal influences. Rather than telling the 
employees what to do in case of a problem, the employees were asked for own 
solutions and suggestions. This all led to a culture which appeared to have suited 
founders and employees alike. Everyone worked for long hours, even on 
weekends. And if the work was done, everyone was free to go home. Office 
hours officially started at nine o’clock but no one ever controlled it. Some 
employees liked their workplace so much that they did not go on vacations any 
more. In the end the management had to tell them to take some weeks off.  
 
The beginning was coined by few existing formal processes or rules. There were 
hardly any clear defined work processes or task areas except for the IT people. 
Many tasks had never occurred before. It was decided on the spot who was going 
to handle it. Thus, most matters were simply handled by delegation. After a while 
some sort of routines emerged unconsciously. Slowly, task responsibilities 
crystallised and were separated from the rest, e.g. customer service was handled 
by two employees. This was also important as the know-how was no longer 
attached to people but rather put into the processes and routines. Beforehand, a 
smooth action flow was rather vulnerable.  
 “It is only after some time, after gathering experience, that you know 
how things work. And suddenly you recognise a standard case and try 
to standardise it and put a process on it.” (Benedikt) 
 
One thing, the founders had to learn quite soon was motivation. Some of them 
had worked in or together with management consulting teams. But these function 
in a very different way because consultants are motivated by very different 
aspects than their employees as they emphasised. To improve HR processes, they 
started to introduce personal evaluation talks by spring 2000. They developed an 
evaluation sheet which was a combination of other companies’ sheets. They 
emphasised that they ran the evaluation not only with their employees but also 
with their interns. The latter had to evaluate the management as well.  
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“We used the evaluation sheet for a mutual feedback so that interns 
evaluated us, too. Actually, they are quite good at noticing where 
something is in disorder.” (Franz) 
Giving the employees a competent feedback was the driving factor behind its 
implementation. But it also helped the management to discover unnoticed 
dissonant matters and mechanisms at odds within the company. However, these 
job talks were not used for constructing job descriptions. The management said 
that it would not have made sense as job tasks changed too frequently and would 
very soon be outdated.  
 
The employees developed a culture that controlled each other in a friendly 
manner. This was not so much regarding work but social aspects. If someone 
abused the large freedom, e.g. playing too much basketball on the terrace, taking 
too many free drinks or not keeping things in order, they reprimanded each other. 
The management hardly had to intervene. A key role in this played the company 
secretary, an elderly woman who was some sort of company mum for everyone.  
 
By the second quarter, the management had introduced reporting mechanisms. 
They argued it could serve as a better decision basis. It took a while until the 
management had collected all important figures needed to calculate the key ratios 
they had set up. The aim was to base everything on transaction figures. This 
would enable them to exactly know which ideas will be feasible and profitable 
and which will not. It helped them to professionalise and to survive as they 
realised mistakes much earlier. A monthly report was also sent to the VC which 
increased their standing considerably.  
Additionally, these reporting mechanisms were used to improve communication 
which the founders regarded as an important matter. Questions such as ‘How do 
we communicate with our employees?’, ‘Which information should they get and 
which one not?’ or ‘How do we organise our information mechanisms?’ were 
frequently discussed in the founders’ meeting. They believed that it is 
advantageous to inform the employees rather thoroughly than insufficiently. To 
keep the employees better up to date, key financial figures on a weekly basis 
were posted at the blackboard in the entrance area. Everyone was then well 
informed and no one needed to speculate or guess about the company’s situation. 
The problem was sometime caused by newspaper journalists calling and asking 
for current figures and the situation. Depending on the answering employee, the 
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answer changed considerably. With the weekly figures, something like that 
should not happen any more.  
 
In June that year, a milestone event was the opening of a second office in London 
for internationalisation reasons. To set up the office, Benedikt moved to London 
and worked three days a week in England and two in Germany. He hired four 
English employees who helped him in running the new office. The technical 
questions were quite unimportant as the German platform was simply reproduced 
for the English market. Beforehand, an intern had analysed several European 
markets to decide the country. Although the English market was small in 
absolute terms, it was relatively the biggest in Europe.  
 
By the end of summer, the management noticed a stronger need for coordination. 
By then, twelve full-time employees plus a couple of interns were working at 
letters.de. The peak was reached in March 2001 with 20 full-time employees. 
The problem which arose during that summer was that those employees who got 
assigned an intern, were not at ease with that task. They did not really know what 
to do with them. The management considered the interns as additional resources 
but the relevant employee often did not know how to take advantage of that 
resource. This signalled the management to delegate operational tasks even more 
in order to focus more strongly on HR management and strategic questions. The 
immediate measure taken was that the employees being responsible for an intern 
had to run the evaluation talk with him. Thus the employees became more aware 
of their responsibilities and duties. Eventually it changed their thinking so much 
that the management was able to implement group leaders who were responsible 
not only for interns but also for other employees. In order to overcome chaotic 
conditions, structures were seen as a necessary tool.  
“We introduced this structure because we believed that it makes 
sense. At the beginning you are very hesitant because you do not 
really want three levels of hierarchy in a company with so few 
employees.” (Hartmut) 
 
The evaluation talks with the management revealed that the employees had 
problems with being assigned tasks from various managers. In the end the 
employees did not know how to prioritise the different tasks and which to 
decline. To fix and visualise responsibilities, an organisational chart was created. 
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An additional effect was that new employees were integrated more quickly as 
they found it easier to gain an overview for different persons, departments and 
tasks. 
“We formed responsibilities for tasks as well as a task organisation so 
that everybody knows who does what. The responsibility for the tasks 
was stipulated between us as well as disciplinary competences like 
holidays or such. [...] This was our organisation’s development. We 
also realised it a little bit physically.” (Matthias) 
They also changed the office structure by placing people together who are doing 
similar jobs. This made it easier to exchange knowledge and help each other 
more easily. It generally increased communication.  
“All those classical instruments one doesn’t want to have in a 
dynamic start-up company. But one has to admit that it actually is 
more efficient. It brings clearness, better orientation and brings you 
forward.” (Hartmut) 
Introducing clear responsibilities within a company was not completely in the 
interest of the managers. They feared that the informal culture would partly get 
lost. Employees who had been there from the very beginning were used to 
communicate directly with everyone including the founders. Introducing too 
strict hierarchies and rules could discourage them.  
 
October 2000 was an important month for the company. First, they launched a 
complete new product with newletters.de, a web page on which they sold new 
books. The idea was that people buying used books will also buy new ones. 
These customers would hopefully post their just read books on the used books 
page and sell them again. This could also increase the customer numbers. 
Second, letters.de changed their revenue model. So far, the service to post used 
books in the database was free for sellers and buyers alike. This changed in such 
a way that a brokerage fee had to be paid by the seller. The fear that suddenly 
transaction numbers would drastically decrease did not happen. In consequence 
of the new revenue model, the accounting systems with its billing and collecting 
processes became much more sophisticated and formalised.  
The third momentum of those months was the separation from Carl, the IT 
manager. He became more and more an obstacle as he had blocked important 
decisions and was not willing to compromise. His character of basically 
mistrusting everyone and everything was tiresome and unproductive. 
THE (HI)STORIES OF THE NEW VENTURES  140 
 
 
Fortunately, the VC helped the remaining four founders by buying him out, thus 
they had not too much hassle with the whole affair. But still, it was something, 
everyone had tried to avoid. So far Hartmut had acted as a sort of intermediator 
in discussions among the founders. But at one stage it became too much and a 
final decision had to be taken. 
Within three days they replaced the position with a new employee who turned 
out to fit well into the company. However, the new employee did not become 
manager thus the management team decreased to four. Instead, Benedikt was the 
responsible manager for the IT department. In the following, quite some changes 
occurred which could not have been possible with Carl. 
 
The Monday meetings can be grouped in a pre- and a post-Carl era. The pre-era 
was characterised by long discussions, sometimes regarded to be too long. 
Nevertheless, it was important for them to create an open discussion culture as 
everyone was new within that market and mistakes were unavoidable. The 
discussions sometimes paralysed the organisation but helped them to avoid 
substantial mistakes.  
“Like any founding team, we made a lot of mistakes, which is normal. 
But in the beginning we discussed all decisions to the last. This was 
quite good.” (Hartmut) 
Since spring 2000, the meetings became more structured. Every Thursday, 
Hartmut would send around the agenda for the following Monday for everyone 
to prepare the topics. In the actual meeting, a protocol was written and distributed 
by Benedikt. This enabled them to refer to already decided matters and thus not 
discuss them again. If anyone had a problem in the pre-era, they had tried to 
conceal it as it would have triggered endless discussions. In the post-Carl era, 
these meetings became more and more structured and coordinated. Every founder 
gave a short account of his resort and only in cases of problems, discussions 
would start. Without Carl, the mistrustful atmosphere was replaced by an 
atmosphere of trust. 
“In principle, we assumed that if someone did not ask or require help, 
everything was o.k.” (Franz) 
 
So far, these Monday meetings were only for the management team. After Carl 
had left, they opened it up for key employees to foster their involvement and 
entrepreneurial thinking. Initially they feared offending those who could not take 
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part. Especially the employees that had been employed rather early felt strongly 
attached to the company. Due to these new meetings, the management had to 
learn that the employees were less informed than they had expected.  
“On the other hand you reach for the stars at the beginning. You do 
not consider that your employees do not have the same know-how as 
you. It is not like you want to keep the information from them, but 
somehow you do not think about it. You always get the statistics and 
know everything. You have to force yourself to spend more time on 
informing people and so on. This is not necessarily so. You are very 
busy yourself and are well informed and think that your environment 
is also completely informed.” (Benedikt) 
 
Carl’s leaving also marked the end of changing managing tasks. The 
responsibilities within the management team had changed whenever they realised 
that the current arrangement was not sound. It was a sort of experimenting. 
Initially they had started with a theoretical distribution based on their business 
plan but these had to be adapted to reality later on. It took some time until they 
knew each members’ abilities and likings for special topics. It then became more 
and more clear who was good at managing people and who was better at 
managing functional tasks.  
“We continually changed our tasks. There was a very intensive 
discussion among the founding team, as we are all very different types 
of persons, which probably helped. Some wanted to push market entry 
in an aggressive way, others were more considerate. They were a bit 
more circumspective and looked at the costs very closely. All in all, 
the capabilities of the founders complemented one another. That is 
probably why we made no capital mistakes. Like any team of founders 
we made a lot of mistakes, which is normal, but in the beginning we 
always discussed decisions to the end. This was quite good. There 
were some among us, who had working experience. But if you act in a 
completely new market, it is advantageous to develop a culture where 
you can talk about everything. You have to do that. These discussions 
were very hard and sometimes even brought the organisation to a 
standstill.” (Hartmut) 
THE (HI)STORIES OF THE NEW VENTURES  142 
 
 
But these constantly changing responsibilities had a very positive side, too. It 
enabled all founders to learn and experience about all other areas within the 
company. Thus they much more appreciated each other’s work.  
“It was exciting that the tasks had changed. This brought us a lot of 
know-how and understanding of each other’s areas. In intensive 
discussions we were able to find a sustainable structure.” (Hartmut) 
 
As the web page and the service were easily scalable, they launched a French 
web page, letters.fr, for the French-speaking markets in March 2000. In contrast 
to the English web page, they did not open an office in Paris, but managed and 
organised everything from Germany. They simply hired additional French 
speaking employees who would run that web page. As this worked out very well, 
they decided to close the London office. It saved a lot of resources and stopped 
communication difficulties which had started between the two offices. Since 
then, the English web page letters.co.uk was run from Germany. However, they 
had dismissed the English employees but hired one English speaking employee 
in Germany.  
 
As the company was still growing, coordination and communication were 
persistent topics of current interest. To improve communication, the management 
called for a monthly meeting which was compulsory for everyone. This meeting 
started in March 2001 and was used to present major projects, outcomes from the 
Monday meetings and last month’s figures. Due to the employees’ questions the 
management once more realised how badly informed they were about the 
company’s development in general. 
The monthly meeting was expanded by one or two employees who gave a short 
overview of their tasks and responsibilities within the company. The 
management’s aim was to improve the organisational knowledge and awareness, 
i.e. who was responsible for what tasks and what does each department actually 
do. But most employees were not really interested in such topics and they 
regarded it as a distraction and nuisance from their work.  
 
With the collapse of the ‘Neuer Markt’, many start-ups in the high-tech sector 
had difficulties receiving a second round of financing. letters.de tried as well but 
did not succeed. As a result, their initial CVC stepped in and ran an intermediate 
financing round in May 2001. But the management knew that they soon needed 
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new financial resources to finance their growth. So far, the company was not 
profitable and needed additional financial resources. They also tried to build 
cooperation. During that process they got in contact with a Canadian competitor 
who was very interested. In the end, the Canadian management came over to 
Germany to discuss the option of buying letters.de. Finally, letters.de was sold 
and became a wholly owned subsidiary from the 1st October 2001 onwards. 
 
This in turn changed letters.de considerably. It began with the management team 
being too big. Matthias was the first who left immediately and continued to fully 
concentrate on his academic career. It had always been a problem that he was 
only working part-time for the company. He tried to be in the office three days a 
week but still missed two days. It needed a lot of effort to keep him on track 
which was hard to achieve. Especially in the beginning, when so many things 
happened in one day. In the end, the whole team suffered from that constellation.  
“Matthias had been totally exhausted from that double strain. The 
others always had the impression that he was not doing enough, and 
that was expressed in hidden or open remarks.” (Franz) 
 
In February 2002, the new and integrated website were launched. On that day, 
the brand letters.de died and the German web page was dissolved into the 
Canadian brand.  
 
Franz was the next to go. He stopped working in spring 2002 but was still 
involved in setting up the new corporate website. He could have worked in 
Canada at the headquarter but preferred to go back to university to write his PhD. 
Finally, Hartmut and Benedikt remained in the office and managed the 
subsidiary.  
“We fitted the top management for the two of us in order to have more 
influence in Canada. So we did not talk with four voices but rather 
one concerning the operative business.” (Benedikt) 
Next to the management team, the IT department was dissolved as all technical 
matters were handled from Canada. It was very hard for the founders to remove 
both IT specialists as they had done excellent work. Those two were the first 
employees which were dismissed due to business matters. The dismissals harmed 
the general atmosphere severely and impaired the trustful relationship between 
management and employees. To improve it and to acknowledge the IT 
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specialists’ work, Benedikt and Hartmut organised a farewell party for them. 
They wanted to set a point as how the company deals with people they liked but 
which they nevertheless have to dismiss.  
 
6.4.2 Summary of findings 
In the following, the main findings from the letters.de case will be summarised. 
In contrast to both other cases described above, letters.de’s development was not 
a result of mere chances but thoroughly planned. The idea had been triggered by 
the general internet and founding hype. The founders wanted to be part of that 
movement and to take the chance of being an entrepreneur. Rather than having a 
technological innovation to commercialise, they analysed various B2C business 
models which were feasible for a basically business oriented team. All in all the 
planning period before incorporation and taking up operational work took no 
more than six months.  
The founders’ major motivation to start such a venture was the existing chance to 
become an entrepreneur which bore a very limited financial risk provided that 
one receives VC funding. Without such a funding, the start-up would most likely 
not have come into being. The years 1998 to 2000 gave the window of 
opportunity to found the start-up. Before that time, venture capital hardly existed 
in Germany and after 2000, venture capitalists were demanding more 
prerequisites from start-up companies, e.g. a proof of concept for technological 
innovations. The founders aimed at profiting both financial and experience wise. 
Even in case of failure they were sure that their excellent education combined 
with their work experience and the enormous experience gained from running a 
start-up would enable them to find a new job quite quickly again. One of them 
did not even have to worry about failure as he still worked part-time at the 
university. All in all, they calculated that they were not really doing anything 
senseless which they would regret later on. The founding team had strong 
competencies in the management field. They knew from their studies and 
previous consultancy work about the possible pitfalls in the development of a 
company and which problems were likely to come up sooner or later. On the 
other side, all of them had neither experience nor knowledge regarding the book 
industry.  
These elaborate considerations characterise the whole approach of starting and 
running letters.de. However, the episode about getting the booth at the Frankfurt 
Book Fair does not reflect this. This is one of the few incidents which happened 
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by chance and still are so vital for the start-up. The good press coverage and the 
acknowledgements they received at the fair gave them a fundament they could 
draw on. They then started very small with merely the five founders and some 
interns. Not before they knew that they could finance fixed-salaried employees 
did they hire them. In many ways they only took action if it was clear that it will 
be profitable. They discussed every matter at full length and balanced reasons for 
and against. This attitude inevitably resulted in routines, formalisation and 
professionalisation in general. Problems had to be solved but at the same time 
solution finding should be standardised if possible. They did not mind problems 
or mistakes but did not want to make them twice. This also led to the 
introduction of key financial ratios on which many decisions were to be based 
and balanced against.  
One striking feature in letters.de was that they had not at all specialised their 
positions within the management team. The first big change was due to a 
different strategy, i.e. the positions based on a market segmentation and not on 
functions as they later did. But within the functional positioning, they had 
changed the positions several times. The specialisation taking place was a 
process of trial and error. However, contrary to one’s expectation, the venture 
was neither paralysed by the frequent changes in positions nor by its long 
discussions within the management team. Instead, the rotating responsibilities 
and the long discussions helped not to commit big mistakes. 
Delegations and coordination was suddenly increasingly possible after one of the 
founders had gone. The locus of control was concentrated on the remaining four 
founders. Rather than controlling each other or their employees, trust became 
more and more the prevailing control mechanism. Formalisation aspects also 
increased. It started very early with the semi-annual job evaluation talks which 
were also used for coordination and delegation purposes and helped to keep track 
of new employees, their abilities and tasks.  
Despite all these professionalisation tendencies they were aware that it was a 
start-up. And they wanted to keep a certain entrepreneurial spirit as they 
themselves enjoyed working in such an environment and atmosphere. They 
characterised this with a lot of freedom regarding e.g. working hours, hardly any 
hierarchical barriers, the need and pleasure to bring in individual ideas and 
initiative. In addition they fostered the entrepreneurial identity prevailing in 
society by setting up a basketball rim on the roof deck, treating everyone with 
pizza every Friday, supplying free drinks for everyone and calling each other 
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informally by their first name. In order not to destroy this atmosphere, they paid 
special attention during the recruitment process to whether the applicant fits in 
such an environment and liked to work independently. Due to their careful 
recruiting, they hardly had problems with discontent employees.  
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6.5 talk-to-me.com 
talk-to-me.com is a spin-off from an university’s informatics department. A 
group of eight former colleagues decided to found the company in order to stay 
and work together. The company is offering solutions for voice controlled 
services by phone. This comprises voice portals, call centre automation as well as 
information and transaction systems. The venture grew steadily while paying a 
lot of attention to its company culture and internal communication. However, 
sales problems slowed that process down. 
 
Figure 14: Milestones in the history of talk-to-me.com 
  
1998 Summer: kick-off workshop for everyone interested, the idea is formed 
and elaborated on 
  
1999 Autumn: a business plan gets written 
  
2000 March: first three founders start with operational work 
‘Start’ August: moving offices 
 change of legal status into a public limited company 
 September: consultants write a second business plan and receive shares 
 October: partnership with CVC, shares are changed against money and a 
patent  
  
2001 January: first employees get hired 
 March: moving into a larger office 
‘external manager’ May: a finance manager is hired  
  
2002 January: the finance manager becomes CFO 
‘internal focus’ March: the HR department is introduced 
 June: a former Microsoft manager becomes CEO 
 August: management board is downsized to CEO and CFO 
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In the following, the founders will be presented. This time, the focus will be on 
those who later filled management positions. The others are simply mentioned. 
 
Paul graduated in informatics and continued working as a research assistant at 
the university. He was head of research group before founding a small consulting 
company together with a partner. They offered project management and start-up 
consulting. He started as CEO and later on became head of business 
development. 
Dr. Felix wrote his PhD in informatics after having graduated on the same 
subject. He was one of those three founders who started working at the company 
from the beginning on. He was responsible for R&D as head of that department.  
Dr. Monika had studied and received her PhD in computational linguistics. She 
started working at the company in March 2000 and became Head of Professional 
Services and later Head of Human Resource Management.  
Dr. Erich was the eighth founder who stayed at university as he had a permanent 
position there.  
 
The remaining four founders had graduated in informatics and written their PhD 
in the same field. Viktor and Reinhard worked in the R&D department, Jochen 
and Judith in Professional Services whereas the latter became responsible for 
Quality Management.  
 
6.5.1 The company’s development 
In summer 1998, a group of researchers from a computer science department at a 
Bavarian university organised a workshop for discussing the possibility of 
founding a venture. The idea came from one of the researchers who then 
contacted Paul, a former colleague who was at that time running his own 
business doing project and start-up consulting. Paul organised the workshop and 
since then, things seemed to have taken on a life on its own. At the end of the 
day, nearly ten people considered supporting the idea. They agreed on starting 
the company in the beginning of 2000 as some of the researchers, mostly PhD 
candidates, would have finished their thesis by then.  
The idea came a bit as a surprise to most of them. However, it found approval as 
most of the research team liked working together. So far, PhD graduates had 
started working for large companies and the technological knowledge was thus 
fragmented into different companies. For the last twenty years research in that 
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field had been carried out, it was quite elaborated and commercialisation became 
possible. Finally, many of the research team had settled down in town and did 
not mind staying there.  
In the following months, the keen ones met once in a while to discuss further 
proceedings. It was quite clear that they would try to commercialise and licence 
products for voice controlled services. In their free time, Felix, Viktor and 
Reinhard started programming a first service product. And all together they 
started writing a business plan during the following months. These activities 
separated the interested ones from the pretenders. As there was a lot of weekend 
and night work involved, some dropped out because they were not willing to 
invest that much. One year later it was clear that eight people would actually 
found the company. As they aimed at growing incrementally, they did not 
approach venture capitalists but financed everything with their own capital 
contributions. In addition, they managed to interest some business angels who 
invested as well. They also decided to distribute the shares equally among the 
eight founders. Only Paul received twice the amount as he had put much more 
effort into getting everything going.  
 
In March 2000, the first three of the eight founders started with the operational 
work. These were Paul, Monika and Felix. A larger company was subletting 
them one large office where they moved in. All others joined successively until 
the last founder started his operational work in February 2001. They had all 
worked on their PhD thesis and joined talk-to-me.com after their contract with 
the university had ended. Everybody except Erich, who stayed at university as he 
had a permanent position which he did not want to give up. He was the link to 
the university and ongoing research developments. This is rather important for a 
high-tech company as it constantly needs to be on track with recent technological 
developments.  
 
Before taking up operational actions, they had to decide on the legal form. In 
order to start immediately, they took Paul’s existing company and redefined and 
renamed it. The other option would have been to found a new company from 
scratch. 
“We joined the existing company of one of our co-founders who 
already had his own GmbH. Starting right away seemed the easiest 
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way for us because it did not take too much effort and we did not have 
to comply with any formalities.” (Monika) 
They renamed the private limited company to ‘talk-to-me.com’. The company as 
such had been founded half a year ago and Paul had run the company together 
with a partner offering project management and start-up consulting. The only 
problem was that the former partner of Paul kept some of his shares. This, 
however, created increasing problems over the following months as he refused to 
sell his shares. 
 
It had surprised everyone that the workshop actually interested so many 
researchers and that it eventually lead to the venture’s foundation. Apart from 
Paul, all other seven founders had been working at the university writing their 
dissertation and had hardly any business experience. 
“Those were quite academic people. They were very research oriented 
and probably they could not exactly imagine what it meant to work 
commercially. […] Of course it makes a big difference whether you 
join a company as an employee or support the foundation of a 
company.” (Paul) 
Quite a few people had warned them of founding a company with eight people, 
seven of which would actually work in the company. Many expected problems 
about the assignment of responsibilities and power plays. With so many 
founders, not everyone could be part of the management team. However, this led 
hardly to any disputes. It was clear for everyone that Paul would became CEO. 
He was in fact the only one heading for a managerial position. And as he had 
already been managing director at his former company, everyone regarded him 
most suitable for the job. None of the others insisted or even wanted a leadership 
position. In the end, Monika became head of professional services and Felix head 
of R&D. Other founders, e.g. Viktor had no ambition of becoming head of 
anything. He rather preferred working alone and not to manage people. The 
casting of the positions was very much a matter of personality, next to 
personality. 
“This has to do with the fact, that at that time I had no idea of the 
organisational things an executive has to do. Just the legal 
requirements for a foundation, the financial things, accounting, etc. I 
do not know anything about this and the other founders do not either. 
Paul has a certain authority as he is about five years older than all of 
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us. He already had a company of his own and knew about these 
things. […] Right from the beginning we knew, that if we want to 
focus strongly on technology, Paul has to keep organisational matters 
off our backs.” (Felix) 
Thus it was Paul as CEO and the three department heads who formed the 
management team.  
 
As the conflict with the limited company partner could not be solved, they 
decided in August to buy an existing public limited company, change its name, 
its supervisory board and its purpose. After having done so, all talk-to-me.com 
members were transferred to the new company. The reason for buying a public 
limited company instead of a private limited company was to have the possibility 
to go public one day. And it was easier to change the distribution of shares and to 
implement a stock-option program.  
 
By autumn, ten people were working at the company. So far, they had not 
employed any fixed-salaried employees, but one intern for PR matters and some 
students who either wrote their diploma thesis at the company or who worked on 
an hourly basis in the R&D department. Nevertheless, the office quickly became 
too small and it was impossible to work properly. The management had already 
looked out for a new one and decided which to take. However, that office was 
not yet ready so that they needed an interims solution where they stayed for four 
months before moving to their final destination. The new office had the big 
advantage of having a large kitchen in which they placed a long table so that 
everyone could be seated. This room was important as it backed the community. 
At least once a week, every Wednesday, they cooked together and had lunch 
there. When I had been there for an interview, I was immediately asked to join 
them for lunch.  
 
They had started with a telephone service as a prototype which three of the 
founders had created earlier on in their free time. It was a fully automatic 
computer service for the cinema programs in that region. But not as one would 
imagine that the voice is simply reading the program from one cinema to the 
other. Instead the calling person is asked to name the city and theatre or the film 
she would like to see. A nearly normal conversation between the computer and 
the calling person is possible. Interrupting or changing plans is no problem. 
THE (HI)STORIES OF THE NEW VENTURES  152 
 
 
During the first half year the company’s focus was on developing additional 
products and services. They created a product roadmap in order to know what to 
develop. Later in autumn, the ‘product and project meeting’ was implemented to 
coordinate the development efforts. It lasted five months during which 
developers, professional service and sales people discussed possible features. The 
business model was to sell or licence single modules. Customer companies 
would need these for setting up their own telephone services or for improving 
their call centres’ technologies. 
 
In the beginning of 2001, talk-to-me.com recruited two informatics’ graduates to 
join the R&D department as well as two sales people. Most new employees had 
already worked as a student or as an intern in the company before. This enabled a 
quick integration and the new employees were very productive within a short 
time as they knew the company. The other reason was that the company 
atmosphere was very integrating. They were immediately accepted and not 
treated as new members. However, this implied that everyone took it for granted 
that newcomers knew what to do and no one felt responsible for giving short 
instructions. The integrative atmosphere was strongly visible as talk-to-me.com 
was employing one young man who was physically and mentally handicapped. 
His tasks were to run errands, make coffee and keep the large kitchen tidy as well 
as organising lunch if wanted. His position was subsidised by the state as 
otherwise the venture would not be able to finance him. But everyone enjoyed 
having him around. The management liked him and said that he strengthened the 
community and radiated a good atmosphere. As he took over little tasks from 
everyone, he unburdened the others who in return were able to concentrate more 
on their genuine tasks.  
 
During the first twelve months, there were hardly any task distinctions. No 
functional or similar structure did exist and everything was more a muddling 
through as everyone did a bit of everything.  
“At the beginning, everybody did everything and to a certain degree 
this has not changed yet. A strict separation between tasks does not 
work if you are only five people. […] Even today roles are not as 
clearly as defined in the organisational chart but we are still sharing. 
We call it ‘Resource Sharing’, which does not mean, however, that we 
are still doing all the things we are not responsible for.” (Felix) 
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To improve the situation as they were growing, they started talking of 
departments and communicated these to the environment.  
“Therefore, we meanwhile began to define and live responsibilities. If 
you are more people, everybody must know where he belongs, what he 
does and who is his boss.” (Felix) 
This was specially fostered by the second business plan for which they 
contracted a consulting company in September 2000. They wanted to have a 
more professional and detailed business plan. It had to be written in English in 
case they would give it to a foreign venture capitalist. But they expected to gain 
more from the presence of the business consultants than just receiving the 
business plan at the end. However, these expectations were not met. With 
hindsight, they even regret having paid for writing the plan. They should have 
done it themselves. But the plan contained an organisational chart which gave 
them an idea how to set up and organise the different departments and which 
functions to create. They finally decided for the following departments: R&D 
(Felix, Viktor, Jochen, Reinhard and 2 FTE), Business Development and 
Administration (Paul), Professional Services (Monika), sales & marketing & PR 
(3 FTE) and Quality Management (Judith).41 The latter was no full-time job but 
they wanted to set a point and show that they took the topic seriously. 
Professional Services was more or less consultancy, i.e. implementing modules at 
the customer’s premises. However, R&D and Professional Services built a 
resource pool together to share its members. This enabled a greater flexibility e.g. 
in case of vacation or illness and distributed the knowledge more evenly on more 
people which was very helpful in the beginning. 
Paul and the others had put on paper an organisational chart divided into 
functions. However, Paul admitted that in fact, a matrix diagram would suit it 
better. But he deliberately did not change it as it would have been too confusing 
for many to understand the logic behind a matrix organisation. He rather kept the 
impression of an functional organisation with resource sharing between two 
departments.  
 
Although they had an organisational chart by spring 2001, one needs to 
distinguish between having one and living it as well. It took them another half a 
year until people lived up to their expected roles and responsibilities. This was 
                                              
41 The underlined persons are the department heads. 
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especially prominent at the management level. So far, hardly any department 
head took decisions on his or her own. Everything was discussed and decided 
democratically. In fact, the distinction between CEO, department heads and non-
manager founders was obsolete as all discussions were taken by the complete 
founding team. But it was impossible to keep up the democratic system after a 
while as it became too frustrating. Discussions lasting for hours were ineffective 
and too time consuming and decisions were hard to take. Most discussions were 
taken in the ‘core meeting’ which was not called in on a regular basis but 
whenever needed. The core consisted of all founders and the early employees 
who too had received company shares, too. By summer 2001, the core involved 
nine people. The management had given shares to the first two employees in 
order to foster their entrepreneurial spirit and to reward their effort. This has to 
be seen in the light of payment which was not comparable to industry.  
“Especially during the early stage we let people participate in the 
company to a certain degree by giving them shares in order to 
provoke entrepreneurial spirit. Axel is one of those who almost counts 
as a founder, because he joined early even though he has not yet been 
with us during the planning stage.” (Felix) 
The core met either face-to-face but they also discussed via emails. If possible, 
most discussions were taken unanimously. In addition to the core, there was the 
Monday meeting in which the whole company met.  
 
At the end of the first year, organisational problems mounted and the 
management had to take action. The resource pool created constant problems as 
people had the feeling they had two bosses. They did not know whom to 
prioritise. As a result, the management made it clear to which department each 
employee belonged. As a consequence, the department heads knew exactly who 
was doing what and working on which project. It was also decided that every 
member of either department had to write a mail once a week to his boss and his 
colleagues stating his current tasks and activities. 
 
An additional factor which accelerated professionalisation was the recruiting of a 
finance manager. Martin joined the company in May 2001 and was appointed 
CFO in January 2002. They urgently needed someone with experience and 
knowledge in financial matters which all of the founders lacked. And having 
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created the position of CFO could also be advantageous when looking for VC 
money.  
A new team member always changes gridlocked habits and behavioural patterns. 
Martin discovered and mentioned many organisational discrepancies which were 
not obvious to the management and other employees as these had already worked 
too long there. They were in some ways blinded and unaware of certain 
conditions. Martin mostly noticed the lack of standardised processes or 
communication structures. But as he was new and had not known the others 
before, he was not part of the informal network. So far, most people had known 
each other for quite a time. Especially the management team which simply 
worked by acclamation. This has worked well in the first two offices as everyone 
was sitting in the same room. Thus, mutual adjustment was the common way of 
coordination. 
 
Initially, most information pointed at Paul as he was the main manager. With two 
managers, it became important to direct the information to the responsible 
person. The CFO was only annoyed by organisational matters which were 
important for Paul to know but not for himself. He too often received all market 
information as well.  
To improve the information flow, they activated an administrative meeting in 
summer 2001.  
“Before reorganising the board, an organisational meeting was held 
where we discussed organisational topics within a small group. [...] In 
this group, we made unanimous decisions. It had the character of a 
management round, however, we did not take really difficult 
entrepreneurial decisions. Not daily business, but organisational 
things were discussed. We established it in the middle of 2001 and it 
still exists, but has been quite reduced because most things that 
needed regulation are regulated already.” (Felix) 
The aim was to enable discussions and decisions in a smaller group than with the 
whole company which met on Mondays. Organisational aspects such as how to 
organise vacation leaves or how to deal with travel expenses were discussed. It 
were the five managers meeting once a week. After a year the frequency was 
reduced to once a month as by then, most administrative matters had been 
organised and routines and regulations implemented.  
 
THE (HI)STORIES OF THE NEW VENTURES  156 
 
 
At the same time, talk-to-me.com started with semi-annual budget meetings. 
These were initiated by one of their business angels who was used to it from his 
former company. In this meeting, every manager and each department head had 
to report about activities going on in his responsibility area regarding projects 
and employees. The meeting was used to take decisions and to budget the 
coming months. 
 
Due to the professionalisation, structures and processes increased. The 
management realised that these were very helpful for integrating new employees 
more quickly as they served as an orientation for them. On the other hand, the 
management was afraid of structures and fixed processes as it could remind one 
of large multinationals.  
“We are far away from becoming an organisation like Siemens. And 
we don’t want to aim at it either. When you start defining 
organisational structures and processes, you always have the fear in 
the back of your head that sometime you might become like Siemens.” 
(Felix) 
Too many structures or new rules were sometimes regarded as being suspicious. 
It reminded some of bureaucracy which they did not aim at.  
“So far, it has not been necessary, so why now? What is it all about, 
we are not with Siemens here. But in the end, if you think about it, 
there is no other way.” (Monika) 
 
In order to coordinate activities better, a common online time schedule was set 
up for the whole company and became compulsory for everyone to use. Paul who 
had introduced this, regarded appointments which were not entered into the 
calendar as non-existent. He also started a common contact database for everyone 
to use. 
“An organisation can only work well when know-how is shared and 
therefore you need such a data basis.” (Paul) 
Additionally, he wanted to implement a groupware to combine the time schedule 
and the database. This would then improve and support communication activities 
even more. However, they first needed to evaluate existing offers on the market 
to take a decision whether to buy one or to program it oneself. 
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For the time being, they kept quite close contact to one of their business angels. 
He often advised them and observed them closely. Paul as CEO had noticed 
increasing difficulties in marketing and selling products and licences. He 
suggested to look out for a new manager who could become CEO if he suited 
well. Suddenly, Rolf, one of their business angel and former Microsoft manager 
offered to do the job. He already knew the venture and would enjoy being back in 
business. So in June 2002, Rolf joined them as CEO. This resulted in Paul 
stepping down as CEO but staying in the management board as Chief Business 
Development Officer. However, he himself regarded it silly to have a small 
venture with three managers on the board. So finally he stepped down and left 
the management board. For the first time, talk-to-me.com was managed by two 
external, non-founder managers.  
“There had been times when there existed a 20-people-company with 
three executives. But that is just absurd. I have left the board now to 
take care of business development and enforce visions that are to 
make the company strong for the future. Insofar, none of the founders 
is at the head of the company anymore, but all founders are on second 
level.” (Paul) 
In some ways he was even glad about it as he saw his own abilities in doing 
business development rather than running the company. The latter included too 
many administrative and legal aspects which he did not consider to be his main 
strengths. Thus the new management board consisted of Martin being responsible 
for finance and organisation and Rolf being head of R&D, professional services 
and HR. 
 
Having recruited Rolf turned out to be a good move. They had generally lacked 
profound industry experience which Rolf has a lot of. In addition he ‘guaranteed’ 
credibility and reliability which the young founders lacked. He radiated 
confidence and experience to the external environment and brought with him a 
large network of contacts which could only but benefit the company.  
“This has been a good move concerning outside credibility. As a start-
up, a new technology venture with all but guys, you are prone to meet 
resistance or credibility problems with conservative-minded 
customers. Thus, a grey-haired head comes well into that.” (Paul) 
But the new CEO did not only send positive signals to the external environment 
but in addition fostered an optimistic and joyful atmosphere within the company. 
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It was a good sign if such an experienced businessman joined a new venture and 
became its CEO.  
 
Rolf’s leadership style can be defined as ‘management by a cup of cappuccino’. 
Whenever he felt like getting to know or discussing something, he simply took a 
cup of cappuccino and sat in one’s office to talk over matters. He was not at all 
an introverted character, but rather communicated a lot with everyone, especially 
with the departments’ heads and the founders.  
With Rolf as CEO, decision taking processes changed. So far, the core had 
decided very democratically, if possible unanimously, in all important matters.  
“Mostly we voted via e-mail. We had no strict decision structures. In 
those meetings we always tried to meet everybody’s expectations, 
which obviously does not work well.” (Felix) 
But as this process was too slow and long winded, Rolf embodied the locus of 
control much stronger in the management board. To speed up decisions and 
simplify them, Rolf and Martin took many decisions. But neither of them would 
have dared to take a decision which would be against the core’s perceived will.  
 
So far, HRM matters had been organised either by Paul or by Monika, who being 
head of professional services also felt responsible for those topics. As time went 
by, she realised the importance of HRM and that one needs to pay much more 
attention and time to it if taken seriously. She decided that a smooth growth 
process aimed at would not be possible without a sound HRM basis. 
“One lesson learnt from other foundations is that an extreme rapid 
build-up of a company is very error-prone concerning personnel 
decisions. We take that topic very seriously.” (Paul) 
As a result she officially named a HR department in May 2002. In the beginning 
she handled it alongside her Professional Service tasks. However, to fully 
concentrate on the new job, she handed over the Professional Services Tasks to 
Viktor who became head of the department. As most founders and employees 
came directly from university and were lacking professional HRM experience, 
she saw the possibility of creating routines and guidelines from scratch. No one 
really interfered as they themselves had no clear expectations or ideas what the 
job encompasses.  
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One of the first things she did was assigning one direct report person to each 
employee and she was introducing monthly job talks. Every employee should 
talk with his respective direct report about the activities of the last weeks and 
upcoming ones. It was the employees duty to ask for the talk. However, some 
department heads ran those talks every or every other week. This measurement 
ensured that communication generally improved and that people manager knew 
better what everyone was actually doing in their departments.  
In addition, it strengthened the managers’ role as being responsible for their 
employees which was not easy for everyone to accept.  
“Some people refrain from being a boss suddenly. Not everybody 
wants to be put in this role.” (Monika) 
So far, a rather egalitarian atmosphere had prevailed. This was fostered by the 
constellation that some of the founders had employee positions and were not 
managers. Thus some managers had to run the job talk as a manager with their 
co-founder. It was much easier with employees who were employed later on.  
“For him [a later employed external applicant], it is totally clear that 
I am the boss. There is not much fuss about any roles.” (Felix) 
The department heads had to learn how to run such a talk and how to handle the 
situation. They therefore had a training session for job evaluations in October 
2002 which was run by an external coach. As everyone welcomed and profited 
from it, they planned to have similar trainings on a regular basis for special 
topics, e.g. time management or recruiting interviews. In addition to the regular 
job talks, leadership guidelines were drafted. Monika considered it to be 
important to think about those topics. 
“We had also started with our leadership concept. This sounds a bit 
silly for such a small company, but I think it is very important to be 
concerned about it early on. We should discuss what leadership 
actually means for us as it should be more than simply telling people 
what to do. Instead we should see ourselves as service providers if one 
assumes responsibility for employees.“ (Monika) 
 
Monika also resented the way salaries were paid. There were no structures or 
guidelines regarding salary levels. So far, everyone’s salary was the result of his 
personal negotiation’s ability. Common guidelines for fixing the amount did not 
exist. Despite the actual salary’s level, talk-to-me.com’s strategy was not to link 
the salary to personnel responsibilities. They would rather have a system in 
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which technology oriented employees without personnel responsibilities can earn 
similar salaries compared to those with personnel responsibilities.  
“One aim of personnel development is to structure it in such a way 
that someone who has no leadership or personnel responsibility can 
get as high in hierarchy as someone who is head of a department. 
Both matter to us equally. Professional competence and personnel 
responsibility have to be regarded equally.” (Monika) 
To come to such a salary structure, the managers were asked to develop job 
descriptions for all existing positions within their realm. But Monika was still 
lacking job descriptions for possible or future positions. This was needed as it 
makes it easier in recruiting interviews to indicate applicants possible career 
paths within the company.  
“Also you are not able to show a job applicant any career 
perspectives. However, one should point out development 
opportunities, like, you start with this job profile but after several 
years these other positions might be possible. First of all we have to 
identify what kind of people we need, what positions they could take 
and what a long-term development perspective for these positions 
could look like. These are the things we are just considering.” 
(Monika) 
Another thing she wanted to change was the naming of the departments. As head 
of Professional Services she had noticed that most customers did not know what 
to understand by Professional Services. She would rather like to rename it in 
something like Consulting. 
 
She also intended to create a brochure or conceptualise a workshop for new 
employees in which the company would be introduced. The reason behind is the 
company’s spirit and culture of which everyone was proud of. They even spoke 
of the ‘talk-to-me-spirit’. It was especially the friendly and family-like 
atmosphere, the tolerance and the highly integrative capabilities which were 
pointed out. They would like to keep that spirit but fear loosing it when too many 
new employees join the company. They planned to recruit up to twenty new 
members in 2003. To grasp the spirit, she intended to ask every employee about 
his perception of the spirit and to describe it. As a result, the management could 
hand out a little booklet about the company and its spirit. The alternative would 
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be to run a workshop for new members in which single employees talk about 
their perception of the company and the culture.  
So far, they did not have to dismiss any employees at all. They even had no 
fluctuation which they ascribed to the good atmosphere and culture.  
“So far we did not have to lay off staff. This is due to the fact that we 
managed to buy cheaply. As a trade-off to the relatively low wages we 
increased the fun factor. People feel comfortable here, they like to 
work here and accomplish a lot.” (Paul) 
 
However, it was not that easy to grow as they did not manage well to sell 
licences or their products. Although their technology was well developed and 
they received a highly recognised European Information Technology Prize in 
2001, sales efforts were not very successful. They started contacting venture 
capitalists to receive funding. The high turnover rates from the service business 
was not sufficient for further developing products and reaching break-even. At 
the end of the study they were in close contact with two venture capitalists, 
however, it was not clear whether the negotiations would be crowned with 
success.  
 
6.5.2 Summary of findings 
In the following, the main conclusions will be drawn and summarised from the 
talk-to-me.com case. 
The company came into being due to a variety of reasons. There was the 
technology which had been researched for nearly two decades and was well 
developed, there was a research team enjoying to work together and all finishing 
their PhD in a foreseeable time and there was the general entrepreneurship hype 
during which new ventures sprang up like mushrooms. These circumstances led 
to the initial workshop at which the idea was formulated and since then 
elaborated and worked on. As they intended to grow only incrementally, they did 
not approach venture capitalists. On the other hand, they bought an existing plc 
to change it into their own. Having bought an ‘Aktiengesellschaft’ hints at 
growth plans as it creates the possibility to go public in case of proven and 
persistent success. Thus, there seems to be the contradiction that the founders did 
not have a clear idea what to aim at. It is difficult to say what each single founder 
aimed at by founding the venture, especially as there were so many. It probably 
was not a matter of earning big money and getting rich. It was rather a 
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convenient way to stay in the area and to do a job which they like and which they 
can influence themselves.  
After one and a half years of planning and preparations, the first three of the eight 
founders started with the operational work. All in all it was a smooth transition 
between the founders’ research work at the university and the venture. There 
were hardly that many differences as it were the same people and the same kind 
of jobs. Especially as the first six months were mainly used for R&D work. Later 
on, finance, sales and HR became important, too. However, as all founders had 
an informatics background and had never worked at a company before, business 
and organisational experience or knowledge was hardly existent. The only 
exception was one founder who was then asked to be the CEO.  
As a result, the company was more or less run like a research group at university. 
Equality was the prevalent principle. Be it that the number of founders and the 
shares’ distribution, the way how decisions were taken or how task 
responsibilities and responsibility areas were hardly defined. Everything was 
designed to foster community and reminds a bit of creating an ideal world. talk-
to-me.com was enacted very informally. Everybody did everything and, when 
necessary, even extra and weekend hours. The need to define responsibilities and 
to allocate managerial tasks entailed the risk of losing the informal and open 
atmosphere. It were mainly external influences which led to an identity change. 
First it were the business consultants through which organisational matters, 
mostly the organisation chart, were paid more attention to. As a result, delegation 
and specialisation were to be improved. Next was the recruiting of one of their 
business angels. As he had a different educational background and as he did not 
know anyone from beforehand, he found some organisational handlings rather 
strange. He then triggered and initialised better coordination and more 
formalisation. Lastly it was him who changed configurational aspects. The locus 
of control was focused much more on the management board and the 
management team, however leaving out all the others. When he was still a 
business angel and not yet CEO, he introduced the semi-annual budget planning 
meetings which helped to gain a more long-term perspective. The next wave of 
professionalisation was due to the creation of the HRM department. Organising 
aspects such as regular evaluation talks, leadership guidelines and salary 
structures were discussed and partly implemented. These aspects gave some food 
of thought and made the importance of organisational aspects more explicit.  
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This shows how their organisational attitude had changed from being reactive to 
proactive. The change was mainly because of the new CEO and former active 
business angel. The reactive phase could have lasted so long because talk-to-
me.com did not grow that fast. As a result, organising shortcomings had hardly 
any noticeable effects. The other reason for not having an effect were the 
founders who were used doing things the way they did as they had never 
experienced anything else.  
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7 Organising in new ventures 
The previous chapter has depicted how the four new ventures have emerged, 
developed and survived in their first years. The reasons for coming into being as 
well as the founders’ intentions and aims were analysed. In a second step, their 
early development processes were described. Clearly, the emergence and early 
development of these four ventures cannot be considered to embody the full 
range of patterns and possibilities that occur in the creation processes of new 
ventures. Yet, certain dynamics are surely not idiosyncratic. 
 
In this chapter, I will refine the findings presented earlier and lift them to a more 
abstract level. To do so, I will first analyse the findings further by confronting 
them with traditional organisation theory. Then, I will develop four different 
organising concepts which cover the major aspects. In those I will tie the findings 
to entrepreneurship and organisation theory in an attempt to further our 
knowledge in these fields.  
 
7.1 Linking traditional organisational theories and case findings 
Some of the cases’ stories mirror a number of obvious themes that are closely 
linked to what has been suggested by traditional organisational and 
entrepreneurial theory on new ventures, especially regarding structure formation. 
In the following I will therefore confront extant theories regarding organisational 
development with the case findings.  
The first step to discuss the four ventures’ organisational development is by 
applying a growth model to the four cases to investigate in which stage they are 
in and whether they are confronted with similar problems as suggested by the 
model. As discussed on a more general level in chapter 2.3.2, a large number of 
these growth models exist (e.g. Hanks et al., 1993). To begin with, the case 
studies’ developments will be compared with Churchill and Lewis’ (1983) five 
stage model. This model seems most appropriate as it has especially been 
designed for small and growing businesses. To broaden the discussion, the stage 
contingent model by Kazanjian and Drazin (1990) will be used thereafter.  
 
Churchill and Lewis’ (1983) model is built on the idea that small companies 
experience common problems at similar stages in their development. The model 
emerged out of a combination of experience, literature search and empirical 
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research and it constitutes five stages of development: existence, survival, 
success, take-off and resource maturity. Each stage can be characterised along 
the contextual dimensions of size, diversity and complexity. For this, five 
management factors were taken into consideration, i.e. managerial style, 
organisational structure, the extent of formal systems, major strategic goals and 
the owner’s involvement.  
 
Figure 15: Small businesses at each developmental stage 
 
Source: Churchill and Lewis (1983: 266) 
 
Comparing the four ventures studied, it appears that all four of them were in 
between stage one and two at the end of my research period, hence between 
‘Existence’ and ‘Survival’. This is insofar true as the ventures were still trying to 
generate enough cash to achieve the break-even point and to stay in business. It is 
also true that their system development in terms of e.g. formal planning was 
simple. However, several other aspects diverge from the model. Most 
importantly, their organisational mechanisms can be placed into stages three and 
four. A functional organisation had already been implemented in all four 
companies, although described for stage III. This means that the ventures were 
already tackling some of the issues of stage III already. talk-to-me.com showed 
quite an elaborate organisational chart which included HRM and quality 
management as departments (stage III). Responsibilities had already been 
delegated to non-founders and non-top management level as in technology.com 
and talk-to-me.com (stage IV). The latter had also replaced the founder-
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management team completely with two external, experienced managers (stage 
V). As a crude judgement, x-it.com and technology.com could be said to be 
located in stage II whereas letters.de and talk-to-me.com were in stage III. The 
last two ventures have introduced organisational elements earlier than suggested 
by this model and other stage and life cycle literature (Greiner, 1972; Quinn & 
Cameron, 1983). It also means that stage II does not have to be completed in 
order to deal with issues of higher stages. This is partly in line with Hannan and 
Freeman’s (1984) view that certain long-term organisational characteristics are 
established very early in the life of an organisation. However, they have not 
specified the meaning of ‘early’ any further.  
 
The model by Kazanjian and Drazin (1990) contrasts the above one by 
distinguishing between four different stages. They call them conception & 
development, commercialisation, growth and finally stability. These evolve out 
of the dimensions of size, growth rate and dominant management problems. The 
structural dimensions taken are the structural form, the degree of formalization 
and centralisation and the top management composition. Kazanjian and Drazin 
have based their model on two studies. They had started with two explorative 
case studies leading to the stage model. The latter was then tested on a data base 
of 105 firms and partially supported.  
Applying Kazanjian and Drazin’s model (1990), all four ventures were in the 
‘Growth’ stage (stage 3 out of 4), meaning that they have already built an 
organisational task system in stage 2, although formality and structure were still 
low. The model proposes that in the third stage the companies should struggle 
with the successful market acceptance. This is true for all four companies as all 
of them have developed at least one product which is ready for market entry. 
However, their acceptance and success is not measurable yet. The third stage is 
also characterised by the advent of functional specialisation and the move 
towards highly trained and experienced personnel. While the specialisation 
aspects seem to hold true, the personnel aspects differ from the model as most 
recruited employees had been well trained from the beginning. Only occasionally 
people were replaced by someone with higher experience levels later on.  
 
To a certain extent these models help to convey an idea of which problems a 
venture might face in general and which aspects should be considered if a 
company strives for further growth. However, to gain a deeper understanding of 
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organising processes, these models are not very helpful. The major problem can 
be seen in the interrelatedness and interdependence of many organisational 
aspects and the complexity which is hard to depict in a stage or life-cycle model, 
which is simplifying by nature. Even if those models attempt to integrate 
different aspects, such as cognitive, behavioural and organisational phenomena, 
the simplification into stage models can only result in very universal models.  
 
The findings also show that many of the stage models’ underlying assumptions 
(Stubbart & Smalley, 1999) should be seen critical. The case studies’ findings 
suggest that they often hold not true. The ventures’ development is not 
necessarily uni-directional. This is most obviously demonstrated in the 
technology.com case. At one point the management had introduced more 
formalised mechanisms and structures, however only to overcome and substitute 
the lack of communication and shared identity. Once the feeling of identity was 
re-established again, formalisation was decreasing. Thus loops within the 
development are not explained in the models, or would at the most be seen as 
setbacks. Yet new venture development does not look like a smooth progression 
line, but rather like curvy lines with ups and downs. Sometimes these down-
phases present real perils. But if the management is well aware of them, they can 
also be used for consolidation and an internal re-organising, leading to 
maturation of the venture and preparation for later growth. This was shown for 
example in x-it.com’s setbacks. Timmons (1994: 576) acknowledged that the 
“actual growth curves […] will look far more like the ups and downs of a roller-
coaster ride”, however, he did not drew any conclusion from that. In his study he 
continued by describing yet another stage model. I would rather suggest to 
emphasise much stronger the irregular development’ of new ventures instead of 
making new ventures’ founder belief a smooth development. 
 
Finally, Stubbart and Smalley (1999) concluded that stage models are in general 
“more deceptive than alluring” (1999: 285). Though this assessment might go 
somewhat too far, my results still suggest that growth or stage models have only 
limited applicability to new ventures as the models are not detailed enough. And 
in addition, these models hardly consider organising aspects inherent to the 
company.  
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Next, I will refer to crises and transition models as an alternative body of 
literature as suggested by Timmons (1977; 1999) who argues that these are more 
useful regarding new ventures. Crises and transition models focus on certain 
milestones and problems which need to be handled (e.g. Greiner, 1998; 
Timmons, 1999; Roberts, 1999).  
According to Greiner’s (1998) model, all new ventures will face five different 
evolution stages which are interrupted by revolution stages. These are: the 
growth phase of creativity stopped by the crisis of leadership, direction by 
autonomy, delegation by control, coordination by red tape and finally 
collaboration by the ?-crisis.  
 
Figure 16: Greiner’s five phases of growth 
 
  Source: Greiner (1998: 56) 
 
Applying this model to the case studies, all four ventures experienced the 
autonomy problem, which implies that the management style is very directive 
and they need to learn to delegate more. Two of the cases also displayed a 
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leadership problem, i.e. who would lead the company and bring in new 
management techniques. This crisis would finally result in the replacement of the 
management. This is most obvious at talk-to-me.com with its large founding team 
of which only one member had some business experience. Although 
technology.com officially had an experienced and strong CEO, he hardly ran the 
company actively as he spent his time at the university. The other two founder-
managers sometimes felt overburdened. 
Greiner defined the control problem as one in which the management would 
attempt to maintain complete control but fails as the company is getting too big. 
This is only partly true in the four ventures. At x-it.com, the control problem was 
insofar different as the company was still so small that direct control was 
possible. But the founders simply did not do it as they wanted to grant their 
employees maximum freedom. There were no signs of the red-tape crisis (i.e. 
bureaucracy and procedures are more important than problem solving) or the ?-
crisis (i.e. the psychological saturation of the employees who grow emotionally 
and physically exhausted from the intensity of teamwork) at any of the four 
companies. 
Do these four ventures therefore have to be called ‘premature’ as claimed by 
Greiner? My findings rather suggest that not all organising principles tested in 
large organisations can be applied equally well to new and small ventures. The 
findings also contradict the assumption that small ventures only solve simple 
problems whereas large organisation solve large and complex problems 
(Brytting, 1991). It can therefore be concluded that even though these new 
ventures experienced periods of crises, the latter were based on different reasons 
than those suggested by crises models. The cases also illustrate that crises appear 
in a different order than suggested by Greiner (1998). The figure below illustrates 
the order of the crises as occurred in the cases.  
 
Figure 17: Order of crises at the case study companies  
Source: Author 
technology.com  autonomy ? leadership ? control 
x-it.com  autonomy ? control (? leadership) 
letters.de  autonomy ? control 
talk-to-me.com leadership ? autonomy (? control) 
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The figure above reflects the great deviation of the cases’ crises from Greiner’s 
suggested order. Also, Greiner stated in his article’s supplement from 199842 that 
the phases in between the crises would last between 3 to 15 years. In my study, 
these phases are certainly shorter. But Greiner admitted that the length of the 
phases would depend on the industry. Many of the ventures founded during and 
because of the Internet hype had the possibilities to grow very fast if supported 
by venture capital. This could explain shorter stages. 
 
A different approach to transitions between stages is taken by Roberts (1999) 
who described four management modes through which a new venture’s 
management is likely to go through: (1) real time management of content, (2) 
management of behaviour, (3) management of results and (4) management of 
context. This concept is an interesting alternative to the models discussed above, 
as it does not specify single tasks and processes as most other models, but 
generalises them to a more abstract level. The first three management modes 
were prominent in all four cases, the transitions between the modes caused 
trouble for some of the managers and some employees alike. The further the 
management proceeded in terms of the four modes, the more responsibilities 
were passed down to the employees. While Roberts’ model is solely theoretical 
and has so far not been empirically tested, my findings provide support for the 
concept.  
 
All models discussed above follow the assumptions that a venture needs to go 
through the different stages/phases/crises as otherwise it would not mature and 
professionalise. And professionalisation is the basis for growth. Thus the models 
implicitly say that professionalisation is the overall goal. Here, the question 
arises whether this suggested cause-and-effect relationship holds. If a venture 
displayed such a nicely charted development, would it then be more likely to 
survive and be better off? As already indicated above, I doubt it. My findings 
rather suggest that certain drawbacks can even be fruitful and help managers and 
employees to see things in a different way.  
 
                                              
42 His article had initially been published in 1972  and was reprinted in 1998. In the reprint, 
Greiner added a one and a half page long supplement titled “Revolution is still inevitable”. 
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In order to understand the organising development better and to analyse it, I will 
now turn to organisation theory which has dealt with structural development of 
organisations in great depth. To begin with, I decided for the Aston studies as 
that model is well elaborated and well known in organisation theory and has 
inspired many studies afterwards. I will confront my findings with their five 
dimensions (Pugh et al., 1968) of specialisation, standardisation, formalisation, 
centralisation and configuration to see how far these traditional organisation 
theories are applicable to new ventures.  
 
Figure 18: Short definitions of the five Aston dimensions  
Source: Author, based on Pugh et al. (1968: 72-79) 
 
To use the concept, I estimated the degree of the dimension for each year and 
each venture along a three-grade scale. The scale distinguishes between low, 
medium and high degree in each of the five dimensions. The aim is to give an 
impression about the development of those dimensions and their magnitude. 
 
Figure 19: Dimensions of structure applied to the cases 
Source: Author Key: L=low, M=medium, H=high 
 
Interpreting this figure, one could rank the four ventures according to the number 
of the highest parameters out of the total of 15 parameters. In that case the 
ranking would be as following: letters.de with 9/15, x-it.com 6/15, 
technology.com 5/15 and talk-to-me.com with 3/15.  
Specialisation:  deals with the division of labour; the degree is an activity performed by 
 someone with that function; the extent of which specialised roles exist  
Standardisation:  the degree of a procedure/event that has regularity of occurrence and is 
 legitimised by the organisation 
Formalisation:  the extent to which rules, procedures, instructions and communications 
are written 
Centralisation:  the degree and locus of authority to make decisions affecting the 
 organisation 
Configuration.  the shape of the role structure; the degree of the vertical and lateral span 
of control 
year 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
x-it.com L M M L L M L L L M M M L L L
technology.com L L M L M M L L L L M M L L L
letters.de L M M L M M L M M M M M L L L
talk-to-me.com L L M L L M L L L L L M L L L
configurationspecialisation standardisation formalisation centralisation
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This enforces the impression that the ventures were initially run in an informal 
manner and later professionalised by implementing increasing levels of 
standardisation and centralisation. Formalisation and configuration were not 
distinctive and did not change either. The only exception is with letters.de which 
introduced the written evaluation talks and the written budgeting plans. This 
confirms general studies on new ventures’ development such as Van de Ven et 
al. (1984), Manstedten (1997) or Meijaard et al. (2001).  
 
All the above discussed models show that traditional and entrepreneurial theories 
can be applied. However, they are not capturing crucial organising processes and 
thus not giving new insights in organising processes in new ventures. 
In addition, the traditional theories did not aim at new and small ventures but 
rather pointed towards established and large organisations. The question then 
arises to what extent are these theories generally applicable despite the age and 
size of the company? Neilson (1974) tested the validity of contingency theory as 
presented by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a; 1967b) for small businesses. He 
found that “size (in terms of personnel) affects the nature of the interaction 
pattern among organizational subgroups and interaction patterns affect the 
nature and quality of the information top managers can obtain” (1974: 359). 
Thus small business managers could apply Lawrence and Lorsch’s principles, 
however the forms taken are different from those in large firms.  
 
The cases allow to demonstrate that the management’s role shifts over time to be 
less operationally and more managerially and strategically orientated. This 
implied that a greater decentralisation and delegation is required. This is in line 
with Greiner (1972) and Adizes (1979). I can also confirm Van de Ven et al.’s 
view (1984) that firms at an early stage are extremely informal. However, their 
finding that new ventures are extremely unstructured is not quite true for my 
cases. Having developed specialised and centralised tasks as well as decision 
taking procedures, I would not call them unstructured. And besides, from an 
constructivist point of view, everything is always structured only to different 
degrees.  
 
Organising was seen by the founders and managers not as a general problem, but 
as highly specific one, e.g. new accounting procedures had to be created and 
implemented or a job description for recruiting had to be set up for being 
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published in the national press. Thus, organising takes place by confronting 
highly concrete problems with highly concrete solutions. After a number of these 
problems or events have been accumulated, the founders see themselves as being 
organised. Ex-post, the organisation and organising gets rationalised. 
However, this ‘objective’ view (Kieser, 1998) on the development process does 
not manage to capture the crucial organising themes that unfold in the stories. 
While a number of traditional, mainly structural categories can be detected, these 
fail to draw an accurate picture of new venture organising activities. 
Consequently I will now turn to discuss four organising mechanisms which 
emerged and had an important impact on organising in most of the cases studied.  
 
In the following, I will categorise my finding into four principles. The 
interpretative analysis of the four case studies has resulted in: organising as 
enacting dualities, organising as the context of entrepreneurial behaviour, 
organising as identity construction as well as organising as a game. All four 
principles refer to organising as an achievement as well as an ongoing activity. 
As such, it is always both the result of entrepreneurial activities and an active 
process of attempting to bring things under control. Organising can be viewed as 
an ongoing struggle for order, regularity and coherence in the venture. It aims at 
achieving temporary patterns of regularities and routines. And organising plays a 
crucial role in preparing the venture for future growth.  
 
7.2 Organising as enacting dualities 
This is the first of four organising principles. Organising as enacting dualities 
points at one major challenge that evolved in the stories told, namely that of 
managing dualities. The ventures were confronted with opposing forces that 
needed to be balanced. The research approach chosen allowed for identifying 
dualistic situations because inherent ambiguities are not overlooked, but can be 
addressed to clarify their nature. As the ventures experimented with their 
organising processes, they constantly faced situations that were characterised by 
seemingly contradictory demands, e.g. professionalising but keeping an 
entrepreneurial spirit, being the boss and the friend at the same time or whether 
the founder wants to be a manager or rather focus on operational work.  
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These dualities will be depicted more in detail in the following short vignettes.  
x-it.com faced the struggle of maintaining a family-like spirit but at the same 
time felt the need to professionalise. The founders feared that by introducing 
more professional mechanism, they would loose their family spirit which they 
regarded crucial as it fostered trust and initiative. By keeping the family spirit, 
they had the impression that they do not have enough distance to be able to run 
disciplinary measures when necessary. One characteristic of the family spirit was 
they way of addressing each other. Everyone actually called each other by their 
first name and the informal ‘du’.43 This way of addressing each other is to a large 
extent necessary for building the family-spirit, one of the founders argued. An 
atmosphere of formality and aloofness would counteract the family spirit. The 
difficulties to take more rigorous actions were also hampered by the fact that the 
founders were of the same age as their employees, sometimes even younger. 
However, keeping the family spirit was neither an option as they also felt the 
need to professionalise especially in times of growing numbers of employees. 
Instead of introducing single job evaluation talks as other case ventures did,  
x-it.com introduced the ‘Thursday Meeting’ to tackle task evaluation matters and 
to improve communications. Thus they tried to combine both poles, however 
with little success as the meeting was not used for its intended aims. This 
certainly slowed their professionalisation. This family-professionalising-spirit 
dilemma was more or less apparent at all ventures. However, technology.com 
was not aware of it and letters.de managed to overcome it by implementing the 
regular evaluation process in which difficult topics were more easily addressed. 
The founders of talk-to-me.com faced the dilemma of having co-founders who 
were not managers but employees. This resulted in founder-managers who had 
the legitimacy and power to ‘control and rule’ over their co-founders who were a 
member of their department. Acting as a department head was considered to be 
difficult enough, but they then had to face the situation of managing their own 
friends and co-founders and running evaluation talks with them. This created a 
very difficult situation for both sides. However, this dilemma was technically to 
be solved. Everyone had to learn how to manage it reasonably well. As a solution 
the HR manager planed to offer training modules for running evaluation talks in 
                                              
43 This entails a cultural component of the German language. The use of the informal “du” is 
often interpreted as a sign of personal closeness, and therefore hinders behaviour that does not 
express friendship. 
ORGANISING IN NEW VENTURES  175 
 
 
general and how to handle difficult situations in particular. She said that being 
aware of the possible problem helped to deal with the dilemma. technology.com 
was principally facing the same dilemma. But in their case, one of the co-
founders formed a department of his own. This erased the problems as he mainly 
worked independently of the others. The other co-founder was head of the 
development department and enjoyed a high standing among the managers and 
other employees. The managers did thus not perceive the dualistic situation. In 
general, technology.com as well as talk-to-me.com both tried to cope with the 
dilemma by implementing auxiliary means such as formal rules or evaluation 
talks.  
 
Another dilemma is that between the need for control on the one hand and the 
equally strong need to maintain trust on the other. In the beginning, control was 
not as important as most founders worked at operational tasks, too. However, as 
the management tasks increased with time and the founders mainly delegated 
operational tasks, the managers had to start controlling the work afterwards. It 
was a tightrope walk to handle control and trust at the same time. The difficulty 
was that too much control destroyed trust, but on the other hand, too little control 
could lead to unexpected results which might be recognised too late. This 
dualism was apparent at x-it.com. The management had trusted their employees 
to develop the company’s first product. In the end, they were confronted with a 
product that had too many bugs and needed considerable redeveloping. They had 
to invest additional time and resources to bring it to a level at which they could 
sell it on the market. This incident led to a number of more formalised 
measurement, e.g. short working reports in the Monday meeting or general 
working hours for everyone. The founders hoped to improve professionalisation 
by these means. letters.de had solved the control-trust duality via a daily talk 
with every employee in which ideas and open tasks were talked over. To make 
such an organising mode possible, the founders had been especially looking for 
employees being able and enjoying to work very independently. The founders 
were aware that they did not like to exercise strong control on their employees. 
At x-it.com, this duality was identified again in another circumstance. It was the 
introduction of a common starting time for everyone in the morning. The 
management felt the need to improve coordination. But this highly contradicted 
the image of a modern and trustful company. They even introduced a penalty for 
coming too late. This measurement stirred the emotions, however, the employees 
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did not come up with an alternative. Finally, a last time dilemma within x-it.com 
is going to be depicted. In the beginning, their day-to-day activities were centred 
around organising and executing their two main and only deals. The organising 
process was to a large part focused on managing these two contracts effectively, 
as their survival depended on it. As a consequence of those dominant deals, they 
were slowing down all other organising processes. For the time being, they felt 
comfortable in doing so but the long-term perspective showed how they 
neglected developing organising skills needed later on. Suddenly, this time 
dilemma created viable problems.  
 
The examples above show the large impact dualities have on organising in new 
ventures. The different dualities all reflect a dynamic and processual conception 
of organising. This contrasts most ‘classical’ dilemmas which are based on a 
static conception of an organisation, which mainly deal with the optimal fit of 
structures. This is in line with Janssens and Steyaert (1999) who distinguished 
between ‘new’ and ‘classic’ dualities.  
These dynamic dualities need to be seen within their social context which has 
been enabled by the research approach chosen. The cases point at the inherent 
dualistic situations in which the managing team cannot choose between one or 
the other pole but has to reconcile both. This contradicts much of earlier writing 
in management theory, which assumes that choices between mutually exclusive 
options have to be made, e.g. between differentiation and integration (Lawrence 
et al., 1967a) or top-down or bottom-up (Daft, 1978). Thinking in tensions and 
paradoxes contradicts the scientific logic of causality and determinism. But 
allowing for tensions and paradoxes opens up new pathways (zu Knyphausen, 
1988; 1992)  
 
Organising and managing dualities does not entail finding an in-between position 
between two alternatives but managing both sides although they appear 
contradictory. It is a matter of balancing both sides. Most of these dualities in the 
cases are linked to the tension between the wish and the need to professionalise 
on the one hand but keeping an entrepreneurial atmosphere on the other. It seems 
as if choosing between an entrepreneurial and a professional mode (cf. Bouwen 
et al., 1990b) or the spontaneous versus the planned mode (Brytting, 1991). 
Professionalisation involves removing equivocality and degrees of freedom. 
However, equivocality and freedom are needed in the early phase and both 
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appear to be important entrepreneurial hallmarks for the ventures. Kimberley 
(1979) noticed similar difficulties with the creation of a new medical school. 
However, he argued that it is a problem of the transition phase which will get 
solved over time. I rather think that it should not be regarded as a transition 
problem. Not acknowledging the duality does not help in dealing with it. Bouwen 
and Steyaert (1990b) argued in their paper that an entrepreneur understands his 
situation better when realising the dilemmas. I would agree and extend this by 
saying that the management needs to learn how to live both sides of the coin at 
the same time as dilemmas cannot be abolished. It rather seems to be a question 
of balancing these. Thus, the tension between the two poles should be retained as 
it allows for a dynamic approach. Dilemmas are an ongoing activity which need 
to be enacted. The question emerging is how both poles can be linked through a 
dialogue. By acknowledging both sides the venture will be able to organise them. 
One way could be by linking the poles to different people within the 
organisation. A third person could enable a dialogue and therefore be a generator 
between both poles. As a result, fixed meanings are broken up, loosened and put 
in context. The other option is by shifting between both poles. However, this 
only allows for partially keeping the tension. This has been done at 
techmology.com varying their degree of formalisation. 
 
Recent developments in organisational theory propose an increasing importance 
of duality management in established organisations (Janssens et al., 1999; 
Pettigrew et al., 2000) that are experimenting with innovative organising modes. 
The cases show that new ventures face these dualistic situations very early on. 
The founders need to be aware of these and come to terms how to deal with 
them. As their organising processes are only beginning to get elaborated, the 
management faces the challenge of learning to handle organising processes and 
their dualities at an early stage. Dealing with dualities thus becomes a 
challenging organising principle which not only organisation theorists should 
deal with but entrepreneurship researchers alike.  
 
7.3 Organising as the context of entrepreneurial behaviour 
Organising does not only enable processes but is also subject to restrictions as it 
is strongly influenced by its outer and inner context. ‘Context’ is seen here as a 
concept for a specific environment [Lebenswelt] which enables, legitimates and 
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brings meanings to events and actions (Hjorth, 2001). The inner and the outer 
context emerge as crucial factors shaping the entrepreneurial behaviour. The 
outer context includes economic, social and competitive environments. The inner 
context refers to the company’s immanent factors such as structural, cultural and 
political aspects (Pettigrew, 1992; 1997). Studies regarding the outer context in 
relation to organising in new ventures focus on aspects such as the influence and 
access to financial resources (e.g. Gompers & Lerner, 2001; Engel & Keilbach, 
2002) or social networks (e.g. Davidsson & Honig, 2003). These enable or hinder 
entrepreneurial behaviour. If looked at the outer context regarding the four cases 
of this study, the outer context’s influence is clearly seen. This is for example the 
prospering VC industry in those years which enabled the foundation of many 
new ventures. Without it, letters.de would probably not have been founded. Or 
be it the society’s increasing acceptance of new ventures as a legitimate employer 
which helped the ventures to recruit their first employees and thus to be able to 
continue their existence. Or the scepticism of local companies towards new 
ventures which made it very hard for x-it.com to set foot into that region. The 
region favoured local companies run by locals. This made the entrance of an out-
group into the local setting more difficult and created very high barriers. 
Especially as all three founders came from different regions in Germany and 
spoke a different dialect. This resulted in intensifying their search for locals to 
employ, notably an apprentice. Training apprentices also increased the local 
standing as it is politically and socially highly appreciated. The outer context can 
hardly be changed by the founders. It is not within their range of organising to 
alter e.g. the society’s attitudes or the finance industry. They can only adapt to 
these circumstances. Still, they have a large impact on organising processes.  
 
In contrast to the outer context, the inner context is the result of the new 
venture’s activities, its own history and its organising so far. However, studies 
analysing the impact of inner context on entrepreneurial behaviour hardly exist. 
Kazanjian and Drazin (1990: 138) mentioned the stage of growth as a 
contingency factor: “A firm’s stage of growth represents a contingency or 
driving force to which appropriate organizational responses must be matched”. 
This can be regarded as an inner context contingency factor. For them, specific 
structures, functions and decision-making processes need to be in place as 
otherwise the venture will not be able to solve the problems related to the next 
stage. They depicted these structures more as a precondition for growth but did 
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not point out to the influence on organising. Brytting, in a more general way, 
stated that “behavior is guided both by past, present and future structures” 
(1991: 7). However, I would like to stress, that it is not only structures which 
should be looked at but organising in general which makes up the inner context 
of entrepreneurial activities. Organising predefines future activities based on the 
history of the venture and its experience with previous activities. Every 
organisation exerts restrictions on and enables its organising processes through 
the organising already done and in place albeit it has just recently been emerged. 
Since the beginning of organising and the start of the company, organising needs 
to be seen as a restriction and an enabler in itself. Simply speaking, this can be 
subsumed under the notion of ‘organising as the context of entrepreneurial 
behaviour’. This inherent dual function can be compared to Giddens’ (1984) 
concept of the duality of structure. Hence, organising can be seen as a means and 
a product at the same time. To a certain extent does the argument of organising as 
the context of organising touch upon path dependency theories but from a 
different angle. The concept of path dependence does not only occur as a result 
of technology but could be transferred to the individual firm level arguing that 
behaviour is the result of the choice of institutional framework or set of rules 
adopted (Heffernan, 2003). This could then be extended to the organising aspect 
in the sense that behaviour follows organising and vice versa. 
 
In the beginning, x-it.com had relied on very few but large-scale projects. This 
was considered positive as these projects had led to growth and had generated 
secured turnover. As an immediate effect, seven people had to be employed at 
once to work on them. But when the largest customer filed for bankruptcy, the 
venture almost shared its destiny. Suddenly they had seven employees but no 
work. This experience then set the inner context of entrepreneurial behaviour. It 
called for a complete change in strategy. It resulted in the venture acquiring a 
more balanced customer portfolio and limiting the dependence on single 
customers. And it shifted the founders’ attention away from doing operational 
work to strategic work, mainly focusing on acquisition as a true management 
task. This however, called for more control as they did not know any longer what 
every employee was doing.  
Organising as the context for entrepreneurial behaviour can well be illustrated at 
the talk-to-me.com case. In the beginning, the founders had decided against 
venture capital. Instead, they had contacted business angels and were partly 
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financed by them. This resulted in getting to know Rolf, who became one of their 
business angels. Rolf turned out to be a very active business angel and often 
advised the company and suggested new concepts, e.g. the semi-annual budget 
meetings. These meetings formalised their planning processes considerably and 
inherently changed the organising processes. However, deciding against venture 
capital also demanded a much stronger financial involvement of every founder as 
they themselves had to procure by far the largest proportion. This created a 
considerable motivation and strong identity with the new venture. In times of 
scarce liquidity, they sometimes had wished having applied for venture capital 
right from the beginning. Especially as venture capitalists were far more reluctant 
to invest in 2002 than in 1999. The VC’s investment strategy and intensity had 
considerably changed.  
When letters.de introduced its job evaluation talks, these were intended as a tool 
for the management to give each employee a feedback. However, as employees 
became responsible for other employees later on and as they did not know how to 
handle this management task, the job evaluation talks were spontaneously used 
as a tool to get acquainted with leadership. They had to run the talks with the 
employees they were responsible for. This is an example where already 
implemented results of organising enabled quick solutions later on and 
influenced later organising. 
 
In addition to the inner and outer context of organising, I would like to add a 
meso or in-between level. This seems necessary to fully understand the processes 
of organising as certain aspects are neither part of the inner nor of the outer 
context. This is especially true for the founders’ abilities and experience. The 
young founders have not gained experience during the venture’s existence so far, 
but contributed with experience and values from former job employments or 
studies. This played an important role in setting the context for entrepreneurial 
behaviour. letters.de profited from one founder’s surname. This gave them the 
chance to participate at the book fair and then led to a good marketing and PR 
coverage. It was mainly a question of good luck. One of x-it.com’s founders 
acquired his profound knowledge in organisation theory before founding the 
venture. This influenced how certain structures and processes were set up. It was 
him who e.g. insisted upon introducing manuals how to deal with new customers. 
He knew from organisation and entrepreneurship literature the importance of it. 
The influence of the founders’ experience is in line with Löwstedt’s view (1993) 
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who states that the founder’s way of thinking about organisation and organising 
would influence the structuring of a new venture. This can also be seen at 
letters.de where the founders absolutely wanted to start the venture with a 
founder team of five. They had observed similar teams which made very positive 
experiences with such a large team. So they wanted to do the same and to benefit 
from them. Even when one founder dropped out just before the actual 
incorporation, they quickly organised to get a new fifth team member. They were 
committed to go online with five founders.  
 
Organising as the context of entrepreneurial behaviour, especially the inner and 
meso level, plays a much stronger role in new ventures than in established 
ventures. Single actions or organising processes can have a large impact on the 
venture’s development, identity or stability as a whole. In established 
organisations, this is not so much the case as many more patterns and 
mechanisms already exist and as these are quite fixed. They cannot be changed 
so easily as they are firmly anchored in the company. This leads to an 
organisational inertia described by many studies (e.g. Hannan et al., 1984; 
Lawler & Galbraith, 1994). Thus, the importance of organising in new ventures 
from the beginning on has to be stressed. And management should be much more 
aware of it in order to act accordingly.  
 
7.4 Organising as identity construction 
Organising creates worlds as such but it also provides people and organisations 
involved in the process with names, roles and identities. Through the use of 
language, people endow their actions with meaning and themselves with 
identities as actors (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1996). The idea of identity is that 
organisations or their members engage in processes of self-reflection, i.e. they 
ask themselves who they actually are, what business they are in and what 
constitutes the very essence that makes them different from other organisations 
(Hatch & Schultz, 2000). Albert and Whetten (1985) defined organisational 
identity as those characteristics which its members believe to be central, 
distinctive and enduring. A distinction can be drawn between three different 
kinds of identity: (1) the identity of an organisation, (2) the identity of people 
within an organisation and (3) people’s identification with organisations (Gioia et 
al., 2000).  
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The identity of an organisation emerges similar to the organisation as such. 
Albert and Whetten (1985) remarked that the foundation of a company is an 
instance when identity issues become salient. By definition, an organisation does 
not have an identity before it comes into being. Thus, the possibility of having a 
new venture without an identity does not exist. Continuing this line of argument, 
there would be no organisation without organising, hence no organisational 
identity would emerge or be constructed. It therefore means that in the moment 
organising starts, an identity emerges, hence organising as identity construction. 
However, this point has not yet been made in entrepreneurship research but 
seems to be vital as it stresses the importance of organising in new ventures. 
It is important to remember that this study deals with the identities of recently 
founded organisations. While reference to the firm’s history usually is an 
important part of organisational identity, the identity of start-ups cannot be based 
on such a heritage. Kimberly (1979) pointed at the founders and their ideas as 
they are especially important for the organisation’s identity in its beginning 
phase. In the course of the organisation’s development, this influence however 
diminishes as organising processes are designed to remove the equivocality that 
is attached to individual personalities. But in the earliest phase, the founders’ 
intentions and ideas have far-reaching implications on the development of the 
new venture’s identity emergence.  
 
talk-to-me.com’s founding team was probably the least business oriented of all 
four cases studied. Their main intention was to stay and work together as a team 
and to commercialise the technology. The wish to grow fast or to gain a lot of 
money was not their main focus. As long as everyone would be able to work in 
that company, earn money and things were running smoothly, everyone was 
presumed to be happy. Their identity at the time of foundation can be 
characterised by the notion of community. The diametric opposite pole is 
letters.de. For its founders, this internet-hype was a possibility to earn money 
quickly and at the same time, it was trendy to be part of the hype. For them it was 
a chance to test whether they liked being an entrepreneur, thus founding a 
company, being a manager and running a business. They were aware that quite a 
lot of these new ventures were not successful and would die early on. With their 
academic and consultancy background they had ideas and knowledge how to 
manage a company efficiently and successfully. Nevertheless, as it was a bit of a 
game, it was also supposed to be fun and reflect the current hype atmosphere of 
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that industry. For letters.de, professionalisation and fun are the key notions. 
technology.com is an example for an accidental founding. Without the external 
stimulus, i.e. the conversation between the business plan manager and the 
Professor or the business plan competition prize, they would have not thought 
about founding a venture. As all the founders had a technical background, it was 
a challenge whether their developed technology would stand the commercial test. 
For them, the notion proof of technology is characteristic. Last is x-it.com which 
happened to be founded incrementally. Two buddies realised that they can earn 
money by founding a business. They then simply kept it going alongside to their 
university studies. They had no idea what would happen after their graduation, so 
they gave it a chance. And beside, so many other people seemed to founding 
their little company, too. It was just the spirit of the time. Thus Why not us? and 
let’s try and see are their notions.  
 
These different intentions and notions influenced the ventures’ further 
development in terms of organising and identity. The community aspect at talk-
to-me.com is obvious in many ways. After the majority of the founders had 
started working at the company and after the first external employees had been 
hired, the founders decided to integrate and involve them stronger by giving them 
company shares. This automatically enlarged the core, their main decision-taking 
body. It was ten people meeting and discussing the major topics concerning the 
company, its strategy, decisions and further actions. This community identity can 
also be seen by having employed a disabled employee who runs errands and 
organises lunch and tidies the kitchen. The kitchen played an important role, too. 
It was a large room with a long table with space for everyone and a central 
communication point. At least once a week, the whole company was cooking and 
having lunch together. The founders emphasised the special company spirit 
whenever possible as it meant a lot to them. This resulted in a good integration of 
new organisational members. They tried to be on familiar terms with everyone. It 
was so important to them that they thought about creating a brochure covering 
the company history and its spirit. This would then be handed out to new 
employees. Thus the talk-to-me.com founders realised and lived their intentions. 
letters.de started very business orientated by immediately substituting the fifth 
founder who dropped out just before the incorporation. As they had decided to 
have five founders, they were committed to do so. Compared to the other three 
ventures, letters.de introduced formal rules e.g. holiday slips or meetings with a 
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protocol very early. They were also the ones who implemented financial ratios to 
allow for controlling their actions and strategies. But they also aimed at 
conveying a relaxed working atmosphere and being one of these hip new 
ventures. Playing basketball on the deck roof was all right, however, they soon 
restricted it to the late afternoon as it distracted the others. The organising 
processes in technology.com can all be related to technological developments and 
aspects. In contrast to setting up organisational aspects, technological procedures 
were defined and modules developed. R&D was the focus of everything. x-it.com 
appeared to have started rather unsystematically. It began with the two buddies 
not really knowing what their USP was. To improve the situation, they 
participated at the business plan seminar and ex-post wrote a plan which served 
to rationalise and legitimate certain actions, e.g. that they already had employed a 
designer and a team assistant. These random actions continued, e.g. the way they 
got their first deals. They acted very intuitive and tried to find the rationale for it 
afterwards.  
 
These vignettes illustrate how the founders’ initial intentions were reflected in 
their organising. Their intentions and ideas are clearly depicted in the emerging 
venture’s identity. But it is only through organising that an identity is formed. 
Every organising activity either strengthens or slightly changes the identity. 
However, the founders’ influence relatively decreased after the first employees 
have been recruited. The act of recruiting itself made the founders aware of the 
identity topic. And as a result, each new employee was a new influence on 
identity.  
 
All four ventures were not only influenced by their employees but also by 
society. They were confronted with people’s general image of start-ups44 instead 
of their own specific identity. This was most obvious regarding the number of 
job applications when having advertised open positions. It proved to be difficult 
to find good and qualified employees. And this was not only due to the general 
economic situation and the lack of qualified personnel in general, but because of 
the identity a start-up has in general. This can also be characterised as ‘liability of 
newness’ although with a different connotation than Stinchcombe (1965) used it. 
                                              
44 Hatch and Schultz (2000) speak of an organisation’s image if concerned with the external 
perspective. 
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This liability is due to the existing uncertainty the environment perceives 
(Kimberly, 1979) regarding new organisations. The environment had hardly an 
image or knowledge about the venture. Neither had the latter proved to be viable. 
The ventures were aware that they were not able to compete with established and 
well known companies. They lacked the (imagined) stability and job security an 
established company can offer and which most job seekers prefer. And their 
salaries are not as high as in incumbent companies, neither do they offer extra 
social benefits. The new ventures tried to compensate it in two ways. The first is 
by giving shares to the employees or implementing a stock-option program. The 
second way sounds paradox but is by praising the start-up identity and 
atmosphere. Especially younger applicants fancy the seemingly relaxed and easy 
going atmosphere and the chance to be part of this internet hype. At least that is 
the people’s general identification with new ventures.  
 
Although it was difficult to build up quickly an external image, the ventures tried 
differently to create an internal common identity. The examples depicted that 
there are several organising aspects which lead to a common identity within the 
new venture. This is true for the identity among the founders as well the identity 
among all employees.  
It seemed useful for the founders to first follow the same line and have a 
common perception of the identity among themselves. The most important 
organising mechanism for this were regular meetings. Despite the fact, that 
meetings were used for discussing specific problems and taking decisions, they 
more or less unconsciously fulfilled a second purpose. As the founders were 
mostly inexperienced in managing a company and how to deal with situations of 
being an entrepreneur, those meetings can be regarded as an enabler for the 
construction of identity. A frequent and thorough communication between the 
founders led to unifying identities. This was especially important in the 
beginning of a new venture so that all founders headed in the same directions to 
ensure similar answers to individual questions. Divergent ideas can help in the 
sense of brainstorming and gaining ideas, but such a fragile construction of an 
organisation in its early days easily breaks apart. The venture builds its identity 
by making a choice from the multiplicity of meanings available to them. This 
was solved differently at the four examined companies. letters.de’s founders first 
created a common identity during their Monday meetings. And afterwards they 
spread it via the mouth-to-mouth method and later via the general meeting to 
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everyone. This contrasts x-it.com whose founders hardly talked issues over 
amongst themselves but rather preferred everyone’s opinion during their weekly 
meeting. However, they faced the difficulty that the three founders were very 
different in character and hardly knew each other. It took them quite long to form 
a team if they succeeded at all. But when they were forced to represent one 
opinion, it was difficult to come to terms. Both their complementarities and their 
differences became increasingly disadvantageous with time. In order to reduce 
uncertainty, it could have been better to meet more among themselves to discuss 
things first. At talk-to-me.com, a multiplicity of meanings existed within the 
large core which made a consensus very difficult. Although they officially had 
the position of a CEO, he was very consensus-orientated and it was more of an 
alibi-function. As they all knew each other from before, a common identity 
emerged quickly. In addition, their long planning period before the actual 
foundation helped, too. As the departments were all led by founders, the 
distribution of the identity happened automatically. At technology.com, one voice 
after the other tuned in as they did not all start at the same time. This was 
because the management positions were filled one after the other. It was 
therefore a bit more difficult to build a common identity among the management 
team as the team was partitioned. They had a weekly management meeting, too. 
However, the biggest problem was the CEO who mainly worked as a Professor 
and was sitting at the university rather than at the company’s premises. This 
certainly hindered communication.  
Despite the way how the four ventures handled the identity topic, it clearly 
depicts that identity is created through individuals’ interactions within a social 
context (Czarniawska et al., 1998; Weick, 1995). Regarding the four cases, 
meetings and daily conversations play the most important role. This finding 
specifies Davies and Harré’s (1991) study who argued that this process takes 
place in all interactions.  
 
Not only the management but the whole company needed time and possibilities 
to build a common identity by enacting their environment. Stories played an 
important role in that process. These manifest identity which is easy to transmit. 
A strong and unambiguous identity was especially important in the beginning as 
it can substitute lacking organising processes. This strengthens Heidenreich and 
Töpsch (1998) argues that images, metaphors and stories fulfil central 
coordination- and legitimating functions, too. However, they have not looked at 
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new ventures in particular. The technology.com’s case clearly underlines this. 
One founder told how the strong identity with the venture and its resulting 
community among the organisational members solved many organising problems 
in the beginnings. When this community dissolved due to too many new 
employees which had not been integrated quickly enough, structural deficiencies 
became obvious. Rather than improving and ‘repairing’ the community, the 
management implemented more formalised structures and procedures. However, 
these formalised structures diminished again after the community improved. This 
is in line with Albert and Whetten (2000) who have pointed at the importance of 
having built an internalised or cognitive identity of what the organisation stands 
for and where it intends to go. This is clearly mirrored in the cases I studied. An 
existing sense of the organisation’s identity is crucial for its organising. 
The negative aspects of an identity which is not shared by everyone can be seen 
at x-it.com. The venture’s identity was not clear, neither to the founders nor to the 
employees. The company had set up three different business units, but no one 
knew how to make an organisational identity of it. The employees did not know 
where the company was heading towards. The employees were very unsure about 
their acting and organising. It shows how the employees have difficulties making 
sense of the situations, especially as they do not have a strong organisation’s 
identity. Huff and Sarason (1999) showed similar results in connection with 
making sense of paradox and complexity. It can therefore be argued that an 
organisation’s identity is crucial in the beginning as it helps the employees to 
face uncertain decisions they have to take every day. If the overall picture is 
missing, the organising process falls apart and counteracting decisions will be 
taken.  
 
This shows how an organisation’s identity is especially important in the absence 
of bureaucratic structures. In such cases, the identity may substitute missing 
organisational structures, e.g. rules and procedure. This is in line with Bartunek 
(1984) who stated that the loss of shared interpretative schemata can be 
overcome by structures. However, he only considered it in connection with the 
contact between organisational members and the management. This study shows 
that the importance should be extended to all other organising aspects as well. 
 
Previous research has come up with findings on the interrelationship of action 
and organisation identity. Much stress lies on the role of identity as setting, 
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enabling or constraining guidelines for action (Ashforth & Mael, 1996; Bartunek, 
1984; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Reger et al., 1994). Some of this can be seen 
above. However, I would like to emphasise the interrelated identity-organising 
relationship. Organisational identities are the result of plans and ideas on the one 
hand and emergent organising on the other. Consequently, identity at a specific 
point in time does not only precede organising, it itself is preceded by organising 
which it has to relate to. As an analogy to Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel 
(1999), identity follows organising and organising follows identity like one foot 
follows the other. Thus, there should be a stronger focus on the interrelatedness 
of being and organising in entrepreneurship literature. Who you are is not 
dissociated from what you do, as shown with the cases studied. A stronger 
emphasis on context in identity research seems necessary. It is not sufficient to 
see what kind of identities are constructed. We should also consider much more 
that identities are constructed of organising, thus how they are constructed. 
 
7.5 Organising as a game  
After having discussed organising as enacting dualities, organising as the context 
of entrepreneurial behaviour and organising as identity construction, this last 
organising principal will treat organising as a metaphor for playing a game.45 The 
use of a metaphor in organising theory is well known since Morgans’s book 
‘Images of Organizations’ (Morgan, 1986). He stated that “by building on the 
use of metaphor, we have a means of enhancing our capacity of creative yet 
disciplined thought […]. And in doing so, I believe that we can find new ways of 
organizing and new ways of approaching and solving organizational problems” 
(1986: 17). However, the use of metaphors has hardly been applied in 
entrepreneurship research so far. But metaphors are especially useful for studying 
people’s attitudes and thought processes (Hyrsky, 1999). “A metaphor is a figure 
of speech in which a term is transferred from the object it ordinarily designated 
to an object it may designate by implicit comparison or by analogy” (Hyrsky, 
1999: 15). Metaphors represent the subset of cognitive and perceptual factors that 
                                              
45 This metaphor should not be linked to game theory which is a branch of mathematical 
analysis developed to study the rational behaviour for interactive decision problems in 
conflict situations. In a game, several agents strive to maximise their (expected) utility index 
by choosing particular courses of action, and each agent's final utility payoffs depend on the 
profile of courses of action chosen by all agents. For a concise overview, see zu Knyphausen-
Aufseß (1995: Ch. 2.13).  
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are salient to it. And they enable us to talk about experiences which cannot be 
literally described. Last, through imagery they provide a vivid, memorable and 
emotion-arousing representation of perceived experience. 
As a result of the four case studies, I would like to introduce the metaphor of 
organising as a game. This metaphor has not received a lot of attention so far, 
e.g. Morgan did not use it as one of his eight metaphors in his book. However, he 
mentioned it in his bibliographic notes: “organizational activity can be 
understood as the playing of a game” (1986: 361) but he did not further 
elaborate on it. I will first analyse the game metaphor in more detail and show 
why the cases support this metaphor. Secondly, I will argue why such a metaphor 
is useful for understanding new ventures and their organising processes.  
 
The metaphor of a game has many facets which can be transferred to an 
organisation, its members and their activities. Organising is like playing a game 
and the organisational members such as founders, managers and employees are 
like actors who play different roles in that game. The participants have primary 
and secondary roles and some actors may play a double role. However, if 
someone is playing a role no one is aware of or understands, it will lead to 
confusion because the other players have no possibility to expect certain 
behaviours and they have no clear picture of that person. This happened at x-
it.com where one founder changed his role depending on the situation: he was 
either an academic or one of the venture’s managers. Playing these different roles 
was so confusing that it was one of the reasons of his temporary resignation.  
During a venturing game, everyone is having dialogues with the others and 
sometimes the leaders hold monologues. Similar to different ways of organising, 
different games can be played: strategic games, fun games, knowledge games, 
team games or individual games. Actors are always involved in it. And the 
players involved can come and go as well. There are the type of players who are 
playing just for fun, others who are playing for money and some who always 
want to win. And there is a lot of improvising and directing. Someone has to take 
the decision which rules are to be applied. All these are different facets which are 
related to a game and which resemble aspects of organising in new ventures. 
Aspects such as chance, rules, roles, fun and other associative notions of a game 
play a role in the new ventures’ organising. Some of them will be described 
further in the next section. 
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Already the economic times during which these and many more ventures in 
Germany have been founded, can be linked to the metaphor. The late 1990’s are 
called the ‘internet hype’ times and during that period, venture capital became 
available in Germany and many governmental financial support programmes had 
been set up to foster foundations. In the end it assumed bizarre, nearly alarming 
proportions. It became a sort of fashion to found a venture and to become an 
entrepreneur. University students wrote business plans in seminars and graduates 
were encouraged to found a venture. The actual (financial) risk to found a 
venture decreased considerably. Looking back, many of the founding teams 
regarded their entrepreneurial venture as an adventure or as a game, i.e. it was 
easy to get money and even easier to spend it. This was fostered by everyone’s 
attitude that the internet-boom was cool and why should they not give it a try as 
well. So many were founding a venture, that the impression of it being really 
easy emerged. It was just as easy as playing ludo. The following cartoon conveys 
the atmosphere prevailing during the internet hype time.  
 
Figure 20: A week’s schedule of a serial founder 
 
On Monday, I‘ll have an idea. On 
Tuesday, I‘ll found the company. On 
Wednesday, I‘ll find myself an investor. 
On Thursday, I‘ll go public.  On Friday, 
I‘ll sell everything so that I‘ll have 
enough dosh for the weekend.
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The founders of letters.de and x-it.com stated explicitly that they wanted to be 
part of that hype and found a venture, too. A sort of ‘me-too’ effect arose. The 
founders of letters.de had been coming from an environment in which others had 
founded well known start-ups, e.g. onvista.com, alando.de or urbia.com. In short, 
founding a company seemed to be something very normal and it seemed to be 
more like a game, i.e. hardly any risk, always determinable, a high degree of 
freedom, lots of creativity and a high chance of winning. The same is true for x-
it.com. As the general societal attitude was characterised by a ‘lightness of being 
and founding’46, they regarded it as being cool when founding a company. They 
had this attitude of ‘Why not give it a try?’. As one of the founders had followed 
a course at the university about theory and practice of founding a company, they 
even were under the impression that they knew what they were doing.  
However, if one wants to play a game, one needs others to play with for most 
kind of games. During the internet time, most ventures were founded by a team 
(e.g. Bronner et al., 2000). The four ventures in this study had teams of three, of 
five, of six and of eight founders. Especially with talk-to-me.com, it seemed as if 
everyone who wanted to join the ‘expedition’ could have done so. Thus they 
ended up having a team of eight. They appointed one team member as CEO, 
three as department heads and the others were normal employees. Creating a 
management team with equal rights had not occurred to them. In contrast to this, 
letters.de had good reasons for starting with five founders, whereas talk-to-
me.com had not thought about the implications of the number of founders.  
When playing a game, actors can set new rules every time they play. But certain 
basic rules always exist with every kind of game and can hardly be overlooked or 
neglected. A venture cannot change its rules every day, but it should nevertheless 
be aware of the game specific rules of e.g. the industry, the company or its 
members. Otherwise, they will face problems when its members behave to wrong 
or outdated rules. Such a rule was broken by one of x-it.com’s employees when 
pornographic material was found on his hard disk. The consequence was to lay 
him off. A new venture does not make all rules explicit. Nevertheless, everyone 
knows what is acceptable and what is not. Everyone has the basic rules in mind 
from similar games played previously. However, this also explains why only 
young people worked at the four ventures. There seem to be differences between 
different generations in the games played. One founder of x-it.com mentioned 
                                              
46 This phrase follows Kundera’s book “The Unbearable Lightness of Being“ (1984) 
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that he will not hire older applicants as they do not know how to play the game. 
Thus one way to organise seems to be linked to the organisational members’ 
mentality which depends upon their age.  
 
Despite the metaphorical associations, games as such played also a role in the 
venture’s development which was typical for the start-ups at that times. x-it.com 
had a tabletop football in their office. Within the first six months, different teams 
had emerged. Later on, in their second year, the management thought of 
something which would result in a better team spirit and foster togetherness. 
They proposed to go bowling once a month. Although it was on a voluntary 
basis, peer pressure led to numerous appearance. One of the founders compared it 
with his football experience where important issues are pondered after the game 
over beer. Going bowling would serve the same purpose. The management used 
it as a special organising tool and not only to have fun together. To letters.de’s 
office belonged a huge roof-deck on which the employees fixed a basketball rim. 
They had put up a tabletop football, too. So the employees would go outside 
playing a bit or do some shots if they had some free minutes or needed 
refreshment. The games did not only foster team spirit but also underlined the 
ventures’ identity of being young, unconventional. Work should not have this 
connotation of seriousness and duty. Everyone should be able to relax for a few 
minutes in between.  
 
The metaphor is especially fruitful for describing the initial organising of the 
founders and the ventures coming into being. However, the founders sooner or 
later had to realise that managing a new venture is more than a game. One 
founder of x-it.com described it well when acknowledging that they left the 
children’s playground after having set up the company contract. The game 
metaphor is good for arguing the beginning and the kick-off phase. But this early 
phase should end at a certain point in the company’s development as otherwise 
the company shows no learning capacities. It is like with games themselves. As a 
kid, games are everything and of high importance. When growing up and later 
when being an adult, games do still exist however of different importance. They 
have made room for maybe less creative and entertaining but nevertheless 
important processes. So finally the management needs to be aware that founding 
a venture is more than playing games. The process of ending the game could be 
initiated by someone challenging the organising rules which is then the trigger 
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for developing onto another logical level (Bateson, 1972: Ch. III-2). One might 
eventually continue with the game, however with differently negotiated rules. 
Marshak (1993) concluded his study that any change pursued in a company 
should be synchronised with the metaphorical language. Thus the founders 
should focus their attention and language and use words with which they like to 
convey the different organising processes.  
 
Another additional aspect why the metaphor of a game is so fruitful when 
analysing organising processes, is its inherent notion of creativity. Games are 
generally be seen as an act of creativity (cf. Bateson, 1972). This aspect should 
be more integrated in entrepreneurship. Hood and Young (1993) have pointed at 
creativity as one possible characteristic founders should have. Entrepreneurship 
is a creative act whereby people partly generate their own world and rules. This 
is mirrored in the entrepreneurs’ stories. These are stories of people who believed 
in their own power of production and creation. It is not so much how to organise 
production, but how to produce or make the organisation.  
Creativity is a concept known in organisation theory for a long time (e.g. 
Woodman et al., 1993; West & Farr, 1992). My intention is to further integrate it 
into entrepreneurship. The idea of the concept of play in connection with an 
organisation is sometimes difficult to imagine as work and play have traditionally 
been kept separate. But creative organising is an act of playing. This is also 
found in Huizinga’s book Homo Ludens (1998): “Culture comes into existence in 
play form, culture is in the first place played. (…) That does not mean that the 
play changes into culture or dwells in it, but rather, that culture in its formatory 
phase has the character of a play and is formed by play-like forms and 
attitudes”. The key for a new venture coming into being is playing and the 
continuing creation of a context of playing. In this sense, playing is a social and 
organising process.  
 
In the end, many of the new ventures of the entrepreneurship wave that had been 
founded during the internet hype in Germany, disappeared by the end of 2001. 
Their game was over. But was it really just a game? 
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8 Conclusions and implications  
This last chapter serves to sum up the findings of the previous discussion chapter 
and to describe them in terms of meta finings. In addition, theoretical and 
practical implications will be given and finally, some critical reflections upon the 
study will be drawn.  
 
8.1 Meta findings 
This study set out to explore, describe and analyse the organising processes in 
new ventures. To grasp different organising processes, I conducted an explorative 
case study comparing four internet-based new ventures and analysed their 
coming into being and their first two to three years after being founded.  
 
The findings show that organising processes are crucial, but too little emphasised 
in entrepreneurship theory. The stories plainly told how important the different 
organising processes were for the venture and its development. They had a large 
impact on the ventures’ growth and development later on. Many of traditional 
organisation theories are principally useful, however, resulting in little insights 
regarding new venture organising. This is due to the fact that most of the theories 
and concepts are constructed for larger and much more matured organisations 
which show a very different and much more diversified organising landscape 
than recently founded ventures. The underlying assumption when applying such 
theories to new ventures is that these theories either fit small ventures or that 
managers need to implement their concepts in order to grow and succeed. Too 
little considerations have been uttered regarding the idea that new ventures might 
need different theories and concepts. Although organisation theory does by 
definition comprehend all forms of organisations at all stages, one should cut out 
organisations coming into being and their beginning. This phase of an 
organisation is better covered by entrepreneurship theory. Second, traditional 
theory is too often static and focused on stability. As new ventures have to 
survive in a rapidly changing environment, stability can hardly be found at the 
ventures and should neither be the aim. Thus, dynamic approaches should be 
applied much more when analysing new ventures.  
 
Growth models represent a research field in which organisation and 
entrepreneurship research is combined. Those models explicitly acknowledge 
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that a company is not born big but rather grows with time. (If it grows at all and 
does not stay small). These models are a good guideline to get an idea what 
problems and phases a new venture might face in its next ten to fifteen years. 
However, this study shows, that these models are kept far too general for 
generating more insights in organising processes. The growth models point at 
objectively perceivable and measurable aspects which do not allow for a 
relational perspective on organising. In addition, their underlying assumptions 
contradicted the ventures’ actual developments so strongly that their explanatory 
power should be questioned.  
 
The empirical findings resulted in four organising principles which emerged 
from the cases.  
1. organising as enacting dualities,  
2. organising as the context of entrepreneurial behaviour,  
3. organising as identity construction and  
4. organising as a game. 
 
The four organising principles all exerted a large impact on the development of 
the four ventures. By developing organising principles, the focus is clearly set on 
a process perspective on organisations rather than a static one. Following Weick, 
the study shows that organising is understood as an activity which is achieved in 
and through cognitive and social processes. Organising in new ventures starts 
from scratch as the company has no history to base its values or identities on. 
This calls for a stronger communication of intentions and aims by the founders to 
compensate the lack. This is closely linked to another result which shows that 
each founders’ intentions, aims and visions in a small venture are of much more 
important compared to established or large organisations. They are directly 
reflected in the emerging organising activities. In order to foster a smooth 
development, the founders in a team based venture have to be aware and 
communicate each other’s intentions and aims as otherwise they will act against 
each other. These intentions will merge into the venture’s initial identity before 
the latter is being influenced by operational activities and the employees. The 
identity of the new venture is so important because it can substitute structures 
which are not yet in place in the new venture. The founders should be aware of 
this as many of them are hesitant regarding fixing structures. This enables them 
to keep organising processes albeit avoiding fixed structures.  
 
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES  196 
 
 
Organising in new ventures means knowing how to deal with dualities. The study 
has shown that dualities, paradoxes and dilemmas emerge form the beginning on. 
Especially in the uncertain and unsettling times of the beginning, dualities are an 
important factor for the development. These are dualities on the venture’s 
identity or dilemmas between an entrepreneurial and a professional management 
style. But in contrast to problems which can be solved as such, dualities are 
different. The management needs to deal with both poles at the same time and 
needs to try to combine them simultaneously. Deciding for only one or the other 
pole is the least helpful solution as seen in the study.  
 
The impact of organising as the entrepreneurial context has hardly been paid 
attention to in entrepreneurship research. In contrast to most studies, the impact 
of the inner rather than the outer context on entrepreneurial behaviour has been 
addressed in this study. The four cases reveal the large impact of the inner 
context on organising. The inner factors which shape the entrepreneurial 
behaviour deviate strongly from one venture to the other. This contrasts the outer 
context which is similar to those ventures founded at the same time in the same 
region. Inner context factors, however, vary considerably from venture to venture 
because these are influencing factors such as processes already in place, 
constituting factors or founders’ and members’ experiences or abilities. But the 
founders are hardly aware of these influences which makes it much more 
important to point them out. This inner context acts like a ‘duality of organising’, 
as organising defines the inner context of entrepreneurial behaviour and at the 
same time is influenced by it. It is likewise the mediator and the means. To a 
certain extent, this also touches upon path dependence logic, however, on an 
organisational rather than a technological level. The importance of organising as 
the inner context of entrepreneurial behaviour needs to be stressed because it 
exerts a much stronger influence on new ventures than established organisation. 
This is because there are so few fixed processes and structures in place which can 
act as a strong context on organising. 
 
Finally, the metaphor of organising as a game has been introduced. The cases 
show that this metaphor is well applicable on different levels. Different kinds of 
games, of actors and of settings were identified which can be transferred to the 
ventures. In addition, the metaphor allows for interpreting the general economic 
and societal situation. The game metaphor is good for understanding organising 
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processes in the beginning and the kick-off phase of new ventures. Especially 
seemingly non-rational behaviour of the founders can be explained. Although 
some of the founders saw the venturing experience as a game, it should 
nevertheless be clear that it is not one.  
 
8.2 Implications for new venture founders  
As the study is being based on social constructivism, the researcher’s aim by 
conducting such a study is to add to the conversation that is going on in an 
organisation. By raising my voice and uttering my perspective, I can attempt to 
make the actors involved reconsider their actions and thoughts. One way of doing 
so is by developing a self-reflective questionnaire which aims at raising the 
different organising issues that have been studied. The overarching point for new 
venture founders is to be more aware of their organising activities and processes. 
The latter have by far a greater impact than most of them acknowledge. As the 
founding team is the basis of the venture and reason for initial organising, a great 
importance is attached to it. Many organising aspects emerge, often 
unconsciously, however, this should not be the case with the founding team. 
Choosing one’s future partners should be done carefully. Next to work 
experience, education and abilities, the founders should be aware of each others 
intentions and aims which they link with the venture. Why does everyone want to 
found the venture? What is each one’s motivation behind it? What are everyone’s 
time horizon? These are important questions which need to be addressed in 
advance as they have far reaching implications on the venture’s organising.  
 
Thinking in terms of training or consultancy, communication among the founders 
has been seen to be one of the most important aspects in constructing a new 
venture. One aim of trainings and consulting is that the utmost effort is done to 
communicate in clearly defined terms. Comprehensibility is the norm, the ideal. 
However, this implies that it is never admitted that meaning is equivocal and 
multivoiced. Rather than setting comprehensibility and unambiguousness as the 
goal, the management should be trained in how to deal with the equivocality of 
meanings. So far, communication is seen as the message between sender and 
receiver, but this tends to lead to a disadvantageous reductionism. Allowing for 
different voices could enable founders and employees alike to better construct 
organising mechanisms and identities and to better understand the organising 
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processes. And this in turn would foster creativity and play which is seen a an 
important factor in entrepreneurship.  
 
One implication derived from the study concerns public opinion and universities. 
In late 1999, the internet hype had taken bizarre forms. The impression was 
prevailing that everyone could easily found a venture, get venture capital, start 
and manage a company. This was certainly not true and changed in the 
subsequent years again. However, a dilemma arose. Should one try to emphasise 
the difficulties in founding and managing a venture? Thus fostering 
entrepreneurship education? Should one restrain young people and graduates 
from founding their venture straight after leaving university? Or, and this is the 
other pole of the dilemma, should one be glad about all those new ventures? 
Quite a high percentage of them will need to file for bankruptcy sooner or later, 
but some will stay, grow and generate new jobs. Should we not foster creativity 
and play and new ventures even if they seem crazy because one never knows 
how they will develop and maybe prosper? As seen above, this duality cannot be 
solved but its tension should be kept and thought about.  
 
8.3 Reflections on the study and proposals for further research 
Every study has its limitations. There is nothing such as the ‘perfect’ study. The 
limitations will depend upon the deliberate and unconscious choices taken. Some 
limitations concern the research approach. Having chosen case study research has 
certain unavoidable limitations in itself. Some of these were already mentioned 
in the methodological chapter. One limitation of the study is that no employees 
nor even a sample of the employees have been included in the study. It would 
therefore be interesting to draw an even larger picture of the organisational 
developments and the organising principles in these new ventures by enlarging 
the people interviewed per company. Albeit the interviews showed a certain 
degree of diminishing marginal utility which justifies the number of interviews 
taken per company as being appropriate.  
The interviews taken largely rely upon reflections, recalled events and 
impressions. There is always the problem of biasing. A more ethnographical 
study would have overcome some of these difficulties and would have been an 
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interesting alternative.47 However, it seems nevertheless appropriate to have 
chosen the case study approach. Having tried to interview all founders of each 
company aimed at adjusting impressions and different perspectives in order to 
get a broader and more accurate picture. This helped to validate self-perceived 
measures to a greater extent possible.  
With this study, some light has been shed on organising in new ventures. I hope 
that future research my be able to build on the results, especially the four 
organising processes identified. This would advance our knowledge in organising 
in new ventures and possibly confirm, refine or dispute the results made in this 
study. As the study has been explanatory in nature and chosen a qualitative, 
interpretative approach, a similar study carried out by different researchers or in 
different settings would be interesting. This would enable additional organising 
processes to be identified. Not until this, a quantitative and larger study seems 
reasonable to test the results. The outcomes of such a study would then be 
regarded as hypotheses for further testing.  
 
All four companies, except letters.de which had been sold successfully to a 
competitor, were still active on the market at the end of this study. As this study 
has covered the first two to three years of the initial development of the 
company, a follow up would be interesting. How and why do the importance or 
intensity of the four organising processes vary over time? How do the founders 
manage and cope with issues after more routines have emerged and after they 
gained more experience?  
A related question has to do with the fact, that this study concentrated on new 
ventures that had been founded by a team. An interesting comparison would be 
to run the study on companies founded by a single founder and then to analyse 
the differences. This would give more insights into the complex field of the 
founder’s impact on a company’s development versus environmental or 
industrial influences.  
Moreover, future studies should develop concepts and methods to make 
entrepreneurs more aware about organising and organisational matters. The study 
has shown the importance of these processes, however, these hardly gain 
                                              
47 Some researchers even argue that new methods are needed to conduct such studies (Van de 
Ven, 1992; Argyris, 1968). 
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attention in entrepreneurship education or consulting. It seems necessary to 
change this in order to foster more successful and stable new ventures.  
All of these questions represent interesting courses for further research. Their 
contributions would extent knowledge in the area of entrepreneurship, 
organisation behaviour and especially organising processes.  
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Appendix 
 
List of interview partners 
Interview partners at technology.com 
Name Position within company Date 
Michael COO 18. December 2001 
Michael (2) COO 08. January 2002 
Michael (3) COO 22. February 2002 
Simon CTO 29. July 2002 
Johannes Senior Consultant 26. August 2002 
 
Interview partners at letters.de 
Name Position within company Date 
Benedikt Managing Director  21. September 2001 
Benedikt (2) Managing Director  20. June 2002 
Hartmut Managing Director  20. June 2002 
Matthias Managing Director 17. July 2002 
Franz Managing Director 14. August 2002 
 
Interview partners at x-it.com 
Name Position within company Date 
Thorsten Managing Director (Technology) 22. February 2002 
Jan Partner 22. February 2002 
Martin Managing Director (Administration) 05. June 2002 
 
Interview partners at talk-to-me.com 
Name Position within company Date 
Paul Head of Business Developing 06. August 2002 
Felix Head of R&D 14. August 2002 
Monika Head of HRM 14. August 2002 
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Summary in German∗ 
Die Entrepreneurship Forschung ist in Deutschland seit dem Aufkommen des 
Internet-Hypes und den vermehrten Firmengründungen Ende der 90er Jahre in 
das Blickfeld der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Forschung gerückt. Ein kaum 
beachteter Aspekt in diesem Feld sind organisationsbezogene Fragen bei jungen 
Unternehmen. Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich daher mit Prinzipien des 
Organisierens in internet-basierten jungen Unternehmen. Der Ausgangspunkt 
war die Feststellung, dass die vorhandene Organisationsliteratur fast aus-
schließlich für schon bestehende und größere Unternehmen konzipiert wurde. 
Neu gegründete und kleinere Unternehmen sind selten der Forschungs-
gegenstand. Vor allem auch vor dem Hintergrund der hohen Insolvenzquote bei 
neu gegründeten Unternehmen in den ersten Jahren stellt sich die Frage, 
inwieweit das eigene Organisationsverhalten als ein Erfolgsfaktor gesehen 
werden kann. Eine weitere Überlegung war, dass kleine, neu gegründete 
Unternehmen ein anderes Organisationsverhalten zeigen als größere, schon 
bestehende Unternehmen.  
 
Als theoretische Grundlage der Arbeit wurde ein Überblick über die aktuelle 
Organisationstheorie und Entrepreneurship Forschung gegeben. Insbesondere 
wurden die Schnittpunkte beider Forschungsgebiete ausgearbeitet und 
dargestellt. Die sich daraus ergebenden Forschungsfragen umfassen die 
Entstehung von Prinzipien des Organisierens in neuen Unternehmen sowie die 
Übertragbarkeit von traditioneller Organisationstheorie auf junge Unternehmen 
und ihre Organisationsprozesse.  
Aufgrund des explorativen Charakters der Forschungsfragen ist ein qualitativer 
Forschungsansatz mit insgesamt vier Fallstudien gewählt worden. Die vier 
untersuchten jungen Unternehmen wurden im Jahre 1999 oder 2000 durch Teams 
von bis zu acht Personen gegründet und sind in der Internet-Branche tätig. Die 
Gründer waren entweder Universitätsabsolventen kurz nach dem Abschluss oder 
Doktoranden als sie in die neu gegründeten Unternehmen einstiegen. Dadurch 
sollte eine starke Prägung durch vorherige Unternehmenskulturen vermieden 
werden. Die Unternehmen der vier Fallstudien wurden über einen Zeitraum von 
                                              
∗ Gemäß §6 Abs. 6 der Promotionsordnung der Fakultät Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften 
der Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg vom 14. Juli 1982, zuletzt geändert durch die „Siebte 
Änderungssatzung vom 02. April 2001“. 
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bis zu 15 Monaten beobachtet. Parallel wurden mit (fast) allen Gründern 
narrative Interviews durchgeführt, um die verschiedensten Facetten der 
Gründungsgeschichte und der Organisationsprozesse zu erfassen. Dieses 
Datenmaterial der Interviews zusammen mit umfangreicher Sekundärliteratur ist 
anschließend hinsichtlich der Organisationsprozesse und des Organisations-
verhaltens der jungen Unternehmen ausgewertet worden.  
 
Die Ergebnisse wurden anhand der traditionellen Organisationstheorie diskutiert, 
vor allem mit Wachstums- und Phasenmodellen sowie den Aston Studies. Die 
Grundzüge dieser Theorien konnten in den vier Fallstudienunternehmen 
ansatzweise aufgezeigt werden, jedoch war eine detaillierte Analyse der internen 
Organisationsprozesse und deren Entstehen nicht möglich. Es wurden daher vier 
Prinzipen des Organisierens entwickelt, die einen starken Einfluss auf das 
Organisationsverhalten und die Entwicklung junger Unternehmen haben. 
Organisieren wird dabei als eine Aktivität verstanden, die durch kognitive und 
soziale Prozesse zustande kommt. 
Um die von Anfang an auftretenden Dualitäten und Paradoxien in jungen 
Unternehmen berücksichtigen zu können, wurde das Prinzip des „Organisieren 
als Gestaltung von Dualitäten“ (organising as enacting dualities) entwickelt. 
Junge Unternehmen müssen sich mit spezifischen Dualitäten vom ersten Tag an 
auseinandersetzen, um beide Pole einer Dualität miteinander zu verbinden. Viele 
dieser Dualitäten beziehen sich auf die spezielle Situation junger Unternehmen. 
Hier ist z.B. die familiäre Atmosphäre zu nennen, die Ansprache mit Vornamen, 
durch die ein lockere Arbeitsumfeld erzeugt werden soll. Gleichzeitig gilt es aber 
auch, die Rolle des Vorgesetzten und Managers zu leben. Es wird gezeigt, wie 
ein Missachten dieser Dualitäten zu Problemen in der Organisationsentwicklung 
führen kann.  
Organisieren bildet die Grundlage für Zukunftsaktivitäten basierend auf der 
Geschichte des Unternehmen und seinen Erfahrungen mit früheren Aktivitäten. 
Daher wurde das Prinzip des „Organisieren als der Kontext von Gründungs-
verhalten“ (organising as the context for entrepreneurial behaviour) kreiert, da 
Organisieren Gründungverhalten sowohl ermöglicht als auch beschränkt. Die 
Besonderheit von jungen Unternehmen ist, dass diese bei Null anfangen und 
dadurch kein bestimmtes Organisationsmuster oder -verhalten vorherrschend ist. 
Der entstehende innere Kontext definiert und beeinflusst das Organisations-
verhalten wobei letzteres gleichzeitig wiederum den Kontext prägt. Hervor-
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zuheben ist dieser Aspekt deshalb, da er viel ausgeprägter ist als bei etablierten 
und großen Unternehmen. Diese sind wesentlich gefestigter in ihrer 
Organisationsstruktur und –verhalten. Viele der früh geschaffenen Strukturen 
und Prozesse haben unabhängig von ihrer eigentlichen Dauer einen bleibenden 
Einfluss auf das Organisationsverhalten der jungen Unternehmen.  
Eine weitere wichtige Erkenntnis ist die Entwicklung der Identität der jungen 
Unternehmen unter dem Prinzip des „Organisieren als Identitätsbildung“ 
(organising as identity construction). Dabei wurde besonders auf das Eigen- und 
Fremdbild eingegangen. Es werden verschiedene Organisationsmechanismen und 
ihre Auswirkungen auf die Identität dargestellt. Der Identitätsaspekt ist in Bezug 
auf das Organisationsverhalten bei jungen Unternehmen von entscheidender 
Bedeutung, da die Identität fehlende Koordinationsmechanismen kompensieren 
kann. Die Studie zeigt weiterhin, dass die ursprünglichen Unternehmens-
vorstellungen und -ideen der Gründer einen sehr starken Einfluss auf die 
Identitätsentwicklung des Unternehmens haben. Und die Identität wiederum 
prägt entscheidend das Organisationsverhalten des jungen Unternehmens mit.  
Als letztes Prinzip wurde „Organisieren als Spiel“ (organising as a game) 
entwickelt. Dieses Prinzip lässt sich in verschiedenen Ebenen auf das 
Organisationsverhalten von jungen Unternehmen übertragen. Hier sind speziell 
die Prozesse in der Frühphase der Gründung zu nennen. Während der Internet-
Hype-Phase waren viele Unternehmens-gründungen für den Gründer ein „Spiel“: 
es hat Spaß gemacht. Es bestand durch VC-Beteiligungen kaum ein finanzielles 
Risiko. Viele junge Leute gründeten Unternehmen, da durch das Internet neue 
Märkte geschafft wurden. Interne Spielregeln konnten selbst festgelegt werden 
und es herrschte eine freundschaftliche Atmosphäre vor. Die Schwierigkeiten 
ergaben sich erst beim Übergang von dieser spielerischen Phase zu mehr 
Professionalität oder wenn Spielregeln nicht festgelegt wurden. Die Studie zeigt 
auch die Rolle von Gemeinschaftsspielen auf, die vor allem dem Gemeinschafts- 
und Unternehmensgefühl dienen sollten.  
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